# AI Clarity

## Notes

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The idea behind this aff is that the US would cooperate with NATO on increasing clarity and transparency of AI and AI regulations- that could mean a variety of things. Info sharing between militaries, discussion and decision making around clarity on the legal and ethical frameworks of military AI.

The first advantage argues that a creation of a clarity doctrine is what’s needed in order to win the tech race with china and create an alternative to digital authoritarianism.

The basic spillover mechanism is trust- once transparency is created and set as a social norm, it would get through some of the roadblocks in AI development and innovation which accesses the second advantage.

## 1AC

### 1AC—Clarity

#### China is quickly catching up to U.S. in AI development- technological cooperation key to developing a strong government led strategy

**NSCAI 21** “final report” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence: Eric Schmidt (Chair) Safra Catz, Steve Chien, Mignon Clyburn, Chris Darby, Kenneth Ford, José-Marie Griffiths, Robert Work (Vice Chair), Eric Horvitz, Andrew Jassy, Gilman Louie, William Mark, Jason Matheny, Katharina McFarland, Andrew Moore https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf acd

The impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the world will extend far beyond narrow national security applications. The development of AI constitutes a new pillar of strategic competition, and it heightens the competition in existing pillars. The nation with the most resilient and productive economic base will be best positioned to seize the mantle of world leadership. That base increasingly depends on the strength of the innovation economy, which in turn will depend on AI. AI technologies will drive waves of advancement in critical infrastructure, commerce, transportation, health, education, financial markets, food production, and environmental sustainability. The race to research, develop, and deploy AI and associated technologies is already intensifying strategic competition. The U.S. government must embrace the AI competition and organize to win it. The American approach to innovation, which has served the country well for decades, must be recalibrated to account for the centrality of the competition involving AI and associated technologies to the emerging U.S.-China rivalry. To retain its innovation leadership and position in the world, the United States needs a stronger government-led technology strategy that integrates promotion and protection policies and links investments in AI to a larger constellation of related emerging technologies. This chapter articulates the nature of the AI competition and the two prerequisites for winning it: organizing for technology competition under White House leadership and establishing the principles for continued cooperation with competitors. The following chapters (10–16) enumerate the core elements of an integrated strategy and prescribe actions to ensure the United States wins the AI competition and sets the foundation to win the broader technology competition. It is foremost an affirmative agenda for growing and recruiting talent, promoting a diverse AI innovation ecosystem, and investing in the R&D to harness AI and associated technologies to build a healthier, more prosperous, and secure society. Protection of research, intellectual property (IP), and investments will be necessary to complement the effort to invigorate AI competitiveness at home and build a coalition of like-minded partners in the world. The U.S.-China AI Competition Is Serious and Complex. The leading indexes that measure progress in AI development generally place the United States ahead of China.2 However, the gap is closing quickly. China stands a reasonable chance of overtaking the United States as the leading center of AI innovation in the coming decade.3 In recent years, technology firms in China have produced pathfinding advances in natural language processing,4 facial recognition technology,5 and other AI-enabled domains. China’s businesses, investors, technologists, and academics are integral to global AI development. China’s social media and e-commerce companies compete for users around the world. Its telecoms build global 5G infrastructure. Its venture capitalists and large technology firms invest huge sums in new startups.6 Its leading AI companies have research labs in the United States7 and elsewhere.8 Its researchers produce a trove of respected AI papers that advance the field.9 None of this would concern us from a national security perspective, except for the fact that China is led by a single-party authoritarian regime that threatens American interests. China has moved more quickly and with more determination than the United States, guided by a constellation of AI plans for government ministries, universities, and companies.10 These strategic documents reflect Beijing’s view that advances in AI will fundamentally reshape military and economic competition in the coming decades.11 China has backed up its strategic plans with significant state subsidies to technology firms and academic institutions that engage in cutting-edge AI research.12 China preserves its capital by taking advantage of basic research done by the West so that it can focus more on applications. It pours significant sums of money into research and talent in relevant fields,13 and it promotes “national champion” companies to win markets abroad.14 Through its military-civil fusion programs, China has sought to integrate advances in AI from the commercial and academic worlds into military power.15 Using espionage, technology transfer programs, and targeted investment, Beijing seeks to acquire sensitive IP and data from the United States and other countries. The U.S.-China competition is complicated by the complex web of supply chains, research partnerships, and business relationships that link the world’s two AI leaders. Dramatic steps to sever these ties could be costly for Americans and reverberate across the world. The relationships between American and Chinese academics, innovators, and markets are deep, often mutually beneficial, and help advance the field of AI.17 Moreover, it remains in the U.S. national interest to leverage formal diplomatic dialogue about AI and other emerging technologies and to explore areas for cooperative AI projects that will benefit humanity.  The United States can compete against China without ending collaborative AI research and severing all technology commerce. Broad-based technological decoupling with China could deprive U.S. universities and companies of scarce AI and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent,18 sever American companies’ efficient supply chains,19 and cut off access to markets and capital for innovative firms.20 Instead, the United States should conceive of targeted disentanglement as just one element of its overall approach, which, if applied judiciously to key sectors, can help build U.S. technological resilience, reduce threats from illicit technology transfer, and protect national security–critical sectors.

#### (Tech race scenario)

#### AI is a crucial component of the US-China tech race—without a clear and transparent model of digital governance to oppose digital authoritarianism the US will lose the tech race and the world will fall to digital authoritarianism

Justin Sherman, 2019 (WIRED, Washington Post, The Atlantic, New America geopolitics contributor; New America; Chapter 3 “Why U.S.-China AI Competition Matters”,“Essay: Reframing the U.S.-China AI “Arms Race”; https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/why-us-china-ai-competition-matters//EF)

Competing AI development in the United States and**e** China needs to be reframed from the AI arms race rhetoric, but that doesn’t mean AI development itself doesn’t matter. In fact, the opposite is true. We are in an era of great power competition, and U.S. policymakers must pay greater attention to artificial intelligence development domestically and in China, primarily for two reasons. First, artificial intelligence will have a profound impact on state power, mainly through economic growth and enhanced military capability. Second, global leaders in AI will set norms around its use—and around the use of technology in society writ large—which will have important influence on other “undecided” states and the future international order. This is why American policymakers should focus on engaging with China on AI projects without giving up critical expertise or technologies that could potentially enhance harmful applications of artificial intelligence, whether they are in governance, business, or the military. An Era of Great Power Competition We are entering an era of great power competition, characterized by “struggle, change, competition, the use of force, and the organization of national resources to enhance state power.” Industrial productivity, science, and technology are critical in this struggle as well, notes international relations scholar Paul Kennedy.41 Indeed, that seems to be the case. Amidst a heap of articles on the death of the liberal world order,42 there is also much concern in the American national security arena around China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—what political scientist Amy Zegart refers to as the “big four” due to their various elements of state power and the threat vectors they present (nuclear risks, cyber risks, territorial aggression against U.S. allies, and disruption of the international order).43 The great power competition that Paul Kennedy identified from the twentieth century is back in full force.44 Artificial Intelligence and State Power Artificial intelligence is poised to contribute greatly to bolstering a developed nation’s economy. Accenture Research and Frontier Economics predict, based on research in 12 developed countries, that AI could “double annual economic growth rates” in 2035 while also increasing labor productivity by up to 40 percent.49 McKinsey Global Institute predicts AI may deliver $13 trillion in global economic activity by 2030.50 PricewaterhouseCoopers puts that figure even higher at up to $15.7 trillion in global GDP growth by 2030, much of which will be due to productivity increases.51These estimates are varied, but they all rightfully predict enormous economic growth due to an explosion in AI uses worldwide.52 However, these gains will not be evenly spread. As research from McKinsey Global Institute articulates, “leaders of AI adoption (mostly in developed countries) could increase their lead over developing countries,” and “leading AI countries could capture an additional 20 to 25 percent in net economic benefits, compared with today, while developing countries might capture only about 5 to 15 percent.”53 With the United States and China already representing the largest economies in the world, maximizing uses of AI within either nation could lead to massive gains in state power and influence on the global stage. “After all,” writes political scientist Michael Horowitz, “countries cannot maintain military superiority over the medium to long term without an underlying economic basis for that power.”54 Further, there is in part a question of pure economic power: If Chinese companies don’t just *develop* better but *also use* that AI more profitably than American firms, China benefits economically and by extension has more resources to build state power generally. That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting.Militarily speaking, artificial intelligence is also revolutionary for state military power. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China views AI as a revolutionary factor in military power and civil-military fusion,55 just as the U.S. Department of Defense has similarly recognized how advances in artificial intelligence “will change society and, ultimately, the character of war.”56 China is investing in this future. The PLA has already funded a number of AI military projects as part of its 13th Five-Year Plan, spanning command decision-making, equipment systems, robotics, autonomous operating guidance and control systems, advanced computing, and intelligent unmanned weapon systems.57 In 2017, President Xi Jinping called for the military to accelerate AI research in preparation for the future of war.58 There has even been a report of the Beijing Institute of Technology recruiting high-talent teenagers for a new AI weapons development program.59 The Chinese government is undoubtedly preparing to maximize its AI development in the service of maximizing its military power.That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting.The United States has started to do the same, in some respects: It has established a Defense Innovation Board for ethics of AI in war,60 as well as a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to develop “standards….tools, shared data, reusable technology, processes, and expertise” in coordination with industry, academia, and American allies.61 DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, currently has 25 programs in place focused on artificial intelligence research, and in September 2018, its director announced a plan to spend up to $2 billion over the next five years on more AI work.62 But there is still much to be done, as I’ll address in the last section.Even within the U.S. military’s approaches to artificial intelligence, as one West Point scholar notes, “the military is facing some hard questions about how it will adapt its culture and institutions to exploit new technologies—and civilians face a tough job ensuring they answer them effectively.”63 There are certainly military leaders aware of this fact—in announcing the $2 billion in AI funding, DARPA’s director depicted it “as a new effort to make such systems more trusted and accepted by military commanders”64—yet the road ahead will have its challenges. In general, the U.S. defense apparatus’ willingness to engage in cultural and operational shifts will greatly influence how successfully AI is integrated into the United States military.It’s also important to note that China’s government and its private companies will likely be less constrained by ethical and legal norms when developing AI than will their American counterparts.65 Faster deployment of and greater experimentation with AI may result, even though this may lead to perhaps chaotic or more unpredictable deployments of artificial intelligence—or, perhaps, plainly unethical uses of AI. This leads into the second main reason why U.S.-China AI competition still matters.Artificial Intelligence and Global Technology NormsArtificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Many commentators have referred to this as “digital authoritarianism,”66 by which technologies like AI—deployed at scale to, say, bolster citywide facial recognition—enable or enhance authoritarian principles of state governance. Chinese companies have been complicit—and at times instrumental—in the diffusion of the technology and practices that enable this authoritarian governance. While Western companies sometimes export surveillance technology to dictators as well, most democratic governments take steps to prevent it through export controls, such as those established in the Wassenaar Arrangement.67

Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Chinese firms have exported facial recognition systems to governments in Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia. Broader categories of surveillance technology—from national identity cards to biometric sensors, internet monitoring software, and more—are also exported by Chinese companies to governments in Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia.68 In addition to enabling insidious social control and large-scale human rights abuses, such spread of surveillance technology—which includes AI—consolidates power in the hands of governments that are hostile, or typically align with powers hostile, to American interests.69 Democracy is under attack around the world,70 and authoritarian uses of AI further harm democratic norms and the state of democracy globally. This is especially true for the many countries who remain undecided in their use and regulation of technologies like artificial intelligence. This is an obvious strategic problem for U.S. policymakers, especially as Beijing has already sought to become a global leader in technology norms through an assortment of proposals at the likes of the United Nations71 and through channels such as IEEE.72 Unsurprisingly, this interest has already been reflected with respect to artificial intelligence. The China Electronics Standardization Institute, involved in standard-setting under China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, released a white paper in January 2018 on a framework for AI standardization.73 In April 2018, Chinese organizations hosted a major international AI standards meeting in Beijing.74 Similar to how China is proactive in trying to set global norms around the internet, it is also intent on setting global standards and norms around artificial intelligence and its use in society.75 As Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks explain, “realizing that China’s many large companies are increasingly global players, and Chinese-developed AI algorithms will have effects on users outside of China, China’s government aims to advance global efforts to set standards around ethical and social issues related to AI algorithm deployment. Should Chinese officials and experts succeed in influencing such standards and related AI governance discussions, the policy landscape may skew toward the interests of government-driven technical organizations, attenuating the voices of independent civil society actors that inform the debate in North America and Europe.”76 This may very well become a greater trend—as China’s government and private industry develop increasingly sophisticated AI applications—that lends even further global influence to China alongside bigger economic advantage. It’s not just through diplomats, trade negotiators, and military officers that the Chinese or American government will exercise influence in areas of competition between the two countries (most obviously Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Without a clear, viable model of digital governance to oppose digital authoritarianism, the United States stands to lose political influence over a number of countries in these areas. This, too, will significantly impact great power competition, potentially in ways that diminish the relative importance of military power. The Chinese government, in this larger process of global norm-setting on uses of contemporary technologies, is attempting to remake the world in its image. This is why U.S. policymakers desperately need to reframe their thinking on AI competition.

#### Authoritarian governments like China don’t have the capacity for complete totalitarianism right now but current development of Authoritarian AI will change that—The US is key to a democratic pushback to avoid global mind control and widespread explosive success of authoritarian empires-

Wright 18 -- (Nicholas Wright is a cybersecurity fellow in New America’s International Security Program. Wright’s work combines neuroscientific, behavioural, and technological insights to understand decision-making in politics and international confrontations, in ways practically applicable to policy. He leads international, interdisciplinary projects with collaborators in countries including China, the United States, Iran and the United Kingdom., "How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order", 7-10-2018, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-07-10/how-artificial-intelligence-will-reshape-global-order?check\_logged\_in=1)//Alk

There is also a third way in which AI promises to reshape the world. By allowing governments to monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more closely than ever before, AI will offer authoritarian countries a plausible alternative to liberal democracy, the first since the end of the Cold War. That will spark **renewed international competition** between social systems. For decades, most political theorists have believed that liberal democracy offers the only path to sustained economic success. Either governments could repress their people and remain poor or liberate them and reap the economic benefits. Some repressive countries managed to grow their economies for a time, but in the long run authoritarianism always meant stagnation. AI promises to upend that dichotomy. It offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them. Some countries are already moving in this direction. China has begun to construct a digital authoritarian state by using surveillance and machine learning tools to control restive populations, and by creating what it calls a “social credit system.” Several like-minded countries have begun to buy or emulate Chinese systems. Just as competition between liberal democratic, fascist, and communist social systems defined much of the twentieth century, so the struggle between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism is set to define the twenty-first. New technologies will enable high levels of social control at a reasonable cost. Governments will be able selectively censor topics and behaviors to allow information for economically productive activities to flow freely, while curbing political discussions that might damage the regime. China’s so-called Great Firewall provides an early demonstration of this kind of selective censorship. As well as retroactively censoring speech, AI and big data will allow predictive control of potential dissenters. This will resemble Amazon or Google’s consumer targeting but will be much more effective, as authoritarian governments will be able to draw on data in ways that are not allowed in liberal democracies. Amazon and Google have access only to data from some accounts and devices; an AI designed for social control will draw data from the multiplicity of devices someone interacts with during their daily life. And even more important, authoritarian regimes will have no compunction about combining such data with information from tax returns, medical records, criminal records, sexual-health clinics, bank statements, genetic screenings, physical information (such as location, biometrics, and CCTV monitoring using facial recognition software), and information gleaned from family and friends. AI is as good as the data it has access to. Unfortunately, the quantity and quality of data available to governments on every citizen will prove excellent for training AI systems. Even the mere existence of this kind of predictive control will help authoritarians. Self-censorship was perhaps the East German Stasi’s most important disciplinary mechanism. AI will make the tactic dramatically more effective. People will know that the omnipresent monitoring of their physical and digital activities will be used to predict undesired behavior, even actions they are merely contemplating. From a technical perspective, such predictions are no different from using AI health-care systems to predict diseases in seemingly healthy people before their symptoms show. In order to prevent the system from making negative predictions, many people will begin to mimic the behaviors of a “responsible” member of society. These may be as subtle as how long one’s eyes look at different elements on a phone screen. This will improve social control not only byforcing people to act in certain ways,but also by changing the way they think. A central finding in the cognitive science of influence is that making people perform behaviors can change their attitudes and lead to self-reinforcing habits. Making people expound a position makes them more likely to support it, a technique used by the Chinese on U.S. prisoners of war during the Korean War. Salespeople know that getting a potential customer to perform small behaviors can change attitudes to later, bigger requests. More than 60 years of laboratory and fieldwork have shown humans’ remarkable capacity to rationalize their behaviors. As well as more effective control, AI also promises better central economic planning. As Jack Ma, the founder of the Chinese tech titan Alibaba, argues, with enough information, central authorities can direct the economy by planning and predicting market forces. Rather than slow, inflexible, one-size-fits-all plans, AI promises rapid and detailed responses to customers’ needs. There’s no guarantee that this kind of digital authoritarianism will work in the long run, but it may not need to, as long as it is a plausible model for which some countries can aim. That will be enough to spark a new ideological competition. If governments start to see digital authoritarianism as a viable alternative to liberal democracy, they will feel no pressure to liberalize. Even if the model fails in the end, attempts to implement it could last for a long time. Communist and fascist models collapsed only after thorough attempts to implement them failed in the real world. CREATING AND EXPORTING AN ALL-SEEING STATE No matter how useful a system of social control might prove to a regime, building one would not be easy. Big IT projects are notoriously hard to pull off. They require high levels of coordination, generous funding, and plenty of expertise. For a sense of whether such a system is feasible, it’s worth looking to China, the most important non-Western country that might build one. China has proved that it can deliver huge, society-spanning IT projects, such as the Great Firewall. It also has the funding to build major new systems. Last year, the country’s internal security budget was at least $196 billion, a 12 percent increase from 2016. Much of the jump was probably driven by the need for new big data platforms. China also has expertise in AI. Chinese companies are global leaders in AI research and Chinese software engineers often beat their American counterparts in international competitions. Finally, technologies, such as smartphones, that are already widespread can form the backbone of a personal monitoring system. Smartphone ownership rates in China are nearing those in the West and in some areas, such as mobile payments, China is the world leader. China is already building the core components of a digital authoritarian system. The Great Firewall is sophisticated and well established, and it has tightened over the past year. Freedom House, a think tank, rates China the world’s worst abuser of Internet freedom. China is implementing extensive surveillance in the physical world, as well. In 2014, it announced a social credit scheme, which will compute an integrated grade that reflects the quality of every citizen’s conduct, as understood by the government. The development of China’s surveillance state has gone furthest in Xinjiang Province, where it is being used to monitor and control the Muslim Uighur population. Those whom the system deems unsafe are shut out of everyday life; many are even sent to reeducation centers. If Beijing wants, it could roll out the system nationwide. To be sure, ability is not the same as intention. But China seems to be moving toward authoritarianism and away from any suggestion of liberalization. The government clearly believes that AI and big data will do much to enable this new direction. China’s 2017 AI Development Plan describes how the ability to predict and “grasp group cognition” means “AI brings new opportunities for social construction.” Digital authoritarianism is not confined to China. Beijing is exporting its model.The Great Firewall approach to the Internet has spread to Thailand and Vietnam. According to news reports, Chinese experts have provided support for government censors in Sri Lanka and supplied surveillance or censorship equipment to Ethiopia, Iran, Russia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Earlier this year, the Chinese AI firm Yitu sold “wearable cameras with artificial intelligence-powered facial-recognition technology” to Malaysian law enforcement. More broadly, China and Russia have pushed back against the U.S. conception of a free, borderless, and global Internet. China uses its diplomatic and market power to influence global technical standards and normalize the idea that domestic governments should control the Internet in ways that sharply limit individual freedom. After reportedly heated competition for influence over a new forum that will set international standards for AI, the United States secured the secretariat, which helps guide the group’s decisions, while Beijing hosted its first meeting, this April, and Wael Diab, a senior director at Huawei, secured the chairmanship of the committee. To the governments that employ them, these measures may seem defensive—necessary to ensure domestic control—but other governments may perceive them as tantamount to attacks on their way of life. THE DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE The rise of an authoritarian technological model of governance could, perhaps counterintuitively, rejuvenate liberal democracies. How liberal democracies respond to AI’s challenges and opportunities depends partly on how they deal with them internally and partly on how they deal with the authoritarian alternative externally. In both cases, grounds exist for guarded optimism. Internally, although established democracies will need to make concerted efforts to manage the rise of new technologies, the challenges aren’t obviously greater than those democracies have overcome before. One big reason for optimism is path dependence. Countries with strong traditions of individual liberty will likely go in one direction with new technology; those without them will likely go another. Strong forces within U.S. society have long pushed back against domestic government mass surveillance programs, albeit with variable success. In the early years of this century, for example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency began to construct “Total Information Awareness” domestic surveillance systems to bring together medical, financial, physical and other data. Opposition from media and civil liberties groups led Congress to defund the program, although it left some workarounds hidden from the public at the time. Most citizens in liberal democracies acknowledge the need for espionage abroad and domestic counterterrorism surveillance, but powerful checks and balances constrain the state’s security apparatus. Those checks and balances are under attack today and need fortification, but this will be more a repeat of past efforts than a fundamentally new challenge. In the West, governments are not the only ones to pose a threat to individual freedoms. Oligopolistic technology companies are concentrating power by gobbling up competitors and lobbying governments to enact favorable regulations. Yet societies have overcome this challenge before, after past technological revolutions. Think of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting, AT&T’s breakup in the 1980s, and the limits that regulators put on Microsoft during the Internet’s rise in the 1990s. Digital giants are also hurting media diversity and support for public interest content as well as creating a Wild West in political advertising. But previously radical new technologies, such as radio and television, posed similar problems and societies rose to the challenge. In the end, regulation will likely catch up with the new definitions of “media” and “publisher” created by the Internet. Facebook Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg resisted labeling political advertising in the same way as is required on television, until political pressure forced his hand last year. Liberal democracies are unlikely to be won over to digital authoritarianism. Recent polling suggests that a declining proportion in Western societies view democracy as “essential,” but this is a long way from a genuine weakening of Western democracy. The external challenge of a new authoritarian competitor may perhaps strengthen liberal democracies. The human tendency to frame competition in us versus them terms may lead Western countries to define their attitudes to censorship and surveillance at least partly in opposition to the new competition. Most people find the nitty-gritty of data policy boring and pay little attention to the risks of surveillance. But when these issues underpin a dystopian regime in the real world they will prove neither boring nor abstract. Governments and technology firms in liberal democracies will have to explain how they are different. LESSONS FOR THE WEST The West can do very little to change the trajectory of a country as capable and confident as China. Digital authoritarian states will likely be around for a while. To compete with them, liberal democracies will need clear strategies. First, governments and societies should rigorously limit domestic surveillance and manipulation. Technology giants should be broken up and regulated. Governments need to ensure a diverse, healthy media environment, for instance by ensuring that overmighty gatekeepers such as Facebook do not reduce media plurality; funding public service broadcasting; and updating the regulations covering political advertising to fit the online world. They should enact laws preventing technology firms from exploiting other sources of personal data, such as medical records, on their customers and should radically curtail data collection from across the multiplicity of platforms with which people come into contact. Even governments should be banned from using such data except in a few circumstances, such as counterterrorism operations. Second, Western countries should work to influence how states that are neither solidly democratic nor solidly authoritarian implement AI and big data systems. They should provide aid to develop states’ physical and regulatory infrastructure and use the access provided by that aid to prevent governments from using joined-up data. They should promote international norms that respect individual privacy as well as state sovereignty. And they should demarcate the use of AI and metadata for legitimate national security purposes from its use in suppressing human rights. Finally, Western countries must prepare to push back against the digital authoritarian heartland. Vast AI systems will prove vulnerable to disruption, although as regimes come to rely ever more on them for security, governments will have to take care that tit-for-tat cycles of retribution don’t spiral out of control. Systems that selectively censor communications will enable economic creativity but will also inevitably reveal the outside world. Winning the contest with digital authoritarian governments will not be impossible—as long as liberal democracies can summon the necessary political will to join the struggle

#### Digital authoritarianism leads to a global suffering worse than extinction

Di Minardi, October 15, 2020, a graduate of Boston College where she majored in Political Science and minored in International Studies now works in communications at Georgia Tech, “The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’”, <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence>

When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad. It’s called the “world in chains” scenario, where, like the preceding thought experiment, a global totalitarian government uses a novel technology to lock a majority of the world into perpetual suffering. If it sounds grim, you’d be right. But is it likely? Researchers and philosophers are beginning to ponder how it might come about – and, more importantly, what we can do to avoid it. Existential risks (x-risks) are disastrous because they lock humanity into a single fate, like the permanent collapse of civilisation or the extinction of our species. These catastrophes can have natural causes, like an asteroid impact or a supervolcano, or be human-made from sources like nuclear war or climate change. Allowing one to happen would be “an abject end to the human story" and would let down the hundreds of generations that came before us, says Haydn Belfield, academic project manager at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge. Toby Ord, a senior research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford University, believes that the odds of an existential catastrophe happening this century from natural causes are less than one in 2,000, because humans have survived for 2,000 centuries without one. However, when he adds the probability of human-made disasters, Ord believes the chances increase to a startling one in six. He refers to this century as “the precipice” because the risk of losing our future has never been so high. Researchers at the Center on Long-Term Risk, a non-profit research institute in London, have expanded upon x-risks with the even-more-chilling prospect of suffering risks. These “s-risks” are defined as “suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.” In these scenarios, life continues for billions of people, but the quality is so low and the outlook so bleak that dying out would be preferable. In short: a future with negative value is worse than one with no value at all. This is where the “world in chains” scenario comes in. If a malevolent group or government suddenly gained world-dominating power through technology, and there was nothing to stand in its way, it could lead to an extended period of abject suffering and subjugation. A 2017 report on existential risks from the Global Priorities Project, in conjunction with FHI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, warned that “a long future under a particularly brutal global totalitarian state could arguably be worse than complete extinction”. Singleton hypothesis Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence. In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance or autonomous weapons, and, with this monopoly, remain perpetually stable. If the singleton is totalitarian, life would be bleak. Even in the countries with the strictest regimes, news leaks in and out from other countries and people can escape. A global totalitarian rule would eliminate even these small seeds of hope. To be worse than extinction, “that would mean we feel absolutely no freedom, no privacy, no hope of escaping, no agency to control our lives at all", says Tucker Davey, a writer at the Future of Life Institute in Massachusetts, which focuses on existential risk research. “In totalitarian regimes of the past, [there was] so much paranoia and psychological suffering because you just have no idea if you're going to get killed for saying the wrong thing,” he continues. “And now imagine that there's not even a question, every single thing you say is being reported and being analysed.” “We may not yet have the technologies to do this,” Ord said in a recent interview, “but it looks like the kinds of technologies we’re developing make that easier and easier. And it seems plausible that this may become possible at some time in the next 100 years.” AI and authoritarianism Though life under a global totalitarian government is still an unlikely and far-future scenario, AI is already enabling authoritarianism in some countries and strengthening infrastructure that could be seized by an opportunistic despot in others. “We've seen sort of a reckoning with the shift from very utopian visions of what technology might bring to much more sobering realities that are, in some respects, already quite dystopian,” says Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, a bipartisan non-profit that develops national security and defence policies. In the past, surveillance required hundreds of thousands of people – one in every 100 citizens in East Germany was an informant – but now it can be done by technology. In the United States, the National Security Agency (NSA) collected hundreds of millions of American call and text records before they stopped domestic surveillance in 2019, and there are an estimated four to six million CCTV cameras across the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the 20 most surveilled cities in the world are in China, but London is the third. The difference between them lies less in the tech that the countries employ and more in how they use it. What if the definition of what is illegal in the US and the UK expanded to include criticising the government or practising certain religions? The infrastructure is already in place to enforce it, and AI – which the NSA has already begun experimenting with – would enable agencies to search through our data faster than ever before. In addition to enhancing surveillance, AI also underpins the growth of online misinformation, which is another tool of the authoritarian. AI-powered deep fakes, which can spread fabricated political messages, and algorithmic micro-targeting on social media are making propaganda more persuasive. This undermines our epistemic security – the ability to determine what is true and act on it – that democracies depend on. “Over the last few years, we've seen the rise of filter bubbles and people getting shunted by various algorithms into believing various conspiracy theories, or even if they’re not conspiracy theories, into believing only parts of the truth,” says Belfield. “You can imagine things getting much worse, especially with deep fakes and things like that, until it's increasingly harder for us to, as a society, decide these are the facts of the matter, this is what we have to do about it, and then take collective action.”

#### Democracy solves extinction.

Twining 21, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", *The Hill*, <https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/575693-america-must-double-down-on-democracy>) \*language edited

The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any [individual] ~~man~~ — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.

#### Democratic backsliding leads to nuke war and threat-multiplication

Kendall-Taylor 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (Andrea, February 26th, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline: National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World”, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence-1>, accessed 7/21/19)

The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts.9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot afford.

Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression. Although Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions.

Politics in China show many of these same trends. Xi’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea has occurred alongside the rising personalization of the political system. Xi has amassed substantial personal power since coming to office in 2012 and continues to roll back the norms of the post-Mao collective leadership system. If Xi further consolidates control and limits accountability—particularly over military and foreign policy bodies—research suggests that he, too, could feel free to further escalate his aggressive rhetoric and actions in the South China Sea.

Not only do personalist dictatorships pursue aggressive foreign policies—they are also often difficult and unpredictable partners. Research underscores that, thanks to limited constraints on decisionmaking, personalist leaders generally have the latitude to change their minds on a whim, producing volatile and erratic policies.10 Moreover, personalist leaders—think Putin, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro—are among those autocrats who are most suspicious of U.S. intentions and who see the creation of an external enemy as an effective means of boosting public support. Anti-U.S. rhetoric, therefore, is most pronounced in personalist settings.

#### AI clarity framework with NATO is fundamental to building international trust- that’s key to making broader multilateral cooperation possible

Hill 20 (Steven Hill\* Affiliation: The author served until February 2020 as Legal Adviser and Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) at the NATO International Staff in Brussels and , 4-27-2020, accessed on 7-9-2022, Cambridge Core, "AI's Impact on Multilateral Military Cooperation: Experience from NATO | American Journal of International Law | Cambridge Core", https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/ais-impact-on-multilateral-military-cooperation-experience-from-nato/3AEF22AA22550A10B75DD74A806D4D18)

It is useful to complement this description of NATO's fairly nascent policy work on military applications of AI with a brief overview of the types of applications that one hears most discussed in NATO circles. Given the amount of academic, media, and political attention to the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), it might come as a surprise that it is the far less high-profile or headline-grabbing applications of AI that receive attention within NATO. This may well be because LAWS are already being discussed by a Group of Governmental Experts within the Geneva-based framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, thus making Allies hesitant to duplicate discussions in Brussels. However, the reason that the issue of LAWS—however important the debates involved—is not on the forefront of the agenda at NATO is likely more straightforward: that current and foreseeable technology suggests different, perhaps more prosaic applications, for AI in the military sphere. This essay focuses on two: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and (2) cyber defense. The development and use of AI-enabled applications in each of these areas clearly presents both opportunities and challenges. Enhancing the information available to support decision-making is one of NATO's priorities. ISR is based on information-gathering from a variety of assets deployed across domains. **The information or data gathered from both NATO and national assets can then be fused together to help identify patterns and trends in support of situational awareness and operational decision-making.** Since this data will likely be too voluminous for traditional human analysis, NATO can leverage AI-enabled systems to comb through these datasets. **In this way, NATO can apply AI to enhance situational awareness and improve decision-making, a potentially considerable advantage given the challenges of getting all Allies up to speed on rapidly evolving situations**. AI applications can also be used in the context of cyber defense, where NATO has a defensive mandate focused on defending NATO's networks and supporting Allies as they defend their own networks. AI-based applications cover areas such as preemptive patching and the taking of corrective action on the basis of a constant analysis of low-level and recurrent patterns of attacks and cyber threats across networks, all done more quickly and with greater precision. Moreover, the more information exchanged on the nature of attacks in a variety of networks, the easier it is to identify trends in multinational cyber threats. While the use of **AI in both these contexts could potentially increase the speed and quality of multinational military cooperation**, it clearly also can pose difficulties. For example, increasing speed could be perceived as fueling pressure for inappropriately accelerated action. This kind of acceleration of usual processes might be perceived as going against “normal” NATO decision-making in a number of ways: it might be seen as evading the political control exercised by the North Atlantic Council, overriding the consensus decision-making that applied within the Alliance, being susceptible to misinterpretation or being seen as escalatory in nature, or otherwise leading to unpredictable results. In an extreme case, Allies might see these situations as inconsistent with NATO's collective defense mandate. **This might result in a backlash against the use of AI-enabled military applications, precisely at a time when the Alliance needs to maintain an edge with them**. In other words, as with many issues involved in multinational military cooperation, the problem may ultimately boil down to one of trust. As noted above, the different national strategies refer to the need for legal and ethical frameworks. They also generally refer to the desirability of multilateral cooperation on AI. The limited work within NATO so far has also pointed to a willingness to take on these issues in a multinational setting. However, the reality is that these discussions have not yet taken off. There may be good reasons for this, including the ongoing nature of LAWS discussions in Geneva or the understandable reluctance—frequently encountered with respect to new technologies—to take positions that could constrain innovation or that could present a strategic disadvantage to those who abide by the rules. At the same time, the perception that there are unresolved legal or ethical issues hovering over military applications of AI clearly poses a risk to the use of this technology, including in a multilateral military setting. There is generally broad agreement among NATO allies that existing international law should apply to the military use of new technologies, including AI. However, a perception of lack of clarity on the rules of the game may lead to a lack of trust that might hamper multinational cooperation. In this regard, dialogue about legal and ethical frameworks can be an important means of building trust. Individual NATO Allies are in the midst of developing their own national strategies for military applications of AI. As noted above, while these strategies use some of the same vocabulary in calling for more clarity on the legal and ethical frameworks of military AI, there is a real risk of a lack of meeting of the minds about the substantive content of these frameworks.

#### Multilateral cooperation key to solving a plethora of multidimensional existential risks- climate change, disease, overfishing, space conflict, nuclear armament, and war- its an impact filter

Löfven & Wallström 22 (Stefan, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 2014 to November 2021 and leader of the Social Democratic Party from 2012 to 2021, Margot, Chair of the international expert panel guiding the Environment of Peace initiative, “We must strengthen multilateralism in a new era of risk”) 2 June 2022 https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2022/we-must-strengthen-multilateralism-new-era-risk

Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, it was all too apparent that global governance was not dealing well with the most important contemporary challenges. The outcomes of COP 26—the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Glasgow in November 2021—[fell far short of what was needed](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/2021-11-15-COP26-what-happened-summary-Aberg-et-al_1.pdf), even if they exceeded many observers’ low expectations. The conference’s achievements included accelerating the process of making national commitments more ambitious. But the collective pledges would not keep the global average temperature rise below the ‘desirable’ 1.5°C limit set six years earlier in the Paris Agreement, and probably not below the 2°C limit viewed as essential. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic also highlighted key weaknesses—as well as the strengths—of global governance and cooperation. The rapid development of effective vaccines was an outstanding example of successful cooperation. But the distribution of vaccines was plagued with logistical problems and ‘vaccine nationalism’. Two thirds of the world’s ocean surface—the so-called areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ)—is being ravaged by unsustainable and illegal fishing and pollution from shipping and mineral extraction. But the institutions and agreements that focus on the ABNJ tend to have narrow mandates, making it hard to address threats to this important global commons. The legal framework governing the use of outer space is similarly unfit for purpose. Mostly dating from the 1960s and 1970s, it does not regulate the activities of private companies and includes no enforcement mechanisms. Nor does it provide any clarity about how to prevent or even manage the militarization of outer space, or instruments for handling disputes. And progress on nuclear disarmament has stalled during the last decade and much of the arms control architecture since the cold war has collapsed. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) from 2010 is now the only agreement left that sets any verifiable limits on the size and composition of the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals, while the Conference on Disarmament has long been stagnant as a negotiating body. The body entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN Security Council, was shown to be powerless in the face of the invasion of Ukraine, as a consequence of Russia’s veto power. Russia also blocked, last year, a resolution that would have recognized climate-related security risks as core Security Council business. In short, the instruments and institutions of international governance are badly in need of a makeover and a revivified spirit of cooperation. We have no choice but to address these deficiencies. As the Environment of Peace report emphasizes, the twin environmental and security crises have brought us into a new era of risk to human security. In this new era, many of the problems we face are non-linear: they are multi-dimensional; they have multiple stakeholders; they have multiple causes; they have multiple symptoms; they have multiple solutions; and they are constantly evolving. We need global governance fit to address these kinds of risk, and to deliver on three key tasks: The first is managing the consequences of climate change and environmental challenges, both those that are already here and those that are probably inevitable over the coming years because of the environmental damage we have already done. The second is tackling the root causes of those environmental problems to stop them getting worse. Because those root causes so often lie in human economic activities, we need to effect a far-reaching green transition—not just decarbonizing energy and transport systems, but also how we produce food, how we manage natural resources and how we manage waste. We must make sure we do not create new risks to peace and justice in the process. And third, we must ensure that the steps we take to build peace and security are sensitive to the risks from, and potential impacts on, the natural environment. All of these tasks require collective action both at and between different scales—local, national, regional, global—and within and between different spheres—communities, youth, civil society, public services, government, intergovernmental mechanisms, and the finance and business sectors. This collective action, in turn, requires the rebuilding of trust, a new social contract, and the means to negotiate a viable bargain between different participants to balance their interests in the most productive way. This is true for relations between states and for relations between community groups. But how do we go about creating this new contract and strengthening collaborative global governance? One of the headline recommendations of the Environment of Peace report is to be ‘deliberately inclusive’. Inclusivity broadens the base of knowledge available when creating or adapting policies. It can help in understanding the nature of the problems policies are meant to address, as well as the context. It can also help to identify possible solutions, who could implement them, and what unintended knock-on impacts—including on peace and security—the policy might have. And when these different groups know that their perspectives and their interests have been taken into account, it creates legitimacy for the policy, unity of purpose and political trust. These in turn improve the chances of a successful outcome and build political trust that makes even more ambitious policies possible in the future. Healthy democratic governance and a strong civil society are vital to this process. Inclusivity is as important between states as between communities, even if it inevitably takes different forms. Between states, it means that nations large and small have a seat at the table in discussions that affect them. Inclusivity also means actors from outside the worlds of government and diplomacy can participate meaningfully in multilateral exchanges. One of the questions that the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism will explore is how to make sure that youth, women, Indigenous Peoples and other traditionally sidelined groups are included and can influence what is happening. Non-linear problems demand joined-up policymaking and implementation that is coordinated between the traditional policy areas and sectors. This requires breaking out of siloed thinking. It requires dialogue. And for that to happen, the different policy areas and sectors need to speak each other’s language. Specialization needs to be balanced with breadth of knowledge. This is an area where substantial progress has already been made. The UN Security Council has held several discussions on climate security. Several governments have, like Sweden’s, pushed for climate security to become more systematically included in the Security Council agenda. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) includes environmental cooperation within its comprehensive approach to security. Its 2008 Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security explicitly recognized the OSCE’s role in addressing security risks related to climate change and other environmental challenges within its region, and in 2021 the OSCE passed a decision at the highest political level on ‘strengthening co-operation to address the challenges caused by climate change’. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP)—a key part of the legacy of the 1972 Stockholm Conference—has conducted various projects on the security implications of climate change for well over a decade. In 2018, the UN formally established the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), which provides integrated climate risk assessments to the Security Council and other UN bodies. As we push further into this new era of risk, we need more initiatives like this, and stronger, broader mandates. Another area where multilateral cooperation must improve is finance. Huge sums are needed over the coming years to increase resilience to climate change and other environmental hazards, to reverse environmental decline and to build peace. The principle is firmly established that richer countries should provide climate finance and technical assistance to poorer countries for this purpose. This is not only about global solidarity but also a recognition that richer countries have, by and large, had the biggest historical carbon footprints and enjoyed the greatest benefits from fossil-fuelled industrialization. Yet there is a worrying tendency for big funding pledges to be broken, whether it is for disaster relief, post-conflict reconstruction or climate finance. At the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009, rich countries pledged to provide US$100 billion of climate finance annually to developing countries by 2020. By 2021, they were still an estimated $20 billion short of the target—arguably far more. It is also worth noting that when it comes to resilience building, the most fragile states have the clearest need; yet per person, they receive only around one eightieth of the climate financing that flows to non-fragile states. Trust is an essential foundation for cooperation. One key way to build trust at the multilateral level would be for rich countries to quickly and fully meet their international funding obligations on climate change, biodiversity and other environmental issues. Reliable data and improved transparency could play a big role in multilateral action to deal with the twin crises. It is hard to predict the scale and timing of today’s environmental and security risks, partly because they are often generated by combinations of factors originating in different parts of the world. Shared global or regional banks of accurate, up-to-date data could improve our ability to spot emergent risks and prepare for them, or even stop them materializing. Advances in monitoring, data processing and modelling could help communities, governments and businesses to plan and invest more confidently.

#### AI clarity reduces existential nuclear risk- multilateral military coop is key

Boulanin et al. 20 (vincent, PhD in Political Science from École des Hautes en Sciences Sociales, lora saalman, petr topychkanov, fei su, moa peldán carlsson, “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK”) June 2020 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial\_intelligence\_strategic\_stability\_and\_nuclear\_risk.pdf

Existing nuclear risk-reduction measures The fact that many of the risks and strategic challenges posed by AI are not fundamentally new means that policy options to mitigate the impact of AI on nuclear risk already exist. In fact, a number of existing policy options for nuclear risk reduction could have a positive effect on the strategic relations of nuclear armed states and could help to reduce nuclear risk. These include no-first-use policies, commitments to lower the alert status of nuclear arsenals, transparency and information sharing, and cooperation. No-first-use policy One of the most effective means to prevent the nuclear escalation scenarios described in chapter 4 would be if all nuclear-armed states adopted a clear NFU policy. Currently, China and India are the only nuclear-armed states that have such a policy. Although universal adoption of NFU policies would not necessarily alleviate all the signalling problems generated by the introduction of AI in nuclear weapon systems, from the authors’ perspective it would be positive for strategic stability if all nuclear-armed states, particularly Russia and the USA, were to make such a commitment. Some participants in the SIPRI workshops—notably from Russia and the USA—did not share this view. Indeed, in the current geopolitical context, it is highly unlikely that these two states, as well as the USA’s NATO partners France and the UK, would seriously consider that possibility. The USA in particular is constrained from official adoption of NFU by its alliance structures and the views of its allies in both East Asia and Europe.491 The likelihood of Russia and the USA adopting NFU policies is further compromised by both official and non-official statements from China and India about the longer-term status and nature of their NFU commitments.492 A commitment to lower the alert status of nuclear arsenals Removing strategic weapons from a launch-on-warning or launch-ready alert status would allow more time for decision makers to make appropriate assessments. India, Pakistan and China have the lowest level of alert as their nuclear warhead and delivery vehicles are reportedly kept separate.493 It would take at least a few days for them to launch a nuclear strike (although this is changing as they develop the sea legs of their nuclear triads).494 In contrast, Russia and the USA have their systems on high alert, which means that they are much more likely to use nuclear weapons by accident or deliberately in a crisis or from the outset of a conflict. It would be highly positive for international security if Russia and the USA were to de-alert their nuclear weapons––although this would not be a panacea without proper training, data integrity and cybersecurity systems in place. In the current context, this also seems to be an unrealistic possibility. Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that this possibility could be part of future bilateral nuclear riskreduction measures between these two countries, as well as between them and other nuclear-armed states. Transparency and information sharing A traditional approach to transparency and information sharing could also help in risk reduction. AI is a kind of technology that is prone to misunderstanding for two principal reasons. First, there remains widespread misconceptions about what AI is and what it can or could do. Second, it is difficult for states to assess in a tangible way each other’s progress in this area. It is, for instance, impossible for a state to assess whether an opponent’s air defence systems rely on traditional hard-coded programming or an algorithm trained by machine learning if that information has not already been disclosed by the opponent itself. There are a number of transparency-centred CBMs that states could implement voluntarily and unilaterally or as a result of bilateral or multilateral dialogue. These can be grouped in three categories: (a) AI-specific measures, (b) measures related to the military use of AI, and (c) measures related to the use of AI in connection with nuclear weapons and deterrence. AI-specific measures. One AI-specific measure would be for a state to make publicly available official documents that outline its general strategy and policy on AI. If a state has not yet adopted a national policy or strategy on AI, then it could adopt one to clarify its intention and views. Another AI-specific measure would be to make publicly available governmental recommendations (e.g. guidelines, procedures and techniques) about testing and verification and about cybersecurity in the field of AI.

#### The US and NATO are key

**Everstine 20** – Brian W. Everstine served as Air Force Magazine’s Pentagon editor, where he reported on US military operations, the Air Force’s presence abroad, among others. (Jan. 15, "DOD AI Leader Wants Closer Collaboration With NATO", 1-15-2020, Air Force Magazine, <https://www.airforcemag.com/dod-ai-leader-wants-closer-collaboration-with-nato/)//Alk>

NATO allies need to join the US in developing artificial intelligence capabilities to gain an upper hand over China and Russia, which are working together on AI in ways that threaten shared Western values, the military’s top AI expert said Jan. 15. Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, the director of the Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, said that while the US is moving forward on AI as a military initiative, some NATO allies are progressing slower because ethical debates have “immobilized” some countries. “Success with AI adoption requires a multi-generational commitment with the right combination of tactical urgency and strategic patience,” Shanahan told reporters on a call from Brussels, where he is meeting with NATO officials. “The US, along with our NATO allies, will face difficult decisions regarding the future of legacy systems and platforms in an era where technological innovations are transforming every aspect of the human experience.” The threats are clear from China and Russia in the realm of AI, Shanahan said. For example, China is using it for censorship, stifling freedom of expression, facilitating the sale of AI-enabled weapons, “and lowering the barrier of entry of potential adversaries and potentially placing this technology in the hands of non-state actors.” Most concerning is China forcing its companies like Huawei to cooperate with Chinese Communist Party intelligence, “no matter where the company operates,” he said. Russia has shown a “greater willingness to disregard international ethical norms” and develop systems that could destabilize international security, he added. That includes using automation and machine learning to power global disinformation campaigns as well as lethal weapons systems, Shanahan said. Much of AI software comes from commercial industry and is easily exported, so “we have serious concerns about nonstate actors and their ability to grab these capabilities from the open-source market,” Shanahan said. While other technologies are developed by the military and then spun off in the commercial world, AI is moving in the opposite direction. “When you do that, those technologies will be available to almost anyone with not a lot of effort to go get them,” he said. “That risks a future which destabilizes the international order in the digital age, so I will tell you that we’re looking carefully about how we would prevent proliferation of those capabilities. But I will not pretend that we can do that easily or immediately.” One example Shanahan touched on is the expansion of “deepfake” technology, where AI and machine learning can produce video that looks and sounds realistic enough to convincingly portray a world leader. Deepfakes could worsen the “corrosive influence” of disinformation campaigns in political elections, such as Russia’s attempt to influence the 2016 US presidential race, Shanahan argued. “What if a senior leader were to come on and announce that the nation is at war, but it was a deepfake?” he said. “Those are areas that are of increasing concern across all of society, not just the United States military, but they could be used anywhere across the world. They’re not hard to get access to either.” Authoritarian regimes can also deploy AI for ubiquitous social surveillance and facial recognition, he added. Shanahan believes these issues should compel the US and NATO to “vigorously promote AI for our shared values.” “The deliberate actions we take in the coming years with responsible AI adoption will ensure our militaries keep pace with digital modernization and remain interoperable in the most complex and consequential missions, so that we can continue to rely on the security architecture that has preserved peace, prosperity, and stability in Europe and beyond for decades,” he said.

### 1AC—Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of artificial intelligence clarity

### AC—Public trust

**Transparent AI builds public trust at large and solves malevolent and racist AI**

**Mills et al., 21** (Steven Mills, Elias Baltassis, Nadim Abillama, and Matthew Mendelsohn, Steven Mills is the Global GAMMA Chief AI Ethics Officer at Boston Consulting Group. , 1-18-2021, accessed on 7-17-2022, BCG Global, "Responsible AI Builds Trust in Government", https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/responsible-ai-builds-trust-in-government)

When governments incorporate artificial intelligence into decision making, the results can be good. Governments have, for instance, deployed AI-based systems effectively to manage hospital capacity, regulate traffic, and determine the best way to distribute social benefits and deliver services. However, some government AI systems have unfairly or unwittingly targeted or disadvantaged specific portions of their constituencies—and worse. A major difference between systems that work and those that fail is the way in which they are created and overseen. An approach that leads to successful outcomes includes proper governance, thoughtfully conceived processes based on input from affected stakeholders, and transparency about AI’s role in decision making. We call such a comprehensive approach Responsible AI. To achieve it, governments must empower leadership and use AI to enhance human decision making—not replace it. A Responsible AI approach should include regular reviews, integration with standard tools and data models, and a plan for potential lapses. Governments have another powerful tool at their disposal. They can use procurement to promote widespread adoption of Responsible AI. By making adherence to Responsible AI principles a prerequisite for bidding on public-sector AI contracts, agencies can ensure that the systems they create are ethical and transparent, while gradually integrating AI into public-sector decision making. **UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT AI SYSTEMS** In the recent past, several well-publicized lapses have illustrated the unintentional harm that can befall individuals or society when government AI systems aren’t designed, built, or implemented in a responsible manner. **A major difference between AI systems that work and those that fail is the way in which they are created and overseen.** After college entrance exams were canceled because of the pandemic, the UK government used an algorithm that determined grades based on students’ past performance. The system [reduced the grades of nearly 40% of students](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/world/europe/uk-england-grading-algorithm.html) and led to accusations that it was biased against test takers from challenging socioeconomic backgrounds. A Dutch court ordered the government to [stop using a system based on an undisclosed algorithm](https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/06/blackbox-welfare-fraud-detection-system-breaches-human-rights-dutch-court-rules/)—which was intended to predict whether people would commit benefits or tax fraud—after it was determined that the system breached human rights laws and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Citizens groups initiated the legal action after discovering that the system had been used to target neighborhoods with mostly low-income and minority residents. A local NGO [sued Buenos Aires for violating child rights](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/09/1009992/live-facial-recognition-is-tracking-kids-suspected-of-crime/) after the city adopted a facial-recognition system to find criminal suspects. The system relied on a database that contained information about children as young as four. A US border control agency deployed a biometric scanning application built on machine-learning systems from multiple vendors. When it was [unable to explain failure rates](https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf) because of the proprietary nature of the technology, concerns arose about the agency’s accountability and procurement practices. These lapses and others like them have led to widespread criticism and legal action. In the US, concerns over algorithmic-based decision systems in health care, criminal justice, education, employment, and other areas have resulted in lawsuits. Lapses have also led to organized efforts to track “bad actor” vendors and enact policies or laws to limit the use of public-sector AI systems or, at a minimum, make them more transparent. A 2020 UK parliamentary committee report on AI and public standards found that government and public-sector agencies are failing to be as open as they should be about AI use. The report called on the government to uphold new transparency standards and create effective oversight processes to mitigate risks. When lapses occur in government AI systems, trust in public institutions is eroded. Over time, such a disconnect can damage government legitimacy and citizens’ belief in and support for governmental authority in general. According to BCG research, when people have a positive experience with online public-service delivery, it strengthens their trust in government. But when they have a negative experience, it has a disproportionately detrimental effect on trust. If governments’ deployment of AI is to earn citizens’ trust, they need to get it right. Responsible AI will foster both trust and the ongoing license that governments need in order to use machine learning to improve their own performance.

#### Racist AI exacerbates policy brutality and inequality

**Bailey et al., 20** (Jane Bailey, Jacquelyn Burkell, and Valerie Steeves , 9-2-2020, accessed on 7-20-2022, RSC College of New Scholars, "AI Technologies - Like Police Facial Recognition - Discriminate Against People of Colour | The Royal Society of Canada", https://rsc-src.ca/en/voices/ai-technologies-like-police-facial-recognition-discriminate-against-people-colour)

Predictive policing uses algorithmic processing of historical data to predict when and where new crimes are likely to occur, assigns police resources accordingly and embeds enhanced police surveillance into communities, usually in lower-income and racialized neighbourhoods. This increases the chances that any criminal activity — including less serious criminal activity that might otherwise prompt no police response — will be detected and punished, ultimately limiting the life chances of the people who live within that environment. And the evidence of inequities in other sectors continues to mount. Hundreds of students in the United Kingdom protested on Aug. 16 against the disastrous results of Ofqual, a flawed algorithm the U.K. government used to determine which students would qualify for university. In 2019, Facebook’s microtargeting ad service helped dozens of public and private sector employers exclude people from receiving job ads on the basis of age and gender. Research conducted by ProPublica has documented race-based price discrimination for online products. And search engines regularly produce racist and sexist results. These outcomes matter because they perpetuate and deepen pre-existing inequalities based on characteristics like race, gender and age. They also matter because they deeply affect how we come to know ourselves and the world around us, sometimes by pre-selecting the information we receive in ways that reinforce stereotypical perceptions. Even technology companies themselves acknowledge the urgency of stopping algorithms from perpetuating discrimination. To date the success of ad hoc investigations, conducted by the tech companies themselves, has been inconsistent. Occasionally, corporations involved in producing discriminatory systems withdraw them from the market, such as when Clearview AI announced it would no longer offer facial recognition technology in Canada. But often such decisions result from regulatory scrutiny or public outcry only after members of equality-seeking communities have already been harmed. It’s time to give our regulatory institutions the tools they need to address the problem. Simple privacy protections that hinge on obtaining individual consent to enable data to be captured and repurposed by companies cannot be separated from the discriminatory outcomes of that use. This is especially true in an era when most of us (including technology companies themselves) cannot fully understand what algorithms do or why they produce specific results.

**Trust in the government creates government efficacy, causes econ growth, climate regs, vaccine rates, infrastructure, better crisis response, and solves populism.**

**OECD, 13** (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development., 2013, accessed on 7-20-2022, OECD, "Trust in government, policy effectiveness and the governance agenda", https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov\_glance-2013-6-en.pdf?expires=1658341530&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=1996A5CD57990A17A996CE82603295C8)

Trust in government has been identified as one of the most important foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built. Trust is essential for social cohesion and well-being as it affects governments’ ability to govern and enables them to act without having to resort to coercion. Consequently, it is an efficient means of lowering transaction costs in any social, economic and political relationship (Fukuyama, 1995). A high level of trust in government might increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations. 1. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND THE GOVERNANCE AGENDA 22 GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013 © OECD 2013 Core levels of trust in government are necessary for the fair and effective functioning of government institutions – such as adherence to the rule of law, or the delivery of basic public services and the provision of infrastructure. The rule of law and independent judiciary are particularly important as their proper functioning is a key driver of trust in government, as established in several studies (Knack and Zak, 2003; Johnston, Krahn and Harrison, 2006; Blind, 2007). As well-functioning government institutions matter for business investment decisions, trust in them is a necessary ingredient to spur economic growth (Dasgupta, 2009; Algan and Cuha, 2013). Trust in government institutions at the same time influences individual behaviour in ways that could support desired policy outcomes. This may range from rather narrowly defined policies and programmes (such as participation in vaccination campaigns) to broader policy reforms (e.g. environmental regulation or pension reform). Trust is important because many public programmes create the opportunity for free riding and opportunistic behaviour. Trust could reduce the risk of such behaviour to the extent that people are prepared to sacrifice some immediate benefits if they have positive expectations of the longer-term outcome of public policies, either at a personal level (pensions) or by contributing to the common good (redistribution of income through taxation). Trust in government may help governments to implement structural reforms with long term benefits. Many reforms involve sacrificing short-term satisfaction for longer-term gains and will require broader social and political consensus to be effective and sustainable. In a high-trust environment, such reforms may not only be properly enacted and implemented, but could be sustained long enough to bear their fruits. This extends the time frame for policy decisions. In a low-trust climate, citizen will prioritise immediate, appropriable and partial benefits, and will induce politicians to seek short-term and opportunistic gains through free-riding and populist attitudes (Gyorffy, 2013). Trust in government could improve compliance with rules and regulations and reduce the cost of enforcement. Rules and regulations are never perfect or complete enough to eliminate abuse. Their effectiveness depends on the extent to which people see them as fair and legitimate enough to outweigh the benefits of non-compliance. This is particularly important for regulations where the gap between the cost of compliance and personal benefits is large and where control is more difficult. Taxation is an example of the first, while traffic regulations are an example of the second. Trust in the regulator can lead to higher voluntary compliance (Murphy, 2004). Trust in government institutions could help to increase confidence in the economy by facilitating economic decisions, such as on investment and consumption that foster economic growth. Trust in institutions as well as interpersonal trust may reduce the perception of risks linked to decisions ranging from the consumption of durables to job mobility, worker hiring and investment. An increase in trust among people raises total factor productivity, therefore fosters economic progress (Dasgupta, 2009). This, in turn, supports economic growth and extends the planning horizon of economic agents, increasing economic dynamism. Trust in government seems to be especially critical in crisis situations, such as natural disasters, economic crisis or political unrest which focuses attention on the core functions of public governance. The capacity of governments to manage crises and to implement successful exit strategies is often a condition for their survival and for their re-election. In the aftermath of major disasters, lack of trust may hamper emergency and recovery GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013 © OECD 2013 23 1. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND THE GOVERNANCE AGENDA procedures causing great harm to society and damaging government’s capacity to act. Likewise, the current economic crisis may reveal dimensions of trust that were not evident in the gradual evolution of countries in the years that preceded it. Trust may run in different directions. It is not only trust of citizens and organisations in government that matters for policy effectiveness; trust of government in citizens and organisations and trust within government may shape policy design and its outcomes (Bouckaert, 2012). How much citizens and businesses are trusted by government is reflected in how government functions and how public services are organised as well as their efficiency and effectiveness – e.g. the tax system, the use of self-regulation and self-monitoring. In addition, citizens’ and businesses’ trust in government and governments’ trust in citizens and businesses feed off one another. An open and responsive government is an enabling environment to reinforce trust between government and citizens in both directions. Unfortunately, trust from and within government is considerably less documented in the literature than trust in government. While trust takes time to be established, it can be lost quickly. It is not sufficient to discuss the impact of trust in government on the performance of government, the economy and society, it is also necessary to describe what might happen if there is an increasing distrust in government. This might lead to less willingness on the part of citizens (and businesses) to obey the law, to make sacrifices during crises or to pay taxes. This could raise costs for government – resulting in declining efficiency – or erode revenues. Declining trust in government might also make it more difficult to attract and retain talent to work for government institutions.

#### Given the preponderance of possible existential events, it is important to focus on creating effective governance broadly that reduces cumulative risk

hÉigeartaigh 17 – Professor @ Cambridge, PhD in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin (Sean, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity”, <https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/technological-wild-cards-existential-risk-and-a-changing-humanity/)//> gcd

Confronting the Limits of Our Knowledge A common theme across these emerging technologies and emerging risks is that a tremendous level of scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement typically exists. This is particularly the case for future scientific progress and capabilities, the ways in which advances in one domain may influence progress in others, and the likely global impacts and risks of projected advances. Active topics of research at CSER include how to obtain useful information from a range of experts with differing views, and how to make meaningful scientific progress on challenges where we have discontinuous data, or few case studies to draw on, or even when we must characterize an entirely unprecedented event. This might be a hypothesized ecological tipping point, which when passed would result in an irreversible march toward the collapse of an entire critical ecosystem. Or it might be a transformative scientific breakthrough such as the development of artificial general intelligence, where we only have current trends in AI capability, hardware, and expert views on the key unsolved problems in the field to draw insight from. It is unrealistic to expect that we can always, or even for the most part, be right. We need to have humility, to expect false positives, and to be able to identify priority research targets from among many weak signals. Recognizing that there are limits to the level of detail and certainty that can be achieved, this work is often combined with work on general principles of scientific and technological governance. For example, work under the heading of “responsible innovation” focuses on the challenge of developing collective stewardship of progress in science and technology in the present, with a view to achieving good future outcomes.21 This combines scientific foresight with processes to involve the key stakeholders at the appropriate stages of a technology’s development. At different stages these stakeholders will include: scientists involved in fundamental research and applied research; industry leaders; researchers working on the risks, benefits, and other impacts of a technology; funders; policymakers; regulators; NGOs and focus groups; and laypeople who will use or be affected by the development of a technology. In the case of technologies with a potential role in global catastrophic risk, the entire global population holds a stake. Therefore decisions with long-term consequences must not rest solely with a small group of people, represent only the values of a small subset of people, or fail to account for the likely impacts on the global population. There have been a number of very encouraging specific examples of such foresight and collaboration, where scientific domain specialists, interdisciplinary experts, funders, and others have worked together to try to guide an emerging technology’s development, establish ethical norms and safety practices, and explore its potential uses and misuses in a scientifically rigorous way. In bioengineering, the famous 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant DNA established important precedents, and more recently summits have been held on advances such as human gene editing. In artificial intelligence, a number of important conferences have been held recently, with enthusiastic participation from academic and industry research leaders in AI alongside interdisciplinary experts and policymakers. A number of the world’s leading AI research teams have established ethical advisory panels to inform and guide their scientific practices, and a cross-industry “partnership on AI to benefit people and society” involving five companies leading fundamental research has recently been announced.22 More broadly, it is crucial that we learn from the lessons of past technologies and, where possible, develop principles and methodologies that we can take forward. This may give us an advantage in preparing for developments that are currently beyond our horizon and that methodologies too deeply tied to specific technologies and risks may not allow. One of the key concerns associated with risks from emerging and future technologies is the rate at which progress occurs and at which the associated threats may arise. While every science will throw up specific challenges and require domain-specific techniques and expertise, any tools or methodologies that help us to intervene reliably earlier are to be welcomed. There may be a limited window of opportunity for averting such risks. Indeed, this window may occur in the early stages of developing a technology, well before the fully mature technology is out in the world, where it is difficult to control. Once Pandora’s box is open, it is very difficult to close. WORKING ON THE (DOOMSDAY) CLOCK Technological progress now offers us a vision of a remarkable future. The advances that have brought us onto an unsustainable pathway have also raised the quality of life dramatically for many, and have unlocked scientific directions that can lead us to a safer, cleaner, more sustainable world. With the right developments and applications of technology, in concert with advances in social, democratic, and distributional processes globally, progress can be made on all of the challenges discussed here. Advances in renewable energy and related technologies, and more efficient energy use—advances that are likely to be accelerated by progress in technologies such as artificial intelligence—can bring us to a point of zero-carbon emissions. New manufacturing capabilities provided by synthetic biology may provide cleaner ways of producing products and degrading waste. A greater scientific understanding of our natural world and the ecosystem services on which we rely will aid us in plotting a trajectory whereby critical environmental systems are maintained while allowing human flourishing. Even advances in education and women’s rights globally, which will play a role in achieving a stable global population, can be aided specifically by the information, coordination, and education tools that technology provides, and more generally by growing prosperity in the relevant parts of the world. There are catastrophic and existential risks that we will simply not be able to overcome without advances in science and technology. These include possible pandemic outbreaks, whether natural or engineered. The early identification of incoming asteroids, and approaches to shift their path, is a topic of active research at NASA and elsewhere. While currently there are no known techniques to prevent or mitigate a supervolcanic eruption, this may not be the case with the tools at our disposal a century from now. And in the longer run, a civilization that has spread permanently beyond the earth, enabled by advances in spaceflight, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming, is one that is much more likely to endure. However, the breathtaking power of the tools we are developing is not to be taken lightly. We have been very lucky to muddle through the advent of nuclear weapons without a global catastrophe. And within this century, it is realistic to expect that we will be able to rewrite much of biology to our purposes, intervene deliberately and in a large-scale way in the workings of our global climate, and even develop agents with intelligence that is fundamentally alien to ours, and may vastly surpass our own in some or even most domains—a development that would have uniquely unpredictable consequences. It is reassuring to note that there are relatively few individual events that could cause an existential catastrophe—one resulting in extinction or a permanent civilizational collapse. Setting aside the very rare events (such as supervolcanoes and asteroids), the most plausible candidates include nuclear winter, extreme global warming or cooling scenarios, the accidental or deliberate release of an organism that radically altered the planet’s functioning, or the release of an engineered pathogen. They also include more speculative future advances: new types of weaponry, runaway artificial intelligence, or maybe physics experiments beyond what we can currently envisage. Many global risks are, in isolation, survivable—at least for some of us—and it is likely that human civilization could recover from them in the long run: less severe global warming, various environmental disasters and ecosystem collapses, widespread starvation, most pandemic outbreaks, conventional warfare (even global). However, this latter class of risks, and factors that might drive them (such as population, resource use, and climate change) should not be ignored in the broader study of existential risk. Nor does it make sense to consider these challenges in isolation: in our interconnected world they all affect each other. The threat of global nuclear war has not gone away, and many scholars believe that it may be rising again (at the time of writing, North Korea has just undergone its most ambitious nuclear test to date). If climate pressures, drought, famine, and other resource pressures serve to escalate geopolitical tensions, or if the potential use of a new technology, such as geoengineering, could lead to a nuclear standoff, then the result is an existential threat. For all these reasons and more, a growing community of scholars across the world believe that the twenty-first century will see greater change and greater challenges than any century in humanity’s past history. It will be a century of unprecedented global pressures, and a century in which extreme and unpredictable events are likely to happen more frequently than ever before in the past. It will also be a century in which the power of technologies unlike any we have had in our past history will hang over us like multiple Damocles’ swords. But it will also be a century in which the technologies we develop, and the institutional structures we develop, may aid us in solving many of the problems we currently face—if we guide their development, and their uses and applications, carefully.

#### (Populism scenario)

#### Public trust in AI is low now- A regulatory framework of **transparency** is key to trust, development and implementation.

Gillespie, Nicole, et. al (2021); (Professor of Management; KPMG Chair in Organizational Trust, The University of Queensland, research fellow; University of Queensland, KPMG; “Executive Summary--Trust in Artificial Intelligence: a five country study”; https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Caitlin-Curtis/publication/356842206\_Trust\_in\_artificial\_Intelligence\_a\_five\_country\_study/links/61b0342cc2e267424d0fd68f/Trust-in-artificial-Intelligence-a-five-country-study.pdf//EF & acd)

Realising the benefits AI offers requires building and maintaining the public’s trust: citizens need to be confident AI is being developed and used in an ethical and trustworthy manner2 . AI poses considerable risks and challenges to society which have raised concerns about whether AI systems are worthy of trust. These concerns have been fuelled by high profile cases of AI use that were biased, discriminatory, manipulative, unlawful, or violated human rights. This survey is the first to take a deep dive into understanding citizen trust and expectations of AI use across multiple countries. To do this, we surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,200+ citizens from the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia, respectively (total sample 6,054). We asked about AI systems in general, as well as AI systems in two domains – healthcare and human resources – where AI is rapidly being deployed and is likely to impact large numbers of citizens. Our findings provide important and timely research insights into citizens’ trust and attitudes towards AI. We draw on these insights to lay out an evidence-based pathway for strengthening trust and acceptance of AI systems, and discuss the implications for government, business and non-government organisations (NGOs). Below, we summarise the key findings. Most of these findings hold across all countries and therefore are reported in aggregate form. Significant country differences in the findings are highlighted.

Trust in artificial intelligence Trust is central to the acceptance of AI, and is influenced by four key drivers Our results confirm that trust strongly influences AI acceptance, and hence is important for the societal uptake of AI and realising its benefits. There are four key drivers that influence citizens’ trust in AI systems: 1) beliefs about the adequacy of current regulations and laws to make AI use safe, 2) the perceived impact of AI on jobs, 3) familiarity and understanding of AI, and 4) the perceived uncertain impact of AI on society. These drivers are important across all five countries. Of these drivers, the perceived adequacy of current regulations and laws is clearly the strongest. This highlights the importance of ensuring adequate regulatory and legal mechanisms are in place to protect people from the risks associated with AI use. Such regulation in turn supports citizen uptake and adoption. Citizens have low trust in AI systems but generally ‘accept’ or ‘tolerate’ AI Trust in AI is low across the five countries, with citizens generally wary or ambivalent about trusting AI systems. Only about a quarter (28%) of citizens are willing to trust AI systems in general. Two out of five citizens are unwilling to share their information or data with an AI system and a third are unwilling to trust the output of AI systems (e.g. a recommendation or decision). While many citizens are hesitant to trust AI systems, they generally accept (42%) or tolerate (28%) AI, but few approve (15%) or embrace (6%) it, and some outright reject AI (9%). Citizens’ trust and support of AI depends on the purpose of the AI system: the public is more trusting and supportive of AI use in healthcare (i.e. for aiding medical diagnosis and treatment), and less trusting and supportive of AI use in human resources (i.e. for aiding hiring and promotion decisions). Citizens also view the benefits of AI in healthcare as greater than the risks, whereas they view the risks of AI in human resources as greater than the benefits. However, regardless of the application, citizens are still wary with the majority unwilling or ambivalent about trusting AI in both healthcare (63%) and human resources (77%). Younger generations, notably Gen Z and Millennials, are generally more trusting and accepting of AI systems than older generations. In Germany and Australia, those with a university education are also more accepting of AI than those without a degree. Confidence in entities to develop, use and regulate AI varies across countries Citizens have the most confidence in their national universities and research institutions, as well as their defence organisations, to develop and use (71-77%) and regulate and govern AI (67-73%) in the best interest of the public. In contrast, citizens have less confidence in governments and commercial organisations to do this. 58% – 62% have confidence in commercial organisations and government to develop and use AI, and 54 – 58% have confidence in these entities to regulate and govern AI. This may be because most citizens believe commercial organisations (62%) and government (52%) innovate with AI for financial gain, rather than for societal benefit. Countries differ in their confidence of entities to use and govern AI. Americans are less confident in a broad range of entities to regulate and govern AI, compared to citizens in other countries. US and UK respondents are also less confident in their governments to develop and use AI in the public’s best interest compared to other countries, a finding that mirrors the lower trust these countries have in their governments more generally. In contrast, Australians are more confident in their research institutions and defence forces to develop, use and regulate AI. ©2021 The University of Queensland ©2021 KPMG, an Australian partnership and a member firm of the KPMG global organisation of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Limited, a private English company limited by guarantee. All rights reserved. The KPMG name and logo are trademarks used under license by the independent member firms of the KPMG global organisation.  Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation. Trust in artificial intelligence 3 Citizens expect AI to be regulated with external, independent oversight The large majority of citizens (81%) expect AI to be regulated. While there are small country differences, there is general agreement (61-62%) that there should be a new, dedicated independent AI regulator, and that government and existing regulators should play a role in the regulation of AI systems. Co-regulation and involvement of industry that develop or use AI is also seen as desirable by the majority (54-59%). US respondents are less likely than respondents in other countries to report that government and existing regulators should regulate AI, and more likely to believe AI regulation is not required. In contrast, UK respondents are more likely to expect a new, dedicated, independent AI regulator than other countries. Current safeguards are insufficient given the uncertainty around AI Despite the strong expectations of AI regulation, most citizens (67%) across the five countries either disagree or are ambivalent that current regulations and laws are sufficient to make the use of AI safe. This powerfully highlights the importance of strengthening and communicating the regulatory and legal framework governing AI (including data privacy laws) across all surveyed countries. Most citizens (66-79%) in each country believe the impact of AI on society is uncertain and unpredictable. It is therefore not surprising that the large majority (96%) expect AI governance challenges to be carefully managed. The public view data challenges such as surveillance (61%), fake online content (60%), cyber-attacks (60%), and data privacy (59%) to be the most likely to impact large numbers of citizens within their country in the next 10 years. Half also viewed disease misdiagnosis as likely to impact society. Citizens expect organisations to uphold the principles of trustworthy AI Citizens in each country have very clear expectations of the principles and related practices they expect organisations deploying AI systems to uphold in order to be trusted. These principles mirror those proposed by the European Commission’s High Level Expert Group on AI. Almost all citizens (95%) expect AI systems to meet high standards of: – performance and accuracy – data privacy – security and governance – transparency and explainability – accountability – risk and impact mitigation – fairness – human oversight Most citizens (more than 57%) would be more willing to use AI systems if assurance mechanisms were in place, such as independent AI ethics reviews, AI ethics certifications, national standards for transparency, and AI codes of conduct. Organisations can directly build trust and consumer willingness to use AI systems by supporting and implementing these mechanisms. ©2021 The University of Queensland ©2021 KPMG, an Australian partnership and a member firm of the KPMG global organisation of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Limited, a private English company limited by guarantee. All rights reserved. The KPMG name and logo are trademarks used under license by the independent member firms of the KPMG global organisation.  Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation. 4 Trust in artificial intelligence Citizens feel comfortable with some but not all uses of AI at work Only about one in five citizens (22%) believe AI will create more jobs than it will eliminate. Despite this, 45% of employed citizens report using AI in their work, but most use AI rarely or occasionally. Most citizens (70-76%) are comfortable with the use of AI at work for the purposes of task automation and augmentation. However, they are less comfortable with the use of AI for employeefocused activities, such as monitoring and evaluating employees, or in recruitment and selection. Citizens want to know more about AI but currently have low awareness and understanding of AI and its uses Most citizens (62%) have heard about AI. However, three out of every five citizens report a low understanding of AI, including how and when it is used in everyday applications. For example, even though 76% of citizens use social media, only 41% are aware social media uses AI. Men and the university-educated are more likely to be aware of AI and understand when it is being used. The good news is that most citizens across all countries (83%) want to know more about AI. Considered together, the results suggest there is a strong need and appetite for a public AI literacy program. A pathway to strengthen public trust in AI Collectively these survey insights provide an evidence-based pathway for building and maintaining the trust and acceptance of AI systems by citizens of western nations. As we discuss in detail in the concluding section, this pathway requires government and business to take action by: 1) living up to citizens’ expectations of trustworthy AI, 2) strengthening the regulatory framework for governing AI, and 3) enhancing AI literacy of the public and employees. The survey insights are relevant for informing AI policy and practice within business, government, and NGOs at the national level, as well as multinational and pan-governmental AI policy and practice (e.g. the Global Partnership on AI). Resources are available to support organisations to embed the principles and practices of trustworthy AI into their everyday operations, and put in place mechanisms that support stakeholder trust in their use of AI3 . Given the rapid investment and deployment of AI, it will be important to regularly re-examine public trust and expectations of AI systems as they evolve over time, to ensure AI use is aligned with and meeting societal expectations.

The benefits and promise of AI for society and business are undeniable. AI is helping people make better predictions and informed decisions, enabling innovation, productivity gains and improved efficiency, and lowering costs. It is helping protect physical and financial security and facilitating the global fight against COVID-19, to name just a few of its beneficial applications. The risks and challenges that AI poses for society are equally undeniable. These include the risk of codifying and reinforcing unfair biases, infringing on human rights such as privacy, spreading fake online content, technological unemployment and the dangers stemming from mass surveillance technologies, critical AI failures and autonomous weapons. These issues are causing public concern and raising questions about the trustworthiness and regulation of AI systems6 . The public’s trust in AI technologies is vital for continual acceptance. If AI systems do not prove to be worthy of trust, their widespread acceptance and adoption will be hindered, and the potentially vast societal and economic benefits will not be fully realised7 . Despite the central importance of trust, to date little is known about citizens’ trust in AI or what influences it across countries. Prior public attitude surveys8 have instead examined general acceptance and support. In 2020, we conducted the first deep dive survey examining Australians’ trust in AI systems (Lockey, Gillespie & Curtis, 2020). This report extends this deep dive on trust in AI by examining citizen perspectives across five nation states: the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia. This multi-country survey is designed to understand and quantify citizens’ trust in and support of AI, to benchmark these attitudes over time, as well as explore similarities and differences in trust and expectations across five western countries. Understanding similarities and differences across countries is important given AI systems are not bounded by physical borders and are rapidly being deployed and used across the globe. By taking this deep dive into the question of trust, this research provides a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of US, Canadian, German, UK and Australian citizens’ trust in AI systems. The research provides insights into the key drivers of trust, community expectations and confidence in the regulation of AI and management of societal challenges associated with AI. It also sheds light on citizens’ current understanding and awareness of AI, and the practices and principles citizens expect organisations to use to responsibly design, develop, deploy and govern AI in society and the workplace.

#### AI innovation key to NATO cohesion

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During the Cold War, the allies had dedicated instruments—for example, the Cooperation Committee—to monitor and control technological diffusion. Now, to facilitate innovation and improve its adaptability through innovation, NATO needs a strategic-level, civil-military capacity for horizon scanning, technology assessment, and monitoring. Such a capability would build on work currently undertaken by NATO ACT and the Science and Technology Organization, and it would be complementary to the Innovation Board and Defense Innovation Accelerator. However, it would broaden the scope to include a variety of military and civilian, state, and private-sector actors active in the EDTs innovation ecosystem. It would deliver constant understanding (including taxonomies) and intelligence on technological developments in academia, the private sector, and the military across the alliance, as well as the authority to link such developments to NATO innovation priorities. It would contribute to the resilience of allies by monitoring the transfer of jointly agreed critical EDTs (software and hardware) to non-NATO and non-partner countries. And it would provide intelligence and understanding among the allies on adversarial developments in defense innovation and EDTs uptake. Established as a distinct entity or within an existing NATO structure, this capability should regularly consult with competent EU bodies to exchange information, improve understanding, and facilitate coordination on output and commonality of purpose. Figuring out the added value of NATO-enabled innovation in EDTs and how to build a sustainable and mutually reinforcing relationship with prevalent national innovation efforts is another key element. Prioritization is essential in innovation efforts, particularly when there is little certainty about what technology areas or combinations yield sustainable strategic advantages. Without discussing the merits of every innovation effort, NATO should adopt a strategic “systems of systems” focus on innovation in EDTs. While there is merit in strategic planning for individual technology areas, the added value in alliance defense innovation efforts is a more applied focus on technology convergence—what mix of new technologies deliver the more sustainable strategic military advantage in the medium- and long-term in the context of great-power competition. For example, the integration of AI, autonomy, and digitally enabled human enhancement opens multiple possibilities of adversarial exploitation of the cognitive and physical domain.23 Some work in this field is ongoing, but it requires more investment, frequent iteration, and a larger scale. In February, the Science and Technology Organization organized a two-day tabletop exercise that explored combinations of new technologies and their efficiency in various scenarios.24 Similarly, in May the European Defense Agency organized a ten-day Technology Foresight Exercise to inform the revision of the European research and capability development priorities.25 Rob Murray, the head of NATO Innovation Unit has argued that “the nations that win [the technology adoption] race may be those with the most agile bureaucracy rather those with the best technology.”26 Organizational change is a prerequisite of success in defense innovation and the adoption of EDTs—and one aspect of NATO’s adaptation patterns. But it is only one measure of its success. Setting the right benchmarks for defense innovation and EDTs is also critical and it requires a link to clear and measurable improvements in military capabilities, posture and power projection, enhanced resilience, and deterrence and defense in a multi-domain framework, as well as the ability to compete below the threshold of armed conflict against hybrid threats. To this effect, NATO needs to be linked to more experimentation, wargaming, and red teaming to determine how deterrence, defense, and operational capacity will evolve, how resilience can be enhanced, and how to disrupt rival coercive operations, above and below the threshold of armed conflict, across all domains of warfare. Not all allies have the defense funding, technological capacity, skills, and military infrastructure to facilitate rapid defense innovation, including the adoption and scaling of emerging technologies. And not all that have such resources and knowledge are willing to share them in collaborative innovation processes. Leading allies—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—already have national-focused approaches to the adoption of EDTs. By contrast, for most Central and Eastern countries EDTs in defense are mainly a long-term prospect. Previous challenges in integrating cyber capabilities into NATO operations, persistent capability gaps among the allies, and slow standardization procedures are a good indication of the magnitude of the challenge, which is acknowledged at the highest levels of NATO decision-making. As Secretary-General Stoltenberg has stated, a technological gap between the allies would undermine interoperability and weaken alliance cohesion. In the context of the NATO AI and big data strategies and the Defense Innovation Accelerator, allies should reflect on how to improve and facilitate technological transfers among themselves. This could enable smaller allies to specialize in niche EDTs capabilities, as has been the case with cyber, for example, and could prevent the emergence of new technological and capability gaps between the allies. The Biden administration’s focus on shared democratic values and the digital agenda, and its willingness to strengthen NATO and technology partnerships, constitute a window of opportunity for the alliance. It should be fully capitalized on to accelerate transatlantic collaborative defense innovation.

#### Russia will exploit lack of trust, cooperation and cohesion between NATO members to instigate nuclear crises---extinction.

Kulesa ’18 [Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>]

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed?

Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions.

Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.

Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses.

Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.

The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.

With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.

Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

Conflict termination

Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate.

#### NATO cohesion checks numerous existential crises.

Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/>]

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

#### Military cooperation key to increasing transparency

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 **-** Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

Direct military-to-military engagement on deconfliction measures for AI and autonomous systems could be valuable, both as a precursor to potentially more fulsome specific measures, but also a valuable communication mechanism in their own right. For example, if militaries deploy an autonomous vehicle into a contested area where other military forces will be operating, a direct military-to-military channel would give the other side an opportunity to ask questions about its behavior and the deploying side an opportunity to communicate expectations, **to avoid unintended escalation** or incidents. Similarly, such a venue would give militaries an opportunity to ask questions and communicate information about other capabilities or investments that may threaten mutual stability, such as investments in AI, autonomy, or automation in nuclear operations. There are many advantages of direct, private communication over more indirect, public communication. Nations can send targeted messages just to the intended audience, rather than dealing with multiple audiences, including domestic ones. There may be **reduced political pressure** to save face or show strength publicly, although of course some of these pressures may still exist in private channels. And direct discussions afford more high-bandwidth information exchange with greater back-and-forth between sides than may be possible via public messages broadcast to a wider audience. One challenge, of course, is that these dialogues are most challenging precisely when they are needed the most: when there is a lack of transparency and trust on both sides. However, history shows that such **dialogues are possibl**e and indeed can be valuable measures in **increasing transparency and reducing mutual risks.**

# T

### T – Article V

#### W/M— Plan text in a Vacuum – it’s the only non-arbitrary standard

#### C/I—

#### NATO isn’t just Article 5---Article 3 and 4 requirements require training and consultation, and emerging tech requires non-Article 5 activities

Brady ’13 [Colonel Brian H. Brady; October; Judge Advocate, U.S. Army assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency Office of General Counsel Operations, former staff legal advisor (LEGAD) in the Office of the Legal Advisor, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Command Transformation, Joint Warfare Centre; 2013 Army Law. 4, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Legal Advisor: A Primer,” Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-485, lexis]

II. NATO Legal Authority The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a creation of international agreement. A mosaic of international agreements establishes the NATO Alliance, states its mission, and grants privileges and immunities to its subordinate elements. The next section provides an overview of some of these key agreements. A. North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 The North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, establishes NATO legal authority, organization, and function. 11 NATO is both a political entity and a military entity. NATO's political leader is the Secretary General (currently Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a Danish citizen), while its military leader is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (currently U.S. Air Force General Philip M. Breedlove). The treaty establishes both a political and military role for the organization. 1. Core Mission and Article 5 Article 5 of the treaty states the core mission of NATO. 12 This mission is based upon article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for collective self-defense. Article 5 states as follows: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 13 NATO invoked the provisions of article 5 to the treaty for the first time in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. 14 NATO Operation Active Endeavor (naval operations in support of 9/11 counterterrorism missions in the Mediterranean) was one of the first NATO operations authorized under article 5. 15 2. Non-Article 5 Activity Not all NATO military activity can be justified under article 5 to the treaty. NATO member states 16 have an obligation to train and prepare for their defense. This is articulated in article 3 to the treaty. 17 The political aspect of NATO is reflected in the article 4 requirement that parties consult one another to resolve disputes or identify potential threats to the alliance. 18 These authorities have been interpreted to give NATO its own engagement activity (mirroring the activity of a U.S. combatant command), such as the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue. 19 While article 5 is a good start point in articulating the legal basis for traditional NATO operations, the LEGAL) may also refer to underlying United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) giving authority to engage in armed conflict under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 20 In this light, NATO doctrine provides for operational responses beyond article 5 self-defense. To address the multitude of security scenarios facing the alliance, NATO doctrine recognizes a category of activity known as Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO). 21 Non-Article 5 operations cover contingencies that do not amount to a response to an armed attack on alliance territory. 22 The earliest example of this type of operation includes the NATO-lead of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 23 The doctrine states as follows: NA5CRO range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies through operations in support of peace, countering irregular threat activities, to combat . . . this could include, but is not limited to, extraction operations, tasks in support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR) or support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement, sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, peace enforcement (PE), and counterinsurgency (COIN). 24 3. Organizational Authority Under Article 9 The North Atlantic Treaty establishes the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 25 All NATO entities owe their base authority to some action taken by the NAC. As part of NATO's basic functions, the NAC establishes subsidiary bodies which include political, military, and other organizational entities within NATO. On the military side, the NAC established the Military Committee (MC), which provides direction and guidance on military policy and strategy. 26 The MC is supported by its International Military Staff (IMS). Among other things, the NAC approves rules of engagement (ROE) and target lists for specified NATO operations. 27 The NAC is chaired by the Secretary General of NATO (Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen), who builds consensus within this political and military body. The Secretary General is supported by the International Staff (IS) who works NATO's political agenda. The NAC is also empowered to establish a form of subsidiary body that is now known as a NATO Agency. 28 NATO Agencies are the executive body within a subsidiary body. 29 NATO agencies include such entities as the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), NATO Mamtenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), and the NATO Communications and Information System Services Agency (NCSA). 30 Soldiers who eat at a NATO dining facility on the NATO-operated part of Kabul International Airport (KAIA) eat meals that were contracted and paid for by a NAMSA.

#### 3. Prefer it—

a—Predictability – Brady cites NATO’s army pamphlet---key to avoid shifting to the margins of debate

b—Functional Limits—Process CP, Agent DAs, and the K are better checks

c—Other Words Check—Security Cooperation, Topic areas are better checks

d—AFF Ground—cooperating with all of NATO is core AFF ground—forcing the AFF into random definitional restrictions ensures they lose

e—Topic Education—their model of debate decks AFF creativity leading to stale debates

g—Reasonability—competing interpretations incentivizes constantly moving towards a more limited topic—AFF prep becomes impossible—preserving AFF research key to debatability

### T – Security Cooperation

#### 1—W/M–Plan text in a Vacuum – it’s the only non-arbitrary standard

#### 2—W/M – we do mil to mil coop- that’s Boulanin and Horrowitz and Scharre

#### 3—C/I–

#### Security coop entails transferring defense articles, mil-to-mil exercises, military education, and building partner capacity. Both DOD-implemented Title 22 and DOD-administered Title 10 programs are topical.

Arabia ’21 [Christina; May 17; CRS Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade; Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation,” https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf]

Security Cooperation (SC) Overview

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the term security cooperation (SC) to refer broadly to DOD interactions with foreign security establishments. SC activities include

• the transfer of defense articles and services;

• military-to-military exercises;

• military education, training, and advising; and

• capacity building of partner security forces.

SC programs are intended to encourage and enable partner nations (PNs) to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. They are considered a key tool for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These activities are executed through both DOD-administered SC programs (authorized under Title 10, U.S.C.) and DOD-implemented State Department (DOS) security assistance (SA) programs (authorized under Title 22, U.S.C). Beyond grant-based programs, SC encompasses the Foreign Military Sales program and enables U.S. and PN collaboration on defense articles. The following sections focus on DOD “Title 10” activities.

SC: Policy and Objectives

SC activities aim to achieve particular objectives in support of U.S. national security and defense strategies. Specifically, SC may build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests, enhance military capabilities of U.S. allies and partners, and provide the United States with access to PNs. Under the overarching goal of furthering U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, SC emphasizes partnerships, aiming to be mutually beneficial for the United States and its partners. SC activities aim to develop and strengthen a PN’s ability to provide internal security, contribute to regional security efforts, combat shared threats, and increase military interoperability with the United States.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) signaled the Trump Administration’s intention to shift SC activities from nearly two decades of prioritizing counterterrorism toward “great power competition” (GPC) with Russia and China. The shift raised questions as to how SC should be realigned to meet this objective and what the implications could be for scaling down counterterrorism-focused SC activities in Africa and the Middle East, especially as Russia and China increase their influence. Some DOD officials and defense analysts have suggested that rather than a shift, counterterrorism, as well as irregular warfare, should remain priorities within GPC. The Biden Administration has yet to release a new NDS; however, its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance broadly identifies authoritarianism and strategic competition as priority threats that require coordination and cooperation with allies and partners.

SC: Roles and Responsibilities

Many SC activities require DOD to coordinate with multiple DOD components and other federal departments, primarily DOS. Some DOD SC activities require varying levels of coordination with DOS. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) exercises overall direction, authority, and control over SC matters.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) represents the interests of the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) in SC matters and is tasked with directing, administering, and executing many SC programs, developing SC policy, and providing DOD-wide SC guidance. DSCA is also DOD’s main interlocutor between the PNs, implementing agencies, and the defense industry. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) oversees and approves some SC training activities that are managed by DSCA. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) coordinates those SC activities executed by special operations forces (SOF). DOS leads U.S. foreign aid and has final say on SA. DOS’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the principal link to DOD and ensures that SA is integrated with other U.S. policies and activities at the country, regional, and global levels. PM also determines PN eligibility, appropriate SA programs, and which defense articles and equipment are permitted for transfer.

Table

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Title 10 SC Reforms from the FY2017 NDAA

The post-9/11 period saw the rapid and piecemeal expansion of DOD SC activities, mainly as temporary authorities that required annual renewal in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) consolidated and codified existing Title 10 SC authorities into 10 U.S.C. §§301-386. Other provisions aimed to make improvements to the SC programs and themselves, as well as improvements in the management and oversight of those programs. Key reforms from the FY2017 NDAA included requirements for the following:

• A consolidated DOD budget request for Title 10 SC programs and activities (10 U.S.C. §381); the first was released for FY2019.

• Harmonized congressional notification requirements for most DOD train and equip programs (10 U.S.C. §333).

• Institutional capacity building programs to strengthen partner defense institutions (10 U.S.C. §332).

• A DOD SC Workforce Development Program to manage a professional workforce in support of SC programs and activities (10 U.S.C. §384).

• A program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) to be informed and supported by strategic evaluations on initial PN assessments, monitoring of implementation, and the efficiency and effectiveness of SC programs and activities (10 U.S.C. §383).

#### 4.— Prefer it —

#### a—Predictability – it references DoD directives on security cooperation – key to avoid shifting to the margins of debate

#### b—Functional Limits ­– Process CPs, Agent DAs, and the K are better checks

#### c—AFF Ground – ensuring security cooperation is core AFF ground – forcing the AFF into random definitional restrictions ensures they lose.

#### d—Topic Education ­– their model of debate decks AFF creativity leading to stale debates

#### e—Reasonability – competing interpretations incentivizes constantly moving towards a more limited topic – AFF flex becomes impossible leading to stale debates – preserving AFF research key to debateability

### T – AI

#### 1—W/M— Plan text in a Vacuum – it’s the only non-arbitrary standard

#### 2—W/M–the plan is autonomous AI

#### 3—C/I– AI is a broad umbrella term referring to any technique aimed at approximating human cognition using machines----encompasses ML, neural networks, data mining, expert systems, robotics, and more.

Chiles ’19 [John and Clara Reyes; 2019; Partner at Burr & Forman LLP; Assistant Professor of Law and Director of R&D at Michigan State Law School and Faculty Associate at Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University; “Robot Loans: Artificial Intelligence and Its Place in Consumer Finance?,” 73 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 205, WestLaw]

John: Carla is an Assistant Professor of Law and Director of R&D at Michigan State Law School. She's a Faculty Associate at Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. Or is it at the university?

Carla: University.

\*210 John: University, not the law school, which is a think tank collaboration of a number of top intellectuals in this field of fintech. Her focus is on the intersection of blockchain and law, but she knows AI, because she's authoring a casebook on AI and the law. And she's very familiar with all the writings on this issue, so she's an asset to our discussion here.

I want to do something that. ... It may seem elementary to some of you, but having sat through a number of discussions of the use of AI and machine learning and large datasets and analysis for credit-related issues, I was puzzled exactly how this works, to be honest with you. How does the AI model work? How does the machine learning model work? And what is done with big datasets, particularly non-traditional data that's being used more and more by fintech companies? As a kickoff to this, I wanted to ask Carla to give us an overview of how these particular programs and tools, that are being developed in fairly substantial quantities and numbers, how these actually work and how the machine learning and the large dataset analysis is deployed. Just how it works, so we can understand.

Carla: So, in other words, you're asking the professor to do what professors do, which is lay the foundation definitionally. I can do this. Generally speaking, there's really no straightforward consensus on the definition of artificial intelligence. As a result, discussion of AI and its sub-fields really are susceptible to a lot of hype and confusion. For instance, people use the term “machine learning” and “artificial intelligence” interchangeably, but they're really not the same thing, and so the goal here is just to break some of that down a little bit. At a pretty high level still, but just to lay the foundation definitionally.

A best consensus definition of artificial intelligence is that it's a broad term, an umbrella term, used to refer to a large set of information science. It's best understood as a set of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human cognition using machines. And the main takeaway is that, although we use the term “artificial intelligence” as though it's monolithic, it's really not. It covers a range of sub fields, which include, and I should say “but is not limited to” as lawyers say, neural networks, vision, data mining, expert systems, robotics, natural language processing, natural language understanding, planning, and evolutionary computation.

We actually have a class on evolutionary analysis and the law at MSU Law School, so all of these are relevant to the legal field and legal issues, but the one primarily people think about and mean when they use the term “artificial intelligence” is machine learning. Machine learning refers generally to the capacity of a system to improve its performance at some task, some specific task, over time. Often, the task involves recognizing patterns in datasets. Although machine learning outputs can include everything from translating languages to grasping objects or helping to drive a car.

\*211 Specifically, machine learning relies on algorithms to analyze huge datasets. It basically performs predictive analytics far faster than any human can on a dataset that's larger than any human could reasonably get through efficiently. Notably, however and something I think that gets lost sometimes in legal discussions, is that, generally speaking, oftentimes, not always but often, the machine learning system is both ... and this should be always, is both designed and created by humans, and then you put inputs into it and it output results. Those outputs are then interpreted and applied by humans, right?

#### 4—Prefer Chiles —

#### a—Predictability – considers the consensus when making a definition– key to avoid shifting to the margins of debate

#### b—Intent to define – specifically defines AI and ML with separate definitions

#### c—Functional Limits ­– Process CPs, Agent DAs, and the K are better checks

#### d—AFF Ground – AI is core AFF ground – forcing the AFF into random definitional restrictions ensures they lose

#### e—Topic Education ­– their model of debate decks AFF creativity leading to stale debates

#### f—Reasonability – competing interpretations incentivizes constantly moving towards a more limited topic – AFF prep becomes impossible – preserving AFF research key to debatability

# CP

## Turkey PIC

### 2AC—Turkey’s key

**Turkey key AI player**

**Shkurti, 21** (Gloria Shkurti, Gloria Shkurti Özdemir is a PhD candidate at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University and writing her dissertation on the application of artificial intelligence in the field of military., 9-27-2021, accessed on 7-23-2022, Politics Today, "Can Turkey’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy Be a Game Changer? - Politics Today", https://politicstoday.org/can-turkeys-artificial-intelligence-strategy-be-a-game-changer/)

SUSCRIE

By August 2021, more than 50 countries have announced their National Artificial Intelligence Strategies (NAIS). On August 24, 2021, Turkey joined these countries by publishing a 100-page document, where it announced its full AI road map for the next five years (2021-2025). At the beginning, the strategy provides a general background of the global developments and trends in the field of AI and the current situation in Turkey.

Subsequently, the document touches upon the main AI values and principles that are adopted in the current AI strategy such as, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law or the principles of proportionality, fairness, and privacy. At the end, the document touches upon the main strategic priorities and objectives of the Turkish government for the next five years followed by a detailed explanation of the mechanisms of governance that will be created for the implementation of NAIS and the coordination of the process.

Prepared by the Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Industry and Technology, the strategy, among others, laid out Turkey’s aims to increase the share of artificial intelligence in its GDP to 5%, open 50,000 new jobs in the sector, and increase the number of AI postgraduate students to 10,000 by 2025. Within the same period, Turkey plans to become among the top 20 countries in the international AI indices.

### 1AR—Turkey’s Key

**Turkey key to AI**

**Sharma, 22** ( Dr. Sanur Sharma, a researcher working as Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA with 7 years of research experience and 9 years as an educator., 5-30-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, Eurasia Review, "NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis", https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/)

Another challenge for NATO is to standardize rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems.

## UN CP

#### The UN can’t deter because our threats are in the UN

**Daalder, 1999** (Ivo H. Daalder, Ivo H. Daalder is President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of World Review with Ivo Daalder. He served as the US ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013., 3-1-1999, accessed on 7-23-2022, Brookings, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force", https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-the-un-and-the-use-of-force/)

The French perspective is based on the notion that the use force in international affairs, by a single state or group of states like NATO, is ultimately governed by the United Nations Charter. The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of peace (Article 39). At the same time, the Charter recognizes that states have the right to defend themselves individually and collectively (Article 51) and that regional arrangements or agencies can maintain peace and security within their region, provided they do so in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Article 52). The first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security (Article 1) and one of its key principles requires members to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” (Article 2).

**China and Russia are permanent members of UNSC**

**UN, 22** (UN, Literally the UN, 4-5-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, UN News, "What can the UN do? 5 of your questions answered", https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115592)

The Security Council, made up of 15 members – five permanent seats belong to China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with 10 non-permanent seats that rotate by election among other UN member countries – is the body that was granted the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

**China and Russia can veto the plan**

**UN, 22** (UN, Literally the UN, 4-5-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, UN News, "What can the UN do? 5 of your questions answered", https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115592)

In other words, a negative vote by any of the permanent five (China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom or the United States) can prevent the adoption by the Council of any draft resolution relating to substantive matters. Since 1946, all five permanent members – widely referred to as the ‘P5’ – have exercised the right of veto at one time or another on a variety of issues. To date, approximately 49 per cent of the vetoes had been cast by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and thereafter the Russian Federation (the membership of the USSR in the United Nations, including in the Security Council, was continued by the Russian Federation), 29 per cent by the United States, 10 per cent by the United Kingdom, and six per cent each by China and France.

**Russia has vetoed recently**

**UN, 22** (UN, 2-25-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, UN News, "Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine", https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802)

Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on Friday that would have demanded that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops, a move several Council members said was deplorable, but inevitable. While 11 of the Council’s 15 members voted in favour of the text, China India, and the United Arab Emirates abstained. A ‘no’ vote from any one of the five permanent members of the Council stops action on any measure put before it. The body’s permanent members are: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Security Council’s latest attempt to end the Ukraine crisis caps a week of activity at the United Nations seeking a diplomatic offramp to Russian military action in the country, including near daily press stakeouts by the Secretary-General, three emergency Council sessions, and one meeting of the 193-member General Assembly, which saw speaker after speaker call for de-escalation.

**Russia says no**

**Zaverukha, 22** (Iryna Zaverukha, Iryna Zaverukha, former deputy dean of law at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv in Ukraine, teaches public international law and international criminal law at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles., 3-3-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, Los Angeles Times, "Op-Ed: The U.N. should kick Russia off the Security Council", https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-03-03/united-nations-should-remove-russia-from-the-security-council)

Keeping Russia in this inner circle has yielded no benefit for the international community. The U.N. is not restraining the Kremlin’s belligerence thus far, and we have no reason to believe that it ever will if Russia continues to have veto authority. Removing Russia from the Security Council would signal an end to the impotent response to the aggression, autocracy and nuclear threat. It would signal that the U.N. didn’t abandon its main purpose. At this point, the expulsion of Russia is not mere punishment. It is lifesaving necessity. The time for condemnation, punishment and expectations of changes in Russian behavior has long since passed. By the time Russia massed more than 190,000 troops at the Ukrainian border, the international community was well aware of the imminent threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. Such action by Russia was again in direct contravention of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine, signed by Russia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom in 1994.

### UN Fails

#### Ukraine proves, UN is useless

**Semler, 22** (Ashley Semler, Currently Senior Producer at the Atlantic Council. Also has produced for CNN and BBC, 4-15-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, CNN, "Why isn’t the UN doing more to stop what’s happening in Ukraine?", https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/15/politics/united-nations-ukraine-russia/index.html)

Many people who have watched the UN for years agree that the UN Security Council looks impotent in this moment, with the world watching. The Security Council was designed in a different era, after World War II, with a membership and veto system that have ultimately restricted its effectiveness in dealing with this global conflict. Other parts of the UN have responded more effectively to the humanitarian and refugee crises the war has created. Former US Ambassador to the UN [John Bolton](https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/politics/bolton-book-what-we-learned/index.html), who served under Republican Presidents including George W. Bush and Donald Trump, agreed with Zelensky’s assessment. “I thought he was absolutely right,” Bolton told CNN’s chief political analyst Gloria Borger. “And I thought one more convert to understanding what’s wrong with the United Nations. Its political institutions are fundamentally broken.” Bolton has never been a big fan of the UN. He’s famous for saying, back in 1994, that if the UN Secretariat building in New York “lost 10 stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.” There have been many moments of deadlock before in the Security Council when the big powers disagree. But this moment has drawn outsized attention globally. “This is the single biggest crisis to hit the UN since the end of the Cold War,” said Richard Gowan, the UN Director for the International Crisis Group. “It is possible that this does mark the beginning of a sort of fundamental rupture amongst the great powers that will make UN diplomacy see vastly harder going forward.” Bottom of Form The system was designed this way: to prevent global conflict but also to reward the main winners of World War II, according to Gowan. Key veto power When the United Nations [charter was signed in 1945,](https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/united-nations-fast-facts/index.html) it established the Security Council with five permanent members and six nonpermanent members. The permanent members – the US, the UK, France, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China – were each given the power to veto any resolutions they opposed. “It was Franklin Roosevelt who wanted to set up an organization that would police the world after the defeat of Nazi Germany,” Gowan said. “But the only way he could get Russia and other powers to agree to that deal, was if they had the ability to block any actions against themselves.” The late Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin himself insisted on that power as a way for his state to protect itself. Today, the Security Council has 15 members, but the five permanent members have remained the same, with Russia holding the former Soviet Union’s seat and China taking the seat of the Republic of China. And the veto hasn’t changed either. “What we’re seeing is, when there’s a fundamental disagreement among the permanent members, nothing happens,” Bolton said. <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/06/world/meanwhile-zelensky-un-intl/index.html>The UN charter also makes it impossible to do another thing Zelensky suggested: kick Russia off the Security Council, because the country can veto that too. Over the years, countries and diplomats have suggested to reform the council by adding more permanent members to make it better reflect the contemporary geopolitical reality, or even try to take away the veto power. But no country wants to dilute its power. “I’m being honest with you, I don’t think anyone’s going to want to give up their veto,” former US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson, who served under former Democratic President Bill Clinton, told Borger. Richardson points out that the United States has used the veto to protect its own interests – and may need to again. “It helped us in the Iraq War. It helped us in Bosnia. It helps us in conflicts in Africa,” he said. “So no country that is a permanent member wants to give up their veto. And I would be against the US giving up their veto right now, just so that we take action on another issue.” In theory, the Security Council “could impose even more sweeping global economic sanctions on Moscow than we have already seen. It could technically authorize military action to push back Russian forces in Ukraine,” according to Gowan. But with Russia and likely China set to veto any action taken against the war, the Security Council is deadlocked. A massive global organization The UN is bigger than just the Security Council, and other areas of the body – which has six main organs – have been more active since Russia invaded Ukraine. “The UN is for airing publicly the tragedies of the world. Like the refugee crisis in Ukraine, like the [possible war crimes](https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/03/politics/putin-war-crimes-russia-ukraine-us-what-matters/index.html), like so many other human costs that are taking place,” Richardson said. “At the same time, the UN is providing food. The UN is providing refugee assistance.” The UN General Assembly [has condemned Russia twice](https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-24-22/h_13eed04241e5af379eb8159dc96588e8) over the war in Ukraine; those resolutions are nonbinding but carry symbolic weight. Russia was also [suspended from the Human Rights Council](https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/07/politics/un-russia-human-rights/index.html), which requires a two-thirds vote. But Bolton said the math behind that vote shows Russia has significant support around the world; the voting result was 93 in favor, 24 against and 58 abstentions. A remaining 18 member states were not included in that result. “So here’s the real headline … A majority of the members of the United Nations, did not vote to expel Russia,” he told Borger. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely expected these kinds of condemnations, but what he really cares about is the status and power that being on the Security Council gives Russia. “After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow clung on to its seat in the Security Council essentially as proof that it was still a big power,” Gowan of the International Crisis Group said. “Now, in the real world … Russia is not that important. It’s China and the US that are the dominant players, but in the Security Council, the Russians stand as equal to the US. And they’re very, very proud of having that status.” And Richardson knows firsthand from his time at the UN in the 1990s, Russia knows how to play the system. “When I became UN ambassador for the US, Lavrov, Foreign Minister had been there 10 years already. So he was very skillful,” Richardson said. “He knew how to maneuver in the Security Council. He was very formidable. And so we have Russia right now, very knowledgeable about UN operations so that’s an advantage that they have.” And so the Security Council could only watch as Russia invaded Ukraine. And in a bizarre split-screen moment, Russia held the rotating presidency of the Security Council and [even chaired the meeting](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112592) as the invasion began and diplomacy failed. Bolton doesn’t see any way to change the system. “Unless unicorns break free and sweetness and light prevails, where there are disagreements among the (permanent) five, there will be no action,” he said.

**UN is on the brink of financial collapse**

**Mcgreal, 15** (Chris Mcgreal, Managing Editor at The Guardian, 9-7-2015, accessed on 7-23-2022, the Guardian, "70 years and half a trillion dollars later: what has the UN achieved?", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations)

Even accounting for inflation, annual UN expenditure is 40 times higher than it was in the early 1950s. The organisation now encompasses 17 specialised agencies, 14 funds and a secretariat with 17 departments employing 41,000 people. Its regular budget, which is agreed every two years and goes to pay for the cost of administering the UN – including mouthwatering daily allowances which result in many of its bureaucrats being far better paid than American civil servants – has more than doubled over the past two decades to $5.4bn. But that is just a small portion of the total spend. Peacekeeping costs another $9bn a year, with 120,000 peacekeepers deployed mostly in Africa. Some missions have lasted more than a decade. And then there are the voluntary contributions from individual governments that go to fund a large part of disaster relief, development work and agencies such as Unicef. They have risen sixfold over the past 25 years to $28.8bn. And yet even at that level, some agencies are warning that they are [operating on the brink of bankruptcy](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugee-crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing).

#### UN is an inefficient bureaucratic institution

**Mcgreal, 15** (Chris Mcgreal, Managing Editor at The Guardian, 9-7-2015, accessed on 7-23-2022, the Guardian, "70 years and half a trillion dollars later: what has the UN achieved?", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations)

“There is no single institution that I found more exhilarating at its best, yet more debilitatingly frustrating at its worst, than the United Nations,” said Gareth Evans, a former foreign minister of Australia and strong critic of the way the UN is run. He said his efforts to advance reform of the UN “were about as quixotic and unproductive as anything I have ever tried to do”. That’s a sentiment widely shared among diplomats and UN officials. Valerie Amos, Britain’s former international development minister, described the UN as a valuable ally in delivering UK aid but lamented its inefficiency. “There were concerns about the UN being overly bureaucratic and slow in the way it dealt with development issues. I think that’s one of the criticisms of the UN that remains until now, that since it was formed it has become bigger and bigger. Many organisations have overlapping mandates. It’s become an organisation that’s quite unwieldy in lots of respects,” Lady Amos said.

#### No coordination between UN agencies makes counter plan impossible

**Mcgreal, 15** (Chris Mcgreal, Managing Editor at The Guardian, 9-7-2015, accessed on 7-23-2022, the Guardian, "70 years and half a trillion dollars later: what has the UN achieved?", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations)

The report said the UN’s taste for setting goals at the expense of delivering results failed the poorest and most vulnerable. It also criticized a system of funding for many UN programmes in which officials had to beg for money from governments year after year, making it difficult to plan. “Cooperation between organizations has been hindered by competition for funding, mission creep and by outdated business practices,” it said. “In some sectors, such as water and energy, more than 20 UN agencies are active and compete for limited resources without a clear collaborative framework. More than 30 UN agencies and programmes have a stake in environmental management.” The organization has grown so big that at times it is working against itself. Critics point to large numbers of support staff doing ill-defined jobs. Staff costs account for two-thirds or more of some UN agencies’ outgoings. “Performance management is a joke,” said one official. “Almost everyone gets ‘above average’ in their assessment.” The UN is so fragmented that each agency has its own IT system. The reform report noted that about one-third of the UN operations in 60 countries had a budget of less than $2m per agency, which meant that they could do little more than afford the cost of running the office. The report proposed extensive changes to promote greater collaboration and efficiency under a programme called Delivering as One. This included myriad UN agencies in a single country coming under the authority of one official, and working more closely with the governments of those countries, which often had no idea what the UN was doing.

## DOS CP

### 2AC—DOD key

**NATO and US DoD are on the same page for AI**

**Pereira, 21** (Daniel Pereira, Daniel Pereira is research director at OODA. He is a foresight strategist, creative technologist, and an information communication technology (ICT) and digital media researcher with 20+ years of experience directing public/private partnerships and strategic innovation initiatives., 11-12-2021, accessed on 7-13-2022, OODA Loop, "NATO and US DoD AI Strategies Align with over 80 International Declarations on AI Ethics", https://www.oodaloop.com/archive/2021/11/12/nato-and-us-dod-ai-strategies-align-with-over-80-international-declarations-on-ai-ethics/)

In October, we included NATO’s release of its first-ever strategy for artificial intelligence in the OODA Loop Daily Pulse. The strategy is primarily concerned with the impact AI will have on the NATO core commitments of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Worth a deeper dive is a framework within **the overall NATO AI Strategy, which mirrors that of the DoD Joint Artificial Intelligence** Center’s (JAIC) and other U.S.-based efforts to establish norms around AI: “NATO establishes standards of responsible use of AI technologies, in accordance with international law and NATO’s values.”

At the center of the NATO AI strategy are the “NATO Principles of Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in Defence,” which are based on the NATO and Allies commitment to “ensuring that the AI applications they develop and consider for deployment will be – at the various stages of their lifecycles – in accordance with the following six principles: Lawfulness, Responsibility and Accountability, Explainability and Traceability, Reliability, Governability, and Bias Mitigation.”

### 2AC—DOD qualifications key

**The DoD is the most qualified to handle AI**

**Gehlhaus 21** (Diana Gehlhaus and Ron Hodge, Luke Koslosky, Kayla Goode, and Jonathan Rotner, Diana Gehlhaus is a Research Fellow at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), September 2021, accessed on 7-23-2022, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, "The DOD’s Hidden Artificial Intelligence Workforce - Center for Security and Emerging Technology", https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-dods-hidden-artificial-intelligence-workforce/)

In addition, CSET analysis of LinkedIn Talent Insights data reached a similar conclusion regarding several key AI occupations.21 When looking at computer research and information scientists; software developers; statisticians, mathematicians, and data scientists; and project management specialists, we found at least one of the top employers for each occupation were entities considered part of the national security community.22 For computer and information research scientists, four out of the top 10 employers were entities considered part of the national security community. “Public administration ranked third in top employing industries for technical talent, and third and fourth for CSET’s two categories of nontechnical talent.” 15 The importance of the national security community as a top employer of AI talent was even more apparent when we considered additional technical occupations such as electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, aerospace engineers, and operations researchers. For these occupations, we found half of the top employers were entities considered part of the national security community. Table 2 showcases the presence of the DOD and the defense industrial base (DIB) as a top employer of AI talent across a range of prominent AI occupations. The complete list of all occupations and their top 10 employers is provided in Appendix B.

### 1AR—DOD Qualifications key

**CP fails without qualifications**

**West, 22** (Darrell M. West, Vice President and Director - Governance StudiesSenior Fellow - Center for Technology InnovationDouglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies, 3-30-2022, accessed on 7-23-2022, Brookings, "Six Steps to Responsible AI in the Federal Government", https://www.brookings.edu/research/six-steps-to-responsible-ai-in-the-federal-government/)

Technology is an area where breadth of expertise is as important as depth. We are used to allowing technical people to make most of the major decisions in regard to computer software. Yet with AI, it is important to have access to a diverse set of skills, including those of a non-technical nature. A Data and Society article recommended that it is crucial to invite “a broad and diverse range of participants into a consensus-based process for arranging its constitutive components.” [22] Without access to individuals with societal and ethical expertise, it will be impossible to implement responsible AI.

# K

## AT: Capitalism K

#### Mitigating digital authoritarianism is key to successful alternatives

Sherman 21 – (Justin Sherman is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, a research fellow at the Tech, Law & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law, and a contributor at WIRED Magazine. He was previously a cybersecurity policy fellow at New America and a fellow at Duke Law School’s Center on Law & Technology, “Digital Authoritarianism and Implications for US National Security”, 3-15-22, The Cyber Defense Review, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2021\_winter\_cdr/06\_CDR\_V6N1\_Sherman.pdf?ver=\_8pKxD7hOFkcsIANHQZKDw%3d%3d)//Alk

Digital authoritarianism, at its core, is a mechanism for exerting increased, unchecked control over one’s population through digital technologies. Censorship, device hacking, and mass surveillance are all on the table. In this way, digital authoritarianism facilitates power consolidation—ensuring that challenges to a regime are outed in advance or quickly observed as they arise, and suppressed. This exposes US national security to risk. In a world where citizen revolt tops the list of authoritarian fears, digital authoritarianism promises a set of solutions: Internet Protocol (IP) address lists used to block foreign online content; traffic header inspection to monitor online activity; legal control of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) whenever the government wants to shut down Internet services; and more. Sometimes, this is quite explicit. The Russian government, for instance, strongly promotes information control in domestic cyberspace for this reason.[4] Other times, the suggestion is more subtle, for example when countries cite fake news and online disinformation as reasons to censor content deemed politically undesirable by those in power.[5] In either case, authoritarian fears of protest and revolt have long driven such regimes to monitor their citizens. The difference today, however, is that digital technologies, like Internet packet inspection software and artificial intelligence (AI) facial recognition, are increasingly making it cheaper for dictators to do so. These technologies also make surveillance more scalable. They also reduce some of the risks caused by relying on massive networks of human spies and informants.[6] Steven Feldstein points out, for example, that the principal-agent problem, where, by empowering agents to spy and suppress, regimes empower them to act against the government, is a vulnerability that can be reduced by substituting automated surveillance technologies for human beings.[7] In turn, these technologies can heighten the speed, scale, and accuracy of authoritarian surveillance. All of this matters for US national security because promoting democracy and contesting authoritarianism is in the US national interest—and digital authoritarianism helps authoritarian regimes consolidate power. Despite the sometimes resilient nature of online social movements, quashing political organization can be easier than ever before if aided by comprehensive digital surveillance and control technologies.[8] Governments can black out communications, such as Internet servers or mobile cell towers, during revolt. They can censor troubling posts before they bubble into something bigger. They can also censor foreign-originated information that could challenge regime narratives. Most importantly, they can continuously monitor their population, including during relatively stable times, to anticipate movements that could undermine government power. In the wake of a series of revolts in the Middle East that were informed, influenced, and/or aided in part by social media and the melding of online and offline mobilization, digital authoritarians, and those striving for such ends, are using digital technologies, often dual-use, to safeguard against such threats.[9] As the Russian General Valery Gerasimov offered in 2013, “The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy,” making it “necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objects [objectives].”[10] Many of these governments like China, Russia, and Iran, are unaligned with the US on security issues. In the cyber domain, they might engage in everything from pervasive trade secret theft to cyber attacks on foreign countries’ electrical grids. In more traditional ways, they also pose national security risks through such vectors as nuclear weapons, military buildup, territorial aggression against US allies and partners, and disrupting the international order.[11] While US bilateral relationships are complex, often interconnected, and never zero-sum, elements of those relationships already pose national security risks. Likewise, other countries pursuing digital authoritarian practices may be hostile to US interests (and democratic interests more broadly) or be aligned with other powers that threaten national security. Power consolidation by these regimes poses national security risks in various dimensions. In some cases, the export and diffusion of digital surveillance tools, as part of digital authoritarianism, also pose additional national security risks, the point of focus in the next section.

# NEG

## Clarity

### 1NC – CHINA AHEAD

#### China’s already won the AI race

Guy Faulconbridge; 2021 (writer for Reuters; Reuters; “China has won AI battle with U.S., Pentagon's ex-software chief says”; https://www.reuters.com/technology/united-states-has-lost-ai-battle-china-pentagons-ex-software-chief-says-2021-10-11///EF)

China has won the artificial intelligence battle with the United States and is heading towards global dominance because of its technological advances, the Pentagon's former software chief told the Financial Times. China, the world’s second largest economy, is likely to dominate many of the key emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, synthetic biology and genetics within a decade or so, according to Western intelligence assessments. Nicolas Chaillan, the Pentagon's first chief software officer who resigned in protest against the slow pace of technological transformation in the U.S. military, said the failure to respond was putting the United States at risk."We have no competing fighting chance against China in 15 to 20 years. Right now, it’s already a done deal; it is already over in my opinion," he told the newspaper. "Whether it takes a war or not is kind of anecdotal." China was set to dominate the future of the world, controlling everything from media narratives to geopolitics, he said. Chaillan blamed sluggish innovation, the reluctance of U.S. companies such as Google [(GOOGL.O)](https://www.reuters.com/companies/GOOGL.O) to work with the state on AI and extensive ethical debates over the technology. Google was not immediately available for comment outside business hours. Chinese companies, Chaillan said, were obliged to work with their government and were making "massive investment" in AI without regard to ethics. He said U.S. cyber defences in some government departments were at "kindergarten level". Chaillan announced his resignation at the beginning of September, saying military officials were repeatedly put in charge of cyber initiatives for which they lacked experience. A spokesperson for the Department of the Air Force said Frank Kendall, secretary of the U.S. Air Force, had discussed with Chaillan his recommendations for the department’s future software development following his resignation and thanked him for his contributions, the FT said.

### 1NC – NO TECH IMPACT

#### The aff’s characterization of AI as primarily military is wrong AND there’s no arms race

Scharre ’21 (Paul, vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, Accessed 7/21/2022, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/87035/TNSRVol4Issue3Scharre.pdf?sequence=2//EA)

Current Military AI Competition Is Not an “Arms Race” As Heather Roff has written, the arms race framing “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.”5 To begin with, AI is not a weapon. AI is a general-purpose enabling technology with myriad applications. It is not like a missile or a tank. It is more like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or computer networks.6 General-purpose technologies like AI have applications across a range of industries. Wired magazine co-founder Kevin Kelly has argued that it “will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified we will now cognitize.”7 Nations may very well be in a technology race to adopt AI across a range of industries. AI will help to improve economic productivity and, by extension, economic and military power. During the industrial revolution, early adopters of industrial technology significantly increased their national power. From 1830 to 1890, Britain and Germany, which were both early industrializers, more than doubled their per capita gross national product while Russia, which lagged in industrialization, increased its per capita gross national product by a mere 7 percent over that 60-year period.8 These technological advantages led to increased economic and military power, most notably for Europe relative to the rest of the world. In 1790, Europe (collectively), China, and India (including what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, with Europe and India each holding about one-quarter of global manufacturing output and China holding roughly one-third. They all had approximately equivalent levels of per capita industrialization at that time. But the industrial revolution skyrocketed European economic productivity. By 1900, Europe collectively controlled 62 percent of global manufacturing output, while China held only six percent and India less than two percent. These economic advantages translated into military power. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the world’s land surface.9 Being ahead of the curve in adopting AI is likely to lead to significant national advantages. Although AI can increase military capabilities, the more consequential advantages over the long term may come from non-military AI applications across society. Long-term benefits from AI could include increased productivity, improved healthcare outcomes, economic growth, and other indicators of national well-being. Increasing productivity is especially significant because it has a compounding effect on economic growth. Over the long term, technological progress is the main driver of economic growth.10 Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12 Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI fails the arms race test in the critical area of spending. Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent.13 Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races.14 Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget.15 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)

### 1NC -- DEMOCRACY IMPACT

#### Democratic peace theory is wrong — democracy *doesn’t* eliminate conflicts.

Larison 12 — Daniel Larison, Senior Editor at *The American Conservative*, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Democratic Peace Theory Is False,” *The American Conservative*, April 17th, Available Online at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/democratic-peace-theory-is-false/, Accessed 08-11-2013)

Rojas’ claim depends entirely on the meaning of “genuine democracy.” Even though there are numerous examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and elected governments (including that little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably don’t qualify as “genuine” democracies and so can’t be used as counter-examples. Regardless, democratic peace theory draws broad conclusions from a short period in modern history with very few cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I understand it is that democratic governments are more accountable to their populations, and because the people will bear the costs of the war they are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This supposedly keeps democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-in electoral and institutional checks on government power. One small problem with this is that it is rubbish. Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality and voting do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing states. Democratic peace theory doesn’t account for the effects of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic nations think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for them are often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that waged the South African War (against two states with elected governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a huge majority in the “Khaki” election that followed. As long as it goes well and doesn’t have too many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is costly it may still be popular if it is fought for nationalist reasons that appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking that there is an intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their country can gain something at relatively low cost by going to war, the type of government they have really is irrelevant. Unless a democratic public believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to welcome the outbreak of a war that they expect to win. Setting aside the flaws and failures of U.S.-led democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy. Clashing interests between states aren’t going away, and the more democratic states there are in the world the more likely it is that two or more of them will eventually fight one another.

#### Democracy promotion fails -

Fein, 2014- American lawyer and contributor to countless think tanks specializing in constitutional and international law with a JD from Harvard Law (Bruce Fein, 12/24/14, “Stop U.S. democracy promotion abroad,” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/24/bruce-fein-stop-united-states-democracy-promotion-/?page=all>, accessed: 3/28/15)

* Leaders just as bad, allows for authoritarians to rise, aggravate threats

The U.S. government should cease its arrogant and ill-informed attempts to promote democracy around the globe — whether in Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, Communist China, Ukraine, Burma or otherwise. The attempts are extraneous to the purposes of the United States Constitution. Democratically elected leaders can be every bit as tyrannical and aggressive towards the United States as unelected dictators. Hamas, listed as an international terrorist organization, decisively triumphed in Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. It has ruled in Gaza since 2007, routinely denies human rights, chronically attacks Israel, and execrates the United States. Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, proved as much or more contemptuous of the rule of law, human rights and amity towards Israel and the United States than his dictatorial predecessor, Hosni Mubarak. Thus, the United States shed only crocodile tears when he was overthrown in a military coup. Adolf Hitler climbed to power through popular elections. His Nationalist Socialists captured more than 37 percent of the vote in 1932 to become the largest party in the Reichstag. Free and fair elections in Saudi Arabia would yield victory for radical Islamic parties with affinity and sympathy for the murderous perpetrators of 9/11. In sum, promoting democracy in foreign lands may aggravate rather than diminish threats to perceived interests of the United States. Thus, we have supported dictators over democrats in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Indonesia, Argentina, Bahrain, Kuwait, Cambodia, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Spain, the Philippines, ad infinitum. In any event, democracy promotion is overwhelmingly a fool’s errand. The process is vastly too complex for us to master or to jump start. Sending nations copies of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution will not do. Words without a reinforcing political culture are worthless. Iraq’s Constitution prohibits laws that contradict the “principles of democracy.” But Salmon Rushdie would be killed if he attempted to sell The Satanic Verses in Baghdad. We also forget that democracy in the United States evolved over more than seven centuries. We cannot expect more from other people. Anglo-American democracy was born with the Magna Carta to check the absolutism of King John in 1215 on the fields of Runnymede. Through succeeding centuries and periodic civil wars, the powers of Parliament strengthened and the powers of the King diminished. Landmarks included the Grand Remonstrance, the beheading of Charles I by Oliver Cromwell, and the English Bill of Rights of 1688. American colonists claimed the rights of British freemen. They soon took on the trappings of democracy with the Virginia House of Burgesses, the Mayflower Compact, the Connecticut Charter Oak, the Maryland Toleration Act, etc. The United States Constitution was not drafted until 1787, more than five centuries after Magna Carta. Democratic principles did not completely triumph until the Civil War Amendments ending slavery and enfranchising blacks, and the Women’s Suffrage Amendment ending their disenfranchisement in 1919. Blacks did not de facto enjoy the right to vote until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, more seven and one-half centuries since the road to democracy began at Runnymede. It was facilitated in the United States by a literate society, a homogeneity of ethnicity, culture and language, natural boundaries, and an unprecedented array of profound and selfless leaders, for example, George Washington and James Madison. Despite these vast advantages, the United States still needed a bloody Civil War and an obscenely prolonged period of Jim Crow before finally achieving substantial national unity and racial justice. In light of our own seven-century journey to democracy, the idea that we can install democratic dispensations in nations that are at the pre-Magna Carta stage of political maturity and lacking our peculiar cultural advantages is delusional. Our miserable track record speaks for itself, including South Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Burma, South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Bahrain. Taiwan moved into a democratic orbit in 1988 after the deaths of dictators Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, and South Korea did the same after military strongman Chun Doo Hwan left office. But these democratic movements were indigenous. The United States was complacent with reliable, friendly, and anti-democratic leadership. At best, democracy promotion is harmless — like shouting at the weather. At worst, it is counterproductive. Many societies are insufficiently mature, literate, and homogeneous to for its practice. Democracy in these places degenerates into majoritarian, sectarian, or tribal tyrannies notwithstanding formal elections. Russia, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Sudan are emblematic. Democracy is given a bad name, which may handicap its return at a more propitious tim

### 2NC – DEMOCRACY IMPACT

#### Democracy doesn’t prevent war – Larison [phd in history from u of Chicago] – war can be popular among voters. Can’t check Nationalist and imperialist ideologies which change the way democracies think about war.

#### Clashing interests still exist between states. Their theory relies on a small sample size that is insufficient to make such a broad claim

#### 1. Cherry Picked Data

Antić, Associate professor at University of Zagreb, and Vlahovec, MA, University of Zagreb, 2013

(Miljenko and Jadranka, “’Democratic War’: Democratic Peace Theory and the War in Former Yugoslavia” International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, p. 55-71, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d223/9f6efa19ec227df5b083233469507217d213.pdf>, accessed 5-16-18, JCP RH)

David Spiro’s “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace” (1996) argues against the democratic peace theory by stating that the apparent absence of war between democra- cies is statistically insignificant. For most of international history before 1945, there were few democracies and little chance for them to fight each other. Spiro also su- ggests that institutional explanations of democratic peace are weak, because institu- tional constrains on a government’s ability to wage war would make democracies less war-prone. The data, however, reveal that democracies frequently go to war against non-democracies. Spiro also criticizes studies of democratic peace for failing to define democracy clearly. Moreover, he states that shifting definitions of war have also made democratic peace appear more significant than it is. Many supporters of the democratic peace exclude the U.S. Civil War, Spanish-American War of 1898, and Finland’s World War II alliance with the Axis powers against the Western democracies. Therefore, Spiro suggests that the number of wars between democracies is higher than claimed by the proponents of democratic peace proposition.

#### 2. leaders will just change the definition of democracy to justify war – Germany, Russia, and Japan prove

Antić, Associate professor at University of Zagreb, and Vlahovec, MA, University of Zagreb, 2013

(Miljenko and Jadranka, “’Democratic War’: Democratic Peace Theory and the War in Former Yugoslavia” International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, p. 55-71, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d223/9f6efa19ec227df5b083233469507217d213.pdf>, accessed 5-16-18, JCP RH)

Ido Oren’s “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany” (1995) analyses how statesmen change their definitions of democracy. Oren holds that pairs of countries do not remain at peace because they regard one another as democracies. Instead, countries that have an interest in remaining at peace tend to define one another as democracies. Oren argues that American leaders have tried to interpret democracy to mean “countries like the U.S.”. Oren criticizes the literature on democratic peace for overlooking how the meaning of democracy changed over the course of U.S. history. To support this argument, Oren focuses on how some prominent American scholars classified Imperial Germany. Before World War I they regarded Germany as “the most genuinely democratic” state. However, after the War they changed their view and referred to the pre-war Germany as an autocratic state. Oren briefly mentions two additional cases: Russia and Japan. He points out that the United States regarded them as more similar to the United States whenever U.S. interests called for a closer relationship with them.

#### 3. Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are spurious and don’t assume economic growth

Mousseau, 12

(Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p 1-12)

Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their mean levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock 1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents of the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy. Models 3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The democratic peace appears spurious, with contract-intensive economy being the more likely explanation for both democracy and the democratic peace.

#### 4. More evidence – best case scenario for the aff is that democratic peace theory conflates a weak correlation with causation – it’s more likely to cause war – all the best models statistics and studies go neg

Rosato ‘11

[Asst Prof Poli Sci at Notre Dame and Univ of Chicago. *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, 2011]

Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Laync(2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-dcmocratic wars: the American Civil War. the Spanish American War and the Boer War/' This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a stale but a union of stales, and thai this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of (he democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle\*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up lo scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray\*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable." A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic-democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely statistically significant." Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive definitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial.

### 1NC—NO DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

#### Global backsliding is an alt cause or SQ solves – democracy is inevitably resilient

Anna Lührmann et al, 6-26-2017, (Anna Lührmann is a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. From 2002 to 2009, she was a member of the German National Parliament. Valeriya Mechkova is a PhD candidate at the V-Dem Institute/University of Gothenburg. Matthew Wilson is an assistant professor at West Virginia University and will be a visiting researcher at the V-Dem Institute in 2018."Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/26/is-democracy-on-the-decline-not-as-much-as-some-pundits-want-you-to-believe//)MBA HBJ

Clearly liberal democracy is facing challenges in some countries — in particular in the United States. Therefore, U.S. political scientists are right to be on alert and continuously monitor the weak points of their democracy. In some places, it is even worse: Countries such as Turkey or Venezuela have experienced serious breakdowns. But the V-Dem data suggests that alarmist reports about a global demise of democracy are not yet warranted. For one, the average level of democracy in the world is still close to the highest recorded level, even if a slight decline is detectable over the last few years. And there are real success stories, like in Tunisia, even if those do not make as many headlines. Although the declines in democracy in places such as Europe and the United States deserve our attention, the V-Dem data suggest that political institutions in these countries are relatively resilient. Recent examples include the electoral victory of Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen in France and judicial challenges to the immigration ban proposed by President Trump.

### 2NC—NO DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

#### Democracy’s face challenges all the time, but there’s a natural ebb and flow- either the breakdowns in Turkey and Venezuela thump or rebounds are inevitable as proves by examples like Macron- that’s Luhmann

#### Backsliding is a myth—only mathematical analyses conclude democratic strength is increasing—their studies are over-focused on the United States, rely on inflated assumptions about democratic growth, and conflate the existence of a democracy with the grade of the democracy

Doorenspleet 18 — Renske Doorenspleet, Award Winning Scholar, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick, Director, Centre for Studies in Democratization, PhD in Political Science from Leiden University, Postdoctoral Fellowship Completed at Harvard University, “Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective” The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy, Chapter 2, Palgrave Macmillan, Springer International, 2019, Access Provided by Minnesota Libraries

Democratic Trend Analyses

Not only can the numerical values of democracy be used to discover global and regional differences (see above), but also to detect trends over time. Since Samuel Huntington wrote his seminal book on the ‘third wave’ (Huntington 1991), scholars have taken for granted the idea that several waves of democratization have engulfed the world over time. A wave of democracy was defined as a series of transitions from nondemocratic to some democratic systems, which are taking place in a certain period of time and which are significantly more numerous than the trends in the opposite direction (Huntington 1991: 15). It was argued that the first wave of democracy started in the early nineteenth century when the majority of white males got the right to vote in the USA. The second wave started after the Second World War, while the third wave started in 1974. This third wave was truly global as it affected not just countries in Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece) but also many countries in Latin America and Asia. When the totalitarian communist ideology collapsed worldwide, countries in Eastern Europe made the transition to democracy since the late 1980s, followed by many countries in sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1990s. When several dictatorships in the Middle East and North Africa collapsed, scholars and journalists started to talk about the ‘Arab Spring’ with a ‘fourth wave of democratization’. These democratization processes showed beginnings of transitions, but most of the openings closed with inevitable pullbacks. Hence, there are no clear democratization trends happening in this region, let alone a new wave of democratization. While some scholars showed that it would be better to talk about ‘trendless fluctuations’ (see, e.g., Doorenspleet 2000), the dominant way of thinking still emphasizes global trends, linear moves and worldwide waves. Does democracy still come in waves and has the world become more democratic (see, e.g., Fukuyama 1989)? Or—on the other hand—has there been a rollback with an increasing number of dictatorships (see, e.g., Kagan 2008)? At the moment, three different approaches can be distinguished in the literature. The first approach is very optimistic, emphasizing the trend that the world has become a democratic place to live in, particularly since 1989. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many former communist countries started democratizing, not just in Eastern Europe but also in Africa. Democratic government was becoming the norm, slowly but surely, and many scholars believed the trend towards democracy all around the world was unstoppable and irreversible. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published his very influential essay ‘The End of History?’ with the central idea that sociocultural evolution of mankind ended with the collapse of the last totalitarian systems and that the mankind was now able to the final form of government: democracy. Fukuyama’s idea was that the Western values of capitalism and democracy had won against the forces of communism. This was seen as the final victory. According to this view, there was no alternative anymore, and thus, democracy would automatically spread around the world. In empirical studies, scholars showed a clear growth in democratic systems (e.g. Huntington 1991; Shin 1994; but see also Doorenspleet 2000; Levitsky and Way 2015). Not only many academics, but also political leaders and policy makers embraced this idea. They repeated this message of ‘democracy optimism’ and launched international programmes to promote democracy everywhere (see, e.g., Burnell 2011, 2013; Carothers 2011). The second view is recent and very pessimistic, emphasizing that there are signs of an overall rollback of democracy and a reverse wave, particularly since 2002 (see, e.g., Diamond 2008; Puddington 2009, 2010).36 Articles with titles such as ‘authoritarian resilience’ (Nathan 2003), ‘authoritarian reversals’ (Svolik 2008), ‘the democratic rollback’ (Diamond 2008), ‘the great democracy meltdown’ (Kurlantzick 2011), ‘democracy’s deepening recession’ (Diamond 2014) show that researchers have changed from being overly optimistic to pretty pessimistic regarding democracy and democratization around the world. Scholars described the last decade as a period of democratic decline (Puddington 2009; Diamond 2015: 142), during which global freedom has ‘plummeted’ (Kurlantzick 2011), and new democracies have suffered from a ‘powerful authoritarian undertow’ (Diamond 2008: 36). Within this second approach, scholars pointed out that ‘by the final years of the twentieth century, the measurements of democratic progress in the world had essentially reached their peaks’ (Plattner 2014: 13), while the world is experiencing ‘a mild but protracted democratic recession’ (Diamond 2015: 144). The recent reports of the FH reflected this negative mood as well. According to scholars who worked on these reports, the year 2006 was characterized by a growing ‘pushback against democracy’ (Puddington 2007), followed by 2007 and 2008 which were years of democratic ‘decline’ (Puddington 2009), while the democratic erosion had ‘accelerated’ in 2009 (Puddington 2010), resulting in global democracy being ‘under duress’ in 2010 (Puddington 2011). The Arab Spring brought some optimism, but thereafter the FH warned again for a democratic ‘retreat’ in 2012 and an ‘authoritarian resurgence’ in 2013 (Puddington 2013, 2014). Some scholars warned that ‘we might in fact be seeing the beginning of the end for democracy’ (Battison 2011), while others predicted not just the ‘end of the end of history’, but also ‘the return to the authoritarian Great Powers’ (Gat 2007). In summary, this second approach is a gloomy one, at least vis-à-vis the condition democracy seems to be in nowadays. The final view is cautious. On the one hand, scholars within this approach acknowledge the existence of worldwide democratization trends since the end of the nineteenth century, with a clear wave since 1989. They also reject the idea of a global democratic recession since 2008. In this sense, this approach is very similar to the first optimistic view. Thomas Carothers (2009: 1), for example, argued that ‘democracy has not lost ground in the world overall’ and he recommended a ‘stepping back from democratic pessimism’. On the other hand, this approach also states that we need to shake off the excessive, unreasonable, unrealistic democratic optimism of the early 1990s. Already in 2009, scholars such as Carothers pointed out that ‘democracy is certainly troubled in many places, when viewed relative to where it was at the start of this decade’ (Carothers 2009: 1). Although there is no clear reverse democratization wave, the number of democracies has not increased anymore as was expected by the first approach. While a global democratic recession is seen as a ‘myth’ (Levitsky and Way 2015), scholars in this approach call this recent decade a period of ‘stagnation’ or ‘an equilibrium’ (Merkel 2010). Since 2002, the worldwide competition between democracies and dictatorships should be considered as ‘frozen’ (Merkel 2010). What is the empirical evidence? When focusing on the long-term trends, the first approach can certainly be supported by the figures and data. Not only since the end of the nineteenth century, but certainly since the 1970s, has an impressive number of countries made a transition to democracy (see Huntington 1991; Doorenspleet 2000; Merkel 2010). A new wave of democratization seems to be very unlikely though, and the recent period can better be described as stable and stagnant, thereby supporting the third cautious approach. There is certainly no evidence for the second, pessimistic approach, as there are no clear signs of a reverse wave—at least not yet. During the last decade, the level of freedom has declined in 105 countries, and more countries suffered declines in freedom in 2015 compared to any of the previous years (see also Puddington and Roylance 2016). However, those declines can be mainly found among the nondemocratic, unfree countries. Freedom is particularly waning in dictatorships such as Azerbaijan, China, Iran and Russia (see Diamond 2015: 151). Moreover, in 2015, there were also more countries with increased freedom compared to any year since 2007, suggesting that ‘we are entering a period of greater volatility for global freedom, with new possibilities for improvements as well as for setbacks’ (see Puddington and Roylance 2016). The second half of Table 2.3 shows the percentage of countries, classified as ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’.37 There is little or no evidence of a democratic recession. To the contrary, the world is far freer today than it was in 1975. Overall, countries are nowadays considerably freer than in 1990, while there has been no clear decline since the mid- 2000s, which is often seen as the beginning of the democratic recession (Levitsky and Way 2015). An analysis of the period between 1995 and 2005 shows that from the ‘partly free countries’ roughly a similar number became ‘free’ on the one hand and ‘not free’ on the other hand (see also Merkel 2010: 28–29). There is a small decline in free countries, as well as an increase in unfree countries after 2005. Still, the number of 41.7% countries which can be classified as ‘free’ in 2015 is very impressive compared to 25.3% free countries 40 years earlier. If we rely on the Polity IV data instead of the FH data, similar patterns can be detected. The upper half of Table 2.3 shows the percentages of different types of political systems over time (1975–2015). This information shows that the proportion of democracies has clearly increased since 1975, while the proportion of dictatorships has clearly decreased. The proportion of hybrid systems has remained quite stable at the global level (see also Fig. 2.1). If we focus on the overall proportion of democracies in the world, the data suggest a positive trend since 1975 (supporting the first view), with stagnation and stability since 2005 (supporting the third view). A global democratic recession or backsliding seems to be an exaggeration, and ‘can neither be supported by figures nor by arguments’ (Merkel 2010: 29); the second view can thus be rejected as a myth or illusion (see Levitsky and Way 2015). The average level of democracy went gradually up from −2.3 in 1975 to 2.6 in 1995 and 4.3 in 2015. Slowly but surely a clear trend towards more democracy can be seen after 1975. So why have so many scholars recently supported the second pessimistic approach? A first answer to this question can probably be found in the excessive optimism after the fall of the Berlin Wall, expecting countries to become democratic overnight, not just in Eastern Europe but also in other parts of the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union generated a widespread perception that liberal democracy was the ‘only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996). As Levitsky and Way (2015: 45–46) explained it well, those ‘early post–Cold War transitions generated unrealistic expectations that, when not realized, gave rise to exaggerated pessimism and gloom’. If dictatorships went through periods of crises or instability, then it was seen as signs of democratization processes, but there is no foundation—neither theoretically nor empirically—to assume such an outcome. It is true that the collapse of a dictatorship creates opportunities for democratization. Historically, most endings of dictatorships have not led to democratization though, let alone a stable democratic system (Svolik 2012). Breakdowns may result in different outcomes, ranging from the formation of a new dictatorship (e.g. Iran after 1979), or to state collapse and anarchy (e.g. Libya after 2011). Sometimes, it generates a transition to a minimal democracy (e.g. South Africa and Chile in the early 1990s), but we should not assume that this will necessarily, automatically happen. When the democratization boom in the 1990s is seen as an exceptional phenomenon, the recent developments around the world can be assessed in a more realistic way—not through rose-tinted glasses anymore, but with less expectations regarding successful transitions to democracy. Such a more realistic approach would make us less pessimistic about the recent political developments around the world. The excessive scholarly attention to democratic developments in the USA, particularly recently, might also explain the current pessimistic mood around democratic trends. This focus might be caused by the fact that most influential—and highly cited—democracy scholars are still American or based at American universities, or it might be caused by the fact that the USA is still seen as one of the most important democratic world powers. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the pessimistic approach emphasizes the increasing lack of democratic quality in established democracies. Larry Diamond, for example, wrote that ‘the most worrisome dimension of democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence in the West, including the United States’ (Diamond 2015: 152). Lower popular trust in government, decreasing rates of voter turnout and the receding of democracy promotion as a priority of US foreign policy are all ‘additional signs’ of ‘democratic ill health’ according to this approach, while ‘the world takes note of all this’ giving dictators ammunition to ‘discredit democracy in general and immunize authoritarian rule against US pressure’ (Diamond 2015: 152). While this might be true to a certain extent, this pessimistic approach conflates the analyses of the proportion of democracies around the world on the one hand, with democratic quality on the other hand. There are certainly signs that the democratic quality of some established democracies is in decline; still, there is no clear reverse trend with numerous transitions away from democracy, and in this regard, the second pessimistic view cannot be supported. Despite increasingly unfavourable conditions in recent years—not just in democracies such as the USA, but also globally, the new democracies have remained strikingly robust (Levitsky and Way 2015).

### 1NC—NO CLIMATE IMPACT

**No impact and alt causes**

**Shani ’15** (Amir Shani – PhD @ the University of Central Florida, researches ecotourism and ethics at the University of the Negev, Eilat Campus. Boaz Arad – spokesman in the Public Policy Center at the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, “There is always time for rational skepticism: Reply to Hall et al,” April 2015, ScienceDirect)

The uncertainty that encompasses current climate change assessments is strengthened in light of the studies indicating that over earth's history there have been **distinct warm periods** with temperatures **exceeding the current ones** (Esper et al., 2012, McIntyre and McKittrick, 2003 and Soon and Baliunas, 2003). Reviewing the relevant scientific literature, Khandekar, Murty, and Chittibabu (2005) concluded that “in the context of the earth's climate through the last 500 million years, the recent (1975–2000) increase in the earth's mean temperature does not appear to be **unusual** or **unprecedented** as claimed by IPCC and many supporters of the global warming hypothesis” (p. 1568). Other studies challenged the mainstream climate change narrative, according to which CO2 levels in the earth's atmosphere play a prominent role in rising temperatures. One notable example is the research by Shaviv and Veizer (2003), which demonstrates that the earth's temperature correlates well with variations in cosmic ray flux, rather than changes in atmospheric CO2. These findings and others stir contentious debates within the climate scientific community, but are nevertheless largely overlooked by the IPCC, which ignores alternative explanations for climate change. Regrettably, Hall et al. scornfully dismiss this evidence, presented in our research note, based on cherry-picking of a few “non-peer-reviewed” references that were cited, some vague claims about “misreading” and “selective citing,” as well as other semantic nitpicking. 4. Impacts of climate change The IPCC warns that climate change is likely to have severe consequences, particularly for poor countries, such as increased hunger, water shortages, vulnerability to extreme weather events and debilitating diseases. **However**, these estimations have been **heavily criticized** for failing to properly account for **substantial improvements in adaptive capacity** (i.e., the capability of coping with the impact of global warming) that are likely to occur due to advances in **economic development**, **technological change** and **human capital** over the next century (Goklany, 2007). Fostering economic growth and technological development, largely achievable through the use of fossil fuels, will strengthen both industrialized and developing countries' **adaptive capacity** to deal not just with possible future climate change consequences, but also with other environmental and public health problems. Such policy will **provide greater benefits** at lower costs than drastic climate change mitigation efforts involving substantially cutting greenhouse gas emissions (Goklany, 2004 and Goklany, 2012). Furthermore, the analyses of Galiana and Green (2009) exemplify that in the current state of energy technologies, the suggested plans for ambitious emission reductions will likely severely clobber the global economy, especially in view of present economic conditions. In order to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at accepted levels, there is a need for enormous advances in efficient energy technology, which is currently missing (Pielke, Wigley & Green, 2008). In any case, **even if** every industrialized nation meets the most ambitious emissions targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, such efforts are likely to have **little effect**, particularly in the light of the considerable increases in greenhouse gas emissions by rising economic superpowers as **China** and **India**, as well as the **remaining developing world** (Wigley, 1998). Hall et al. criticized us for choosing “selective citations…that discuss natural processes potentially affect climate in specific locations and times.” Yet the purpose of referring to such studies was to refute the claims made by the IPCC and other climate change alarmists to the effect that recent extreme weather events (e.g., floods, droughts and storms) are the consequences of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Moreover, data shows that despite claims that the number and intensity of extreme weather has increased, between 1900 and 2010 the average annual death and death rates from extreme weather events has declined by 93% and 98%, respectively (Goklany, 2009). This is mostly due to economic and technological factors, such as improved global food production, increase globalized food trade and better disaster preparedness. IPCC's exaggerated estimations of climate change impacts were also noted in an op-ed in Financial Times written by climate economist Richard Tol (2014), a week following his demand that his name as one of the leading authors be removed from the IPCC's AR5 due to its over alarmist assessments of the impacts of AGW and underestimation of humanity's adaptive capacity. As concluded by Tol, “Humans are a **tough** and **adaptable** species. People live on the equator and in the Arctic, in the desert and in the rainforest. **We survived ice ages** with **primitive technologies**. The idea that climate change poses an existential threat to humankind is **laughable**” (2014, para 1).

### 2NC—NO CLIMATE IMPACT

**No impact to warming – two warrants from Shani**

**Empirical analysis – no warm period in Earth’s history can be reasonably correlated with mass biod loss**

**Adaptation – economic growth, tech, and human capital preclude any existential risk—it’s not like in six years we can’t build sea walls or shelters**

**Even if they win extinction, it’s much longer term and adaptation delays synergistic effects**

#### Adaptation and resilience solve warming

Hart 15 (Michael - Simon Reisman chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, former Fulbright-Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Research, he was also a Scholar-in-Residence in the School of International Service and a Senior Fellow in the Center for North American Studies at American University in Washington, a former official in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where he specialized in trade policy and trade negotiations, MA from the University of Toronto and is the author, editor, or co-editor of more than a dozen books, “Hubris: The Troubling Science, Economics, and Politics of Climate Change”, google books)

As already noted, the IPCC scenarios themselves are wildly alarmist, not only on the basic science but also on the underlying economic assumptions, which in turn drive the alarmist impacts. The result cannot withstand critical analysis. Economists Ian Castles and David Henderson, for example, show the extent to which the analysis is driven by the desire to reach predetermined outcomes.50 Other economists have similarly wondered what purpose was served by pursuing such unrealistic scenarios. It is hard to credit the defense put forward by Mike Hulme, one of the creators of the scenarios, that the IPCC is not engaged in forecasting the future but in creating “plausible” story lines of what might happen under various scenarios.51 Each scare scenario is based on linear projections without any reference to technological developments or adaptation. If, on a similar linear basis, our Victorian ancestors in the UK, worried about rapid urbanization and population growth in London, had made similar projections, they would have pointed to the looming crisis arising from reliance on horse-drawn carriages and omnibuses; they would have concluded that by the middle of the 20th century, London would be knee-deep in horse manure, and all of the southern counties would be required to grow the oats and hay to feed and bed the required number of horses. Technology progressed and London adapted. Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of more than a century? The work on physical impacts is equally over the top. All the scenarios assume only negative impacts, ignore the reality of adaptation, and attribute any and all things bad to global warming. Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter in reducing atmospheric heat loss to outer space.52 It would have greater impact in increasing minimum temperatures than in increasing maximum temperatures. Secondary studies, however, generally ignore this facet of the hypothesis. The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health due, for example, to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents. As already noted there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-related threats or malnutrition. The claim about heat-related deaths gained a boost during the summer of 2003 because of the tragedy of some 15,000 alleged heat-related deaths in France as elderly people stayed behind in city apartments without air conditioning while their children enjoyed the heat at the sea shore during the August vacation. Epidemiological studies of so-called "excess" deaths resulting from heat waves are abused to get the desired results. Similar studies of the impact of cold spells show that they are far more lethal than heat waves and that it is much easier to adapt to heat than to cold.53 More fundamentally, this, like most of the alarmist literature, ignores the basics of the AGW hypothesis: the world will not see an exponential increase in summer, daytime heat (and thus more heat waves), but a decrease in night-time and winter cooling, particularly at higher latitudes and altitudes. Based on the AGW hypothesis, Canada, China, Korea, Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina will see warmer winters and warmer nights. There are clear benefits to such a development, even if there may also be problems, but the AGW industry tends to ignore the positive aspects of their alarmist scenarios. The feared spread of malaria, a much repeated claim, is largely unrelated to climate. Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW. Similarly, the building of the Rideau Canal in Ottawa in the 1820s was severely hampered by outbreaks of malaria due to the proximity of mosquito-infested wetlands in the area. Malaria remains widespread in tropical countries today in part because of the UN’s lengthy embargo on the use of DDT, the legacy of an earlier alarmist disaster. Temperature is but one factor, and a minor one at that, in the multiple factors that affect the rise or decline in the presence of disease-spreading mosquitoes. Wealthier western countries have pursued public health strategies that have reduced the incidence of the dis- ease in their countries. Entomologist Paul Reiter, widely recognized as the leading specialist on malaria vectors and a contributor to some of the early work of the IPCC, was aghast to learn how his careful and systematic analysis of the potential impacts had been twisted in ways that he could not endorse. In a recent paper, he concludes: “Simplistic reasoning on the future prevalence of malaria is ill-founded; malaria is not limited by climate in most temperate regions, nor in the tropics, and in nearly all cases, ’new' malaria at high altitudes is well below the maximum altitudinal limits for transmission. Future changes in climate may alter the prevalence and incidence of the disease, but obsessive emphasis on ’global warming' as a dominant parameter is indefensible; the principal determinants are linked to ecological and societal change, politics and economics.”54 Catastrophic species loss similarly has little foundation in past experience.55 Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct, its impact would be slow, providing significant scope and opportunity for adaptation, including by ﬂora and fauna. One of the more irresponsible claims was made by a group of UK modelers who fed wildly improbable scenarios and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss by the end of the century. There are literally thousands of websites devoted to spreading alarm about species loss and biodiversity. Global warming is but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity. The claims, fortunately, are largely hype, based on computer models and the estimate by Harvard naturalist Edward O. Wilson that 27,000 to 100,000 species are lost annually - a figure he advanced purely hypothetically but which has become one of the most persistent of environmental urban myths. The fact is that scientists have no idea of the extent of the world's ﬂora and fauna, with estimates ranging from five million to 100 million species, and that there are no reliable data about the rate of loss. By some estimates, 95 per cent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons, most before humans became major players in altering their environment. A much more credible estimate of recent species loss comes from a surprising source, the UN Environmental Program. It reports that known species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years in the last three decades of the 20th century, with some 20 reported extinctions despite increasing pressure on the biosphere from growing human population and industrialization.57 The alarmist community has also introduced the scientifically unknown concept of "locally extinct,” often meaning little more than that a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances, e.g., birds or butterflies becoming more numerous north of their range and disappearing at its extreme southern extent. Idso et al. conclude: “Many species have shown the ability to adapt rapidly to changes in climate. Claims that global warming threatens large numbers of species with extinction typically rest on a false definition of extinction (the loss of a particular population rather than en- tire species) and speculation rather than real-world evidence. The world’s species have proven very resilient, having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?“

**It’s not existential.**

**Seidov 14**—Researcher at NOAA and PhD in Geophysics, Fluid Dynamics, and Thermodynamics [Dan, “Are you aware of any peer-reviewed paper that explicitly classifies current global climate change as an existential risk (risk of human extinction)?” Research Gate, 4 Nov 2014, http://tinyurl.com/jrnfafu, accessed 6 Sep 2016]

The current global climate change **does not have a potential to cause human extinction**. Past severe climate changes were critical for many ancient civilizations, yet our existence proofs that they were not potent enough to cause entire termination of the humankind. The projected changes, even in the worst case scenarios, can cause many dramatic local changes. For example, change in rainfall patterns in agricultural countries may lead to possible famine and other dramatic events. However, any imaginable climate changes based on modern climate science **cannot generate existential risks for the entire human civilization**. In my view, a paper predicting such a catastrophe in any foreseeable future, at least on the time scale of human civilization, that is, thousands of years, has no chance of being published in any serious research journal.

### 1NC—WARMING INEV

**Warming inevitable**

**McKibben, 16**—Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College (Bill, “Recalculating the Climate Math,” <https://newrepublic.com/article/136987/recalculating-climate-math>, dml) [ableist metaphor modifications denoted by brackets]

The future of humanity depends on math. And the numbers in a **new study** released Thursday are the **most ominous yet**.

Those numbers spell out, in simple arithmetic, how much of the fossil fuel in the world’s existing coal mines and oil wells we can burn if we want to prevent global warming from cooking the planet. In other words, if our goal is to keep the Earth’s temperature from rising more than two degrees Celsius—the upper limit identified by the nations of the world—how much more new digging and drilling can we do?

Here’s the answer: **zero**.

That’s right: If we’re serious about preventing catastrophic warming, the new study shows, we can’t dig any new coal mines, drill any new fields, build any more pipelines. Not a single one. We’re done expanding the fossil fuel frontier. Our only hope is a swift, managed decline in the production of all carbon-based energy from the fields we’ve already put in production.

The new numbers are startling. Only four years ago, I wrote an essay called “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math.” In the piece, I drew on research from a London-based think tank, the Carbon Tracker Initiative. The research showed that the untapped reserves of coal, oil, and gas identified by the world’s fossil fuel industry contained five times more carbon than we can burn if we want to keep from raising the planet’s temperature by more than two degrees Celsius. That is, if energy companies eventually dug up and burned everything they’d laid claim to, the planet would cook five times over. That math kicked off a widespread campaign of divestment from fossil fuel stocks by universities, churches, and foundations. And it’s since become the conventional wisdom: Many central bankers and world leaders now agree that we need to keep the bulk of fossil fuel reserves underground.

But the new new math is **even more explosive**. It draws on a report by Oil Change International, a Washington-based think tank, using data from the Norwegian energy consultants Rystad. For a fee—$54,000 in this case—Rystad will sell anyone its numbers on the world’s existing fossil fuel sources. Most of the customers are oil companies, investment banks, and government agencies. But OCI wanted the numbers for a different reason: to figure out how close to the edge of catastrophe we’ve already come.

Scientists say that to have even a two-thirds chance of staying below a global increase of two degrees Celsius, we can release **800** gigatons more CO2 into the atmosphere. But the Rystad data shows coal mines and oil and gas wells **currently in operation** worldwide contain **942** gigatons worth of CO2. So the math problem is simple, and it goes like this:

942 > 800

“What we found is that if you burn up all the carbon that’s in the **currently operating fields and mines**, you’re **already above two degrees**,” says Stephen Kretzmann, OCI’s executive director. It’s not that if we keep eating like this for a **few more decades** we’ll be ~~morbidly obese~~ [doomed]. It’s that if we eat **what’s already in the refrigerator** we’ll be ~~morbidly obese~~ [doomed].

What’s worse, the definition of “morbid” has changed in the past four years. Two degrees Celsius used to be the red line. But scientists now believe the upper limit is **much lower**. We’ve already raised the world’s temperature by one degree—enough to **melt almost half the ice** in the Arctic, **kill off huge swaths of the world’s coral**, and **unleash lethal floods** and **drought**. July and August tied for the hottest months ever recorded on our planet, and scientists think they were almost certainly the hottest in the history of human civilization. Places like Basra, Iraq—on the edge of what scholars think was the Biblical Garden of Eden—hit 129 degrees Fahrenheit this year, approaching the point where humans **can’t survive outdoors**. So last year, when the world’s leaders met in Paris, they set a new number: Every effort, they said, would be made to keep the global temperature rise to less than 1.5 degrees. And to have even a 50–50 chance of meeting that goal, we can only release about 353 gigatons more CO2. So let’s do the math again:

942 > 353

### 2NC—WARMING INEV

**Past the tipping point—McKibben says current fossil fuel operations put us past 2 degrees, the threshold for irreversible warming.**

**They can’t just blow this off and say it’s try or die or “delay key to adapting”—we’re beating them on the math—a new study says avoiding 2 degrees, which is higher than the threshold they’ve set for extinction, means we can emit a max of 800 gigatons of CO2 and current operations are set to burn 942.**

#### Warming inevitable

Loris et al. ’16 [Nicolas D. Loris is Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation. Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Thatcher Center, The U.S. Should Withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 9, 2016, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change]

U.N. climate conferences have become increasingly irrelevant, in large part because the approach taken is unworkable. International negotiations have centered on placing the economic burden of addressing climate change on a few dozen developed countries while asking little or nothing from more the 150 developing countries. But the primary source of GHG emissions is increasingly the developing world, most notably from large developing economies such as China and India. Even if the U.S. cut 100 percent of its CO2 emissions it would not make a significant difference in projected global warming. Using the same climate sensitivity (which is arguably higher than reality) as the IPCC assumes in its modeling, the world would only be 0.137 degrees Celsius cooler by 2100 if the U.S. cut its CO2 emissions by 100 percent. If the entire industrialized world cut its CO2 emissions by 100 percent it would avert warming by only 0.278 degrees Celsius by the turn of the century.[36] Using the IPCC’s own assumptions, to have a meaningful impact on global temperatures, any agreement would require significantly reduced emissions from both developed and developing countries. Such a course would be economically devastating, however, and was one reason why Canada pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol, and why Japan, Russia, and Canada have said they would not commit to a new treaty with binding commitments to reduce emissions.[37] Proponents of an international agreement and the UNFCCC point to China and India’s commitment to reduce CO2 emissions as evidence that the developing world is serious about such reductions. For example, China agreed to peak its GHG emissions by 2030. Non-binding promises to cut emissions 14 years from now are a small price to pay for continuing the status quo. In fact, China has been grossly underreporting its CO2 emissions and use of coal. According to a November 2015 article from The New York Times: China, the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases from coal, has been burning up to 17 percent more coal a year than the government previously disclosed, according to newly released data. The finding could complicate the already difficult efforts to limit global warming. Even for a country of China’s size, the scale of the correction is immense. The sharp upward revision in official figures means that China has released much more carbon dioxide—almost a billion more tons a year according to initial calculations—than previously estimated.[38] What are the odds that China will be more forthright and transparent in the future when accuracy could have an actual impact? Further, China’s refusal to address its current severe air and water quality problems, neither of which has anything to do with reducing GHG emissions, should raise serious concerns as to whether China will follow through with any commitment. China’s improved standards of living have been accomplished through the use of CO2-emitting conventional energy. China’s GDP per capita has increased from a little more than $300 in 1990 to nearly $7,000 today.[39] This growth is impressive, but China’s per capita GDP is still a fraction of the developed world's. Decarbonization would hinder China’s economic growth, which is why authorities have resisted calls to restrict GHG emissions in previous agreements. China is unlikely to honor its promises in 2030 if it would hamper continued economic growth. India’s pledged cuts are similarly dubious. India recently vowed to cut its carbon intensity by 33 percent to 35 percent by 2030.[40] However, roughly 22 percent of Indians still do not have access to electricity.[41] Domestic political pressures to increase access to electricity and living standards are going to be far more pressing than international promises to make GHG emissions cuts. Closer inspection, however, reveals that India has already incorporated this reality into its pledge. The promised reductions are not for CO2 emissions, but for cuts in the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP, i.e., emissions intensity. This ratio will go down so long as CO2 emissions rise less rapidly than GDP. For example, the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy dropped by more than 45 percent between 1981 and 2011 even as CO2 emissions rose 18 percent.[42] India’s GDP is projected to rise from $1.15 trillion in 2005 (the base year for India’s promised cuts) to $6.9 trillion in 2030.[43] Over the same span CO2 emissions are projected to rise from 1.2 gigatons (Gt) to 3.8 Gt.[44] Simple division shows that the CO2 intensity in 2005 was 1.05 Gt per trillion dollars and that it is expected to drop to 0.577 Gt per trillion dollars in 2030. Therefore, projections for India’s GDP and CO2 emissions combine to predict that a business-as-usual scenario (one without any policies beyond those currently in place) will lead to a 45 percent reduction in India’s carbon intensity by 2030. The promised cuts are 33 percent to 35 percent. In other words, if India does nothing at all, it is likely to more than meet its “bold commitment.”

#### The director of the EPA agrees

Snyder 16 (2016, Carolyn, Director, Climate Protection Partnerships Division at US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Evolution of global temperature over the past two million years,” http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html)

Reconstructions of Earth’s past climate strongly influence our understanding of the dynamics and sensitivity of the climate system. Yet global temperature has been reconstructed for only a few isolated windows of time[1](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html#ref1), [2](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html#ref2), and continuous reconstructions across glacial cycles remain elusive. Here I present a spatially weighted proxy reconstruction of global temperature over the past 2 million years estimated from a multi-proxy database of over 20,000 sea surface temperature point reconstructions. Global temperature gradually cooled until roughly 1.2 million years ago and cooling then stalled until the present. The cooling trend probably stalled before the beginning of the mid-Pleistocene transition[3](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html#ref3), and pre-dated the increase in the maximum size of ice sheets around 0.9 million years ago[4](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html#ref4), [5](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html#ref5), [6](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html#ref6). Thus, global cooling may have been a pre-condition for, but probably is not the sole causal mechanism of, the shift to quasi-100,000-year glacial cycles at the mid-Pleistocene transition. Over the past 800,000 years, polar amplification (the amplification of temperature change at the poles relative to global temperature change) has been stable over time, and global temperature and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations have been closely coupled across glacial cycles. A comparison of the new temperature reconstruction with radiative forcing from greenhouse gases estimates an Earth system sensitivity of 9 degrees Celsius (range 7 to 13 degrees Celsius, 95 per cent credible interval) change in global average surface temperature per doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide over millennium timescales. This result suggests that stabilization at today’s greenhouse gas levels may already commit Earth to an eventual total warming of 5 degrees Celsius (range 3 to 7 degrees Celsius, 95 per cent credible interval) over the next few millennia as ice sheets, vegetation and atmospheric dust continue to respond to global warming.

### 1NC—NO DISEASE IMPACT

#### Diseases don’t cause extinction

Owen Cotton-**Barratt 17**, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are **very unlikely to cause human extinction**. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, **less than 4%** (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is **very numerous**, **globally dispersed**, and capable of a **rational response to problems**, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a **selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal**. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

### 2NC—NO DISEASE IMPACT

#### Existential diseases are impossible- any disease that would have an 100% lethality rate would kill their hosts before it could spread, which creates evolutionary pressures for low lethality rates. Out of every extinction of both plants and animals only 4% are from diseases and none of those were globally dispersed like humans, which make burnout likely- that’s Barret.

What is new is the possibility that science, bypassing evolution, will enable monkeypox to be "juiced up" through gene splicing into a far more lethal pathogen than smallpox ever was.

#### Absolutely no chance of extinction from disease

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja, infectious disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh] “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?” June 17, 2016 (http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/) - MZhu

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now?

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

### 1NC—ALT CAUSES

#### Many other characteristics of biodefense must be bolstered to solve the impact

Dhillon et al. 17 (Ranu S. Dhillon, MD, is an instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. [Devabhaktuni Srikrishna](https://hbr.org/search?term=devabhaktuni+srikrishna) is the founder of [Patient Knowhow](http://www.patientknowhow.com), which curates patient educational content on YouTube. [David Beier](https://hbr.org/search?term=david+beier) is a managing director of Bay City Capital. He previously served in several leadership roles at the intersection of government, policy, and technology.)(“The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”, March 15, 2017, Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic)//ASMITH

In 2003 a doctor with SARS [unknowingly infected several guests](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK92462/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK92462.pdf) while staying at a Hong Kong hotel, and overnight the virus reached across the globe. China is currently battling a bird flu that [kills nearly half of the people infected](https://www.statnews.com/2017/02/28/bird-flu-surge/). If Ebola, which transmits through fluids, were spread by air, or if Zika, which [has reached over 50 countries,](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/active-countries.html) were as deadly as Ebola, we would be facing an unprecedented catastrophe. An uncontrolled outbreak or bioterror attack could result in a [contagion that kills over 30 million people](https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-2017/video/panel-discussion-health-security-small-bugs-big-bombs/). We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious pathogen, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked. Pandemics now occur with greater frequency, due to factors such as climate change, urbanization, and international travel. Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and [foreign aid, including funding for the United Nations,](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/13/white-house-seeks-to-cut-billions-in-funding-for-united-nations/?utm_content=buffer6a145&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer) stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also face the specter of novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen before. With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could [rival nuclear weapons in deadliness](https://www.wired.com/2017/02/former-secretary-defense-outlines-future-warfare/). The two of us have advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have [worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika](http://www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j379) and have informally advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines. However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, [has one proven effective](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/health/ebola-vaccine.html). This has been the case with Zika, too. Though there has been [rapid progress](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/testing-the-limits-of-biotech-in-the-race-for-a-zika-vaccine.html) in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We need faster pipelines, such as the one that the [Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations](http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1613577) is trying to create, to preemptively develop vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Point-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our [next best strategy](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2814%2961696-2/fulltext) was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result, many patients were only tested [after several days of being contagious and infecting others](http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1411100#t=article). Some were never tested at all, and about 40% of patients in Ebola treatment centers [did not actually have Ebola](https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm63e1114a1.htm). Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so [pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies might be affected](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/us/zika-test-delays-florida-pregnant.html). What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is well-established. However, the process for their validation [is slow and messy](https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-fight-against-zika-cant-wait-for-a-vaccine). Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were available but [never used because of such bottlenecks](http://www.nature.com/news/researchers-frustrated-by-failure-to-roll-out-game-changing-ebola-test-1.17862). Greater Global Coordination We need stronger global coordination. The responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread across too many players with no unifying authority. In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been [calls for a mechanism](http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1502918#t=article) for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, [continues to suffer from a lack of credibility](http://gh.bmj.com/content/1/2/e000047). Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to contain outbreaks. In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for [about half of the $3.6 billion](https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/cost-response.pdf) ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to routine care is also essential for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care [doubted the intentions of foreigners](http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1508413#t=article) flooding into their villages. The [turning point](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/as-ebola-ebbs-in-africa-focus-turns-from-death-to-life.html) in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead. With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things — vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a key role in combatting pandemics around the world, threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking drastic budget cuts in funding for [foreign aid](https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/02/28/us/politics/ap-us-trump-diplomatic-cutbacks.html) and [scientific research](http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/trump-s-2018-budget-will-squeeze-civilian-science-agencies). The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including [half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN.](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/13/white-house-seeks-to-cut-billions-in-funding-for-united-nations/) The National Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, [may also face cuts](http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/trump-s-2018-budget-will-squeeze-civilian-science-agencies). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has been [at the forefront of responding to outbreaks](https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/security/ghsagenda.htm), remains [without a director](http://www.vox.com/2017/3/4/14803596/trump-pandemic-response-global-health-cdc), and, if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, would lose [$891 million, 12% of its overall budget](https://www.statnews.com/2017/03/07/cdc-budget-obamacare-repeal/), provided to it for [immunization programs, monitoring and responding to outbreaks, and other public health initiatives](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/03/08/obamacare-repeal-guts-crucial-public-health-funds/?utm_term=.a737287260ac). Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through revitalized national and international institutions should be our shared goal. However, if U.S. agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as [Institut Pasteur](https://www.pasteur.fr/en) and the [National Institute of Health and Medical Research](http://english.inserm.fr) in France, the [Wellcome Trust](https://wellcome.ac.uk) and [London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine](http://www.lshtm.ac.uk) in the UK, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done [instrumental research](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2815%2961042-X/fulltext) and [response work](http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/our-work/medical-issues/epidemics) in previous pandemics), would need to step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease. Pandemics are an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict. We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier, more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?

### 2NC—ALT CAUSES

#### Trump’s budget cuts are an alt cause to failed disease response

Baumgaertner 17 (Emily Baumgaertner, the former global health projects and partnerships coordiantor at the Pulitzer Center. Prior to joining the Pulitzer Center, Emily earned her Master of Public Health degree in global health metrics at The George Washington University.)(“Trump’s Proposed Budget Cuts Trouble Bioterrorism Experts”, May 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/politics/biosecurity-trump-budget-defense.html)//ASMITH

WASHINGTON — President Trump has promoted his first budget proposal as placing one mission above all else — keeping America safe. But the president has drawn a narrow definition of national security, and one aspect of defense would actually receive less money: protecting the nation from deadly pathogens, man-made or natural. To help offset a 10 percent increase in military spending, much of the government would take serious hits, including agencies tasked with biosecurity. The Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, which tracks outbreaks of disease, would be cut by $136 million, or 9.7 percent. The National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases — a branch of the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/centers_for_disease_control_and_prevention/index.html?inline=nyt-org) that fights threats like [anthrax](http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/anthrax/overview.html?inline=nyt-classifier) and Ebola — would be cut by $65 million, or 11 percent. The C.D.C.’s Center for Global Health would lose $76 million, or 18 percent. Its Emergency Operations Center, which conducts real-time monitoring of outbreak responses, and its Select Agents Program, which sets regulations in lethal toxin labs and helps researchers stay ahead of bioterrorists, face unspecified cuts as well. Experts in biological threats are reacting with alarm. “It’s horrific — worse than I expected,” says J. Stephen Morrison, the director of the Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They’re just gutting things, overlaying salt upon key institutions, with devastating human impact.” “When you add those cuts up,” he added, they “will inevitably impact health security.” Republicans in Congress are no less critical. “Sometime in the president’s term, you will have a pandemic,” Representative Tom Cole, Republican of Oklahoma, told the president’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, at a House budget hearing on Wednesday. “You will have a [Zika](http://www.nytimes.com/news-event/zika-virus?inline=nyt-classifier), you will have an Ebola,” Mr. Cole said. “Cutting the Centers for Disease Control, I think, leaves you very vulnerable and the American people very vulnerable,” he said. Over all, the C.D.C.’s budget would be cut 17 percent. Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, who recently retired as the director of the C.D.C. and led its 2014 Ebola response, sent more than a dozen bullet points [on Twitter last week](https://twitter.com/DrFrieden/status/866983723857793024) cataloging how the proposed budget was “Unsafe at Any Level Of Enactment.” Trump administration officials say they are trying to refocus scientific research in an era of domestic austerity. Too much federal science is competing with work that could be done in the private sector, they say. Under the president’s budget, the [National Institutes of Health](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/national_institutes_of_health/index.html?inline=nyt-org) at large would be cut 18 percent. Within that, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which handles Zika, Ebola and [H.I.V.](http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/aids/overview.html?inline=nyt-classifier)/AIDS vaccine research, would lose 18 percent of its budget. “The administration wholeheartedly believes in the commitment to research,” Mr. Mulvaney said Wednesday at the House budget hearing. “We’d like to see more focus on what they call basic research, which is research further away from the marketability of products because that is one of the gaps that the government can and should fill.” The targeting is remarkably specific. At the N.I.H., the Fogarty International Center, a small program that in part trains foreign leaders in pandemic response, would be eliminated. Thousands of scientists and global health professionals rallied on Capitol Hill in April to protest the plan after a list of programs targeted for eradication was released. “They’re making a very radical statement,” Dr. Morrison said. “The big picture is a movement toward suspicion of international programs. The administration is threatening to abandon multilateralism in a big way.” Global health programs at the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development would be cut by at least a quarter. ”Our operations must become more efficient, and our assistance must become more effective,” Hari Sastry, the director of the State Department’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, told reporters on Tuesday. “Our primary mission is going to remain advocating for the national interests of our country.” Military and border patrol spending will increase, if Mr. Trump’s request is funded. But scientists warn that a $1.6 billion project to begin constructing a southern border wall will not keep out the most lethal outbreak of [bird flu](http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/avian-influenza/overview.html?inline=nyt-classifier) in history, which recently killed 40 percent of patients in China, nor will it keep out Ebola, which has resurfaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 37 suspected cases this month. “The next weapon of mass destruction may not be a bomb,” said [Lawrence O. Gostin](http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/faculty/Lawrence-Gostin.cfm), the director of the World Health Organization’s Collaborating Center on Public Health Law and Human Rights. “It may be a tiny pathogen that you can’t see, smell or taste, and by the time we discover it, it’ll be too late,” Mr. Gostin said. “The closed-border, highly nationalistic, America-first vision is not the world’s scientific view of how to keep a population safe and healthy,” he said. The president’s requests on biomedical research and defense are likely to be greeted skeptically by Congress, which ultimately controls spending levels. Lawmakers in both parties have greatly increased funding for the N.I.H. budget, and Georgia’s two senators, both Republicans, have protected the C.D.C. and its Atlanta headquarters. Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, called the Trump proposal “dead on arrival.” And in the House budget hearing on Wednesday, Mr. Cole pressed Mr. Mulvaney on proposed cuts to the disease surveillance program.

### 1NC – NO PROLIF IMPACT

#### No impact to nuclear proliferation—more nuclear states produce peace

Suzuki 15 – (June 2015, Akisato, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, SagePub)

Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute–state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

### 2NC – NO PROLIF

#### No prolif impact

Mueller 17 (John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University & Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute & Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University "76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism" https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76\_0.pdf)

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have done Iran a favor. There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests. Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics? Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return have proved faulty. Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished. Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will inevitably go off. But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

### 1NC—NO SPACE WAR

**No space war --- cost and inconvenience**

**Wordsworth 15** - I'm a UK journalist, and write for Gizmodo, Kotaku and Vice. (Rich, “Why We'll Never Fight a Real-Life Star Wars Space Conflict”, December 18, 2015, Gizmodo, http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2015/12/why-well-never-fight-a-real-life-star-wars-space-conflict//dmeth)

Well, never say never. You might not make to the end of this paragraph before the sky lights up and the world goes dark. But there are some good reasons to be optimistic that won’t happen. One reassuring factor is that the more other countries develop their militaries, the more dependent on networks they become as well. China is developing its own drone programme, and so is Russia, which will both presumably be dependent on satellites to operate. And the more their (and our) economies and business interests develop, the more everyone will rely on satellites to further their economic ambitions. In the event that countries were to start knocking out each other’s satellites on a large scale, the consequences across the board – for everyone – would be disastrous. It would also be expensive in the short term. Getting things into orbit – peaceful or otherwise – still isn’t cheap, which is why only a handful of countries regularly do so. And if you want to blow up a network of many satellites today (as you would have to in a first strike, to ensure other satellites couldn’t pick up the slack), launching small satellites or missiles into orbit is the only practical way to do that – arming satellites with their own weaponry just isn’t financially or technologically feasible on a grand scale. We are, happily, a long way from a Death Star. “I don’t think [a large first strike] would be financially too costly [if you’re] thinking about kinetic energy weapons and the air-based or ground-based lasers,” says Jasani. “It’s viable. But if you say, ‘I’m going to put an [ASAT] weapon [permanently] in orbit’, we are then getting into very expensive and very complicated technology. So my guess is that in the foreseeable future, what we are going to focus on are the kinetic energy weapons and possibly lasers that could blind satellites or affect, for example, the solar panels. That kind of technology will be delivered in the foreseeable future, rather than having lasers in orbit [like] the Star Wars kind of thing.” But there’s another, possibly even more persuasive reason that a kinetic war in space may not happen: it’s just so much easier – and less damaging – to mess with satellites without getting close to them. “Jamming from the ground is not difficult,” says Quintana. “If you look at the Middle East, pick a country where there’s a crisis and the chances are that the military in that country has tried to jam a commercial satellite to try and avoid satellite TV channels broadcasting anti-government messages.” “My guess is that by the time we are ready for space warfare, I think you may not be banking on your hit-to-kill ASATs, but more on [non-destructive] high-energy laser-based systems,” Jasani agrees. “[Space debris] affects all sides, not just the attacked side. The attacking side will have its own satellites in orbit, which might be affected by the debris [of its own attack].” And if you really need to remove an enemy’s satellite coverage, you can always try to flatten or hack the control stations on the ground, leaving the satellites talking with no-one to listen. “I don’t think physically blowing things up from the ground is something that people are looking at again,” says Quintana. “Countries and governments try to find means other than physical conflict to achieve their strategic ends. So as space becomes more commercial and more civilian and as more scientific satellites go up, then you’ll find that states will not seek to directly attack each other, but will seek other means. “It may just be that they will try to cyber-attack the satellites and take them over, which has been done in the past. It’s much easier to physically or cyber-attack the ground control station than it is to attack the satellite itself - so why would you not look to do that as a first port of call and achieve the same ends?” Ultimately, then, what might keep us safe from a war in space isn't the horror of explosives in orbit, but a question of cost and convenience.

### 2NC—NO SPACE WAR

**Attacks on space systems don’t escalate to ground war**

-- perceived as foolish/unstrategic

-- official statements/senior officials say we wouldn’t retal w/nukes

**Colby, 16**- senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security with a JD from Yale law (Elbridge Colby, January 2016, “FROM SANCTUARY TO BATTLEFIELD: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space,” <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Space%20Report_16107.pdf>)

But such a threat is of substantially decreasing credibility. In today’s much different context, **no one** really **believes** that **a limited space attack would** necessarily or even **plausibly be a prelude to** total **nuclear war.** Would the United States respond with a major strategic strike if China or Russia, in the context of a regional conflict with the United States, struck discriminately at implicated U.S. space assets in the attempt to defang U.S. power projection, all while leaving the broader U.S. space architecture alone? Not only does such a massive response seem unlikely – it would be positively foolish and irresponsible. Furthermore, would other nations regard attacks on assets the United States was actively employing for a local war as off limits to attack? Indeed, any reasonable observer would have to judge that such discriminate attacks on U.S. space assets would not necessarily be illegitimate, as, by the United States’ own admission, it relies greatly on its space architecture for conventional power projection. Moreover, official U.S. statements on how the United States would respond to attacks on its space assets – to the limited extent such statements exist and the degree to which those given are clear – offer no indication it would respond massively to such strikes.53 Perhaps more to the point, senior responsible U.S. officials have telegraphed that the United States would indeed not necessarily respond massively to attacks against its space assets.54 In light of these factors, any U.S. space deterrence strategy that is predicated on an all-or-nothing retaliation to space attacks will become increasingly incredible and thus decreasingly effective – and indeed might even invite an adversary’s challenge in order to puncture or degrade U.S. credibility.

### 1NC HEG GOOD

#### Multilateralism bad hegemony is good, and restraint is bad — 5 warrants

* Security competition in Asia & Europe
* Nuclear proliferation
* Nationalism & xenophobia
* Spheres of influence
* Political gridlock & democratic decline

Wright 20 – (Thomas Wright, Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution; “The Folly of Retrenchment”; Foreign Affairs; D.A. August 27th 2020, [Published March/April 2020]; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment>) //LFS—JCM

Global retrenchment is fast emerging as the most coherent and ready-made alternative to the United States’ postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it would be a grave mistake. By dissolving U.S. alliances and ending the forward presence of U.S. forces, this strategy would destabilize the regional security orders in Europe and Asia. It would also increase the risk of nuclear proliferation, empower right-wing nationalists in Europe, and aggravate the threat of major-power conflict.

This is not to say that U.S. strategy should never change. The United States has regularly increased and decreased its presence around the world as threats have risen and ebbed. Even though Washington followed a strategy of [containment](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-12/new-containment) throughout the Cold War, that took various forms, which meant the difference between war and peace in Vietnam, between an arms race and arms control, and between détente and an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States changed course again, expanding its [alliances](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/evolution-of-nato) to include many countries that had previously been part of the Warsaw Pact.

Likewise, the United States will now have to do less in some areas and more in others as it shifts its focus from counterterrorism and reform in the Middle East toward great-power competition with China and Russia. But advocates of global retrenchment are not so much proposing changes within a strategy as they are calling for the wholesale replacement of one that has been in place since World War II. What the United States needs now is a careful pruning of its overseas commitments—not the indiscriminate abandonment of a strategy that has served it well for decades.

RETRENCHMENT REDUX

Support for retrenchment stems from the view that the United States has overextended itself in countries that have little bearing on its national interest. According to this perspective, which is closely associated with the realist school of international relations, the United States is fundamentally secure thanks to its geography, nuclear arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the country has nonetheless chosen to pursue a strategy of “[liberal hegemony](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/hegemony-and-after),” using force in an unwise attempt to perpetuate a liberal international order (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, is not so liberal, after all). Washington, the argument goes, has distracted itself with costly overseas commitments and interventions that breed resentment and encourage free-riding abroad. Critics of the status quo argue that the United States must take two steps to change its ways. The first is retrenchment itself: the action of [withdrawing](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-15/nonintervention-delusion) from many of the United States’ existing commitments, such as the ongoing military interventions in the Middle East and one-sided alliances in Europe and Asia. The second is restraint: the strategy of defining U.S. interests narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless vital interests are directly threatened and Congress authorizes such action, compelling other nations to take care of their own security, and relying more on diplomatic, economic, and political tools. In practice, this approach means ending U.S. military operations in [Afghanistan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2019-10-21/what-withdrawal-afghanistan-would-look), withdrawing U.S. forces from the Middle East, relying on an over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer taking on responsibility for the security of other states. As for alliances, [Posen](http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/opinion/trump-aside-whats-the-us-role-in-nato.html) has argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of NATO, replace the organization “with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement,” and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the question of China, realists have split in recent years. Some, such as the scholar [John Mearsheimer](https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/mearsheimers-war-with-china/), contend that even as the United States retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must contain the threat of China, whereas others, such as Posen, argue that nations in the region are perfectly capable of doing the job themselves. Since Trump’s election, some progressive foreign policy thinkers have joined the retrenchment camp. They diverge from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States’ current role. Like the realists, progressive retrenchers hold the view that the United States is safe because of its geography and the size of its military. Where these progressives break from the realists, however, is on the question of what will happen if the United States pulls back. While the realists favoring retrenchment have few illusions about the sort of regional competition that will break out in the absence of U.S. dominance, the progressives expect that the world will become [more peaceful](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/12/13/infinity-war/?arc404=true) and cooperative, because Washington can still manage tensions through diplomatic, economic, and political tools. The immediate focus of the progressives is the so-called forever wars—U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the broader war on terrorism—as well as the defense budget and overseas bases. Although the progressives have a less developed vision of how to implement retrenchment than the realists, they do provide some guideposts. [Stephen Wertheim](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/opinion/sunday/endless-war-america.html), a co-founder of the Quincy Institute, has called for bringing home many of the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, “leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes,” as part of an effort to “deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution.” He argues that U.S. allies may believe that the United States has been inflating regional threats and thus conclude that they do not need to increase their conventional or nuclear forces. Another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan.

IS LESS REALLY MORE?

The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments.

This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at [too high a price](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/restraint-new-foundation-us-grand-strategy)—and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left—resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war.

The progressives’ view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has [invaded](https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine) two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea.

The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about [nuclear proliferation](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/do-nuclear-weapons-matter): nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation.

Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim—such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France—while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia.

A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-of-influence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence—the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded [Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-15/will-china-seize-taiwan) to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law.

A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people may favor greater burden sharing, but there is no evidence that they are onboard with a withdrawal from Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted in 2019 by the [Chicago Council on Global Affairs](https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/rejecting-retreat) found, seven out of ten Americans believe that maintaining military superiority makes the United States safer, and almost three-quarters think that alliances contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 [Eurasia Group Foundation poll](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/9QHRCwpR0mHqMQmCVthSz?domain=egfound.org) found that over 60 percent of Americans want to maintain or increase defense spending. As it became apparent that China and Russia would benefit from this shift toward retrenchment, and as the United States’ democratic allies objected to its withdrawal, the domestic political backlash would grow. One result could be a prolonged foreign policy debate that would cause the United States to oscillate between retrenchment and reengagement, creating uncertainty about its commitments and thus raising the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.

Realist and progressive retrenchers like to argue that the architects of the United States’ postwar foreign policy naively sought to remake the world in its image. But the real revisionists are those who argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical experiment of unprecedented scale in modern history. If this camp were to have its way, Europe and Asia—two stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions that form the two main pillars of the U.S.-led order—would be plunged into an era of uncertainty.

#### US heg boosts transatlantic unity, keeps Russia and China in check, spreads democracy, and leads world peace

Ville Sinkkonen 22, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Center on US Politics and Power, 6/7/2022, "A Fleeting Glimpse of Hegemony? The War in Ukraine and The Future of The International Leadership of The United States ," Transatlantic Policy Quarterly, <http://transatlanticpolicy.com/article/1126/a-fleeting-glimpse-of-hegemony-the-war-in-ukraine-and-the-future-of-the-international-leadership-of-the-united-states>

The war in Ukraine is a world-historical moment – a pivotal event that comes around maybe once every decade. Already the Russian invasion has upended the post-Cold War European security order. However, beyond shattering established structures, crises tend to create opportunities. In this regard, the war in Ukraine is no different. From the standpoint of the United States, Moscow’s blatant aggression has creating an opening to reassert its leadership of the Western alliance and even recapture some of its post-Cold War hegemonic position, which has been challenged by revisionist powers China and Russia and domestic travails.[1] A little over six months after a chaotic exit from Afghanistan, President Biden and his administration are being hailed for the successful coordination of a joint transatlantic response in sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine. Joe Biden’s triumphant inaugural declaration looks prescient: “America is back”.

However, in the midst of such triumphalism, it is vital to pause and consider pathways forward. As the old international order receded, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s international engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world.[2] After briefly outlining how the Biden administration arrived at its pivotal date with history, this article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with to sustain the current “hegemonic moment.” Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.

From Relief to Trepidation and Back Again

In Europe and within the U.S. alliance network more broadly, the Biden presidency was greeted by and large with a sense of relief. After four years on Donald Trump’s America First rollercoaster, transatlantic relations would – so the logic went – give way to a smoother ride. For America’s friends and allies, Joe Biden was a known quantity, an experienced foreign policy leader with transatlanticism and alliance solidarity near his heart; a stark contrast to Trump’s unilateralist and transactionalist tendencies.[3] Biden’s team articulated a willingness to reassume America’s place at the relevant tables of international politics to “earn back [… its] leadership position”.[4]

Relatedly, the leadership role the U.S. has presently assumed remains in stark contrast to how the Trump administration dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic, shutting borders, hoarding medical supplies, and engaging in vaccine nationalism.

In the context of these high expectations, the first year of the Biden administration was a disappointment for many on the old continent. There were, of course, early successes. The U.S. decision to re-enter the Paris Climate Agreement and return to the fold at the World Health Organization (WHO) were greeted with applause by many in Europe. The President’s “feel-good tour” of the old continent in June produced pledges of support for the EU and NATO as well as headline-grabbing developments like the B3W (Build Back Better World) infrastructure initiative and a deal on the 17-year-old EU-U.S. dispute over airline subsidies.[5]

However, dark clouds were brewing on the horizon. The U.S. had already failed in consulting its European allies on the decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, ultimately taken in mid-April. The chaotic exit from the country in August, on the heels of a surprising Taliban takeover, led observers to question U.S. reliability and credibility and the Biden administration’s policy competence.[6]

The Afghanistan debacle was followed in short order by an announcement of a security pact by the U.S., UK, and Australia, dubbed AUKUS. The arrangement would grant Australia access to nuclear propulsion technology for its submarines. In the process, the French – the one EU member with ambitions of a sustained security footprint in the Indo-Pacific – lost out on a lucrative $66 billion deal to build diesel-powered submarines for Australia. In the ensuing dust-up between the U.S. and France, Paris even called home its ambassador to the United States.[7]

After these debacles, Russia’s maximalist calls to renegotiate the European security architecture and build-up of forces around Ukraine provided the Biden administration with an opportunity for a transatlantic reset after a challenging year. By airing intelligence findings about Russian troop movements and intelligence regarding the Kremlin’s plans, the U.S. eroded Moscow’s ability to rely on the element of surprise. Just as importantly, the U.S. took the lead in diplomacy before Russia shut the door on such endeavors with its invasion on 24 February 2022.[8]

Because of astute diplomacy and coordination in the weeks leading up to the invasion, the U.S. and the EU were swift in responding with punitive sanctions and have been able to up the ante as the Russian attack has continued. The provision of Western military aid to Ukraine has also been a joint transatlantic undertaking, and despite some public spats, such as over the fate of Polish MiG-29 fighter jets, the effort has allowed Ukraine to inflict considerable damage upon the invading forces. Meanwhile, NATO is bolstering its defenses on the Eastern flank and has regained a sense of purpose. In the span of less than three months, doubts over U.S. credibility have been traded in for celebrations of transatlantic unity.[9] Yet the war in Ukraine still raises several open questions about the future role of the United States in the world writ large and the shape of the transatlantic relationship in the coming years. Five sets of challenges appear particularly pertinent, namely, making most of the transatlantic unity, selling the U.S. and Western approach globally, engaging in two-theatre great-power competition, finding a balance between safeguarding democracy, and dealing with autocracies, and, last but not least, finding domestic backing for a sustainable foreign policy line.

Cashing in on Transatlantic Unity

The pronounced unity on sanctions against Russia and the steady stream of weapons deliveries and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine speak volumes for the reinvigorated strength of the transatlantic bond. Even Germany has gone against the grain of its strategic culture, pledging a €100 billion increase in defense spending and endeavoring to meet NATO’s 2-percent-of-GDP military spending target.[10] Declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019,[11] NATO has found a new sense of purpose, and is now debating the entry of two new members: Finland and Sweden. Both countries possess a long history of military non-alignment, robust democratic credentials and relatively strong militaries.[12] In fact, the entry of these two Nordic countries to NATO enjoys broad support within the alliance, and bipartisan support in Congress.[13] Such seismic shifts would have been unimaginable at the beginning of the year, let alone in the Trump era.

Yet, barring a leadership change in the Kremlin or a drastic Russian policy shift, a long era of “neo-containment” beckons on the continent.[14] After years of uncertainty over the future direction of the Western alliance, the U.S. commitment to the transatlantic relationship seems secure, at least for the time being. The U.S. has, for instance, increased its troop presence in Europe from 60 000 to 100 000 after the Russian invasion, alongside its material support for Ukraine.[15] In the long run, however, the future American military presence and shape of NATO’s deterrence posture on the old continent will depend on how the war in Ukraine ultimately plays out. The extent to which Russia’s military capabilities can be further degraded in Ukraine and the ability of either the Ukrainians or Russians to achieve successes on the battlefield before a negotiated solution or a stalemate are just two vital vectors that will impact contingency planning.

Whether the U.S. can cash in on its allies’ manifest willingness to invest more in defense is an even broader question. Europeans are finally answering a call for more equitable burden-sharing that U.S. administrations have been making for decades. At the same time, however, the transatlantic relationship has always presented Washington D.C. with a dilemma. The ability of the U.S. to influence its allies has depended on an asymmetry of power between the two sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, a more capable and autonomous Europe would likely be less willing to follow Washington’s lead.[16] This mode of thought has historically been at the core of D.C. insiders’ gripes regarding European strategic autonomy. Going forward, U.S. policymakers would need to drop such antiquated views in favor of a more approach to transatlantic security, one where the U.S. views European capacity building as positive progress regardless of the framework wherein such developments take place.[17] A more capable Europe would not only assume more responsibility for the continent’s security, but free up U.S. resources for use elsewhere around the globe. A stronger Europe thus makes for a better – even if at times more independent-minded – partner. Here the Europeans’ manifest demand for sustained U.S. hegemony and calls for strategic autonomy need not be irreconcilable.

A Worrying Global Context

While European solidarity has been on display in media headlines, and the U.S.’ traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific have been supportive, a prominent chunk of the world does not share the American and European understanding of the war.[18] Nor are they willing to take measures to sanction Russia either symbolically or materially. When the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council on 7 April 2022, 93 members voted for the resolution, but 24 voted against and 58 abstained. Notable abstainers included India, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Vietnam, which the U.S. has sought to woo in recent years, voted against.[19] In the Middle East, the U.S.’ traditional partners have refused to pump more oil into the market amidst soaring energy prices.[20] Meanwhile, despite U.S. courtship of India in the Quad framework, New Delhi continues to balance American demands and its historical relationship with Moscow.[21] Testament to the difficulty of selling the West’s message in the global south, South African President Cyril Ramophosa has blamed NATO enlargement for the outbreak of the war.[22]

The world remains a messy place, and the ability of the U.S. to counter Chinese or Russian influence globally hinges on the U.S.’ ability to work pragmatically with regimes that possess few democratic credentials.

From the U.S. and Europe standpoint, this lack of support from outside the traditional West is a problem. Although the hegemony of the U.S. dollar makes going against its sanctions difficult,[23] how the U.S., EU, and their allies have managed to shut Russia out of the global economy is a warning sign to other potential targets of sanctions. Therefore, the war could hasten movement away from the dollar and euro as reserve currencies, eroding the future efficacy of sanctions.[24] Relatedly, the leadership role the U.S. has presently assumed remains in stark contrast to how the Trump administration dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic, shutting borders, hoarding medical supplies, and engaging in vaccine nationalism.[25] While Covid vaccinations have progressed with vigor in the West, vaccination rates are lagging in the global south. There is a stark contrast between the U.S. Congress approving a $40 billion package to support Ukraine, and its inability to agree on sufficient funding for the global vaccination drive.[26] In this vein, what might appear as newfound U.S. leadership in the West, can easily be construed as yet another manifestation of American and Western hypocrisy elsewhere.[27]

Competing on Two Fronts

In the process of upending the European security architecture, the Ukraine crisis has thrown the U.S. into the center of a “two-front great-power competition”.[28] At the start of the Biden presidency, there were few areas of bipartisan consensus in Washington D.C., but the imperative of engaging China in great-power competition came close. The incoming administration recognized China as a priority over other security challenges, including Russia. In fact, there was little discernible change beyond rhetorical nuance from the Trump administration when it came to China policy. The Biden team kept Trump-era tariffs in place, and despite a joint U.S.-China pledge made at the COP26 summit, competition has been the order of the day. Joe Biden’s recent statements indicating U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack – which would be a departure from decades of “strategic ambiguity” – underline how the U.S.’ China policy’s tides have shifted in the span of two presidential administrations.[29]

When it came to Russia, the initial intention of the administration was to manage the relationship so that the U.S. could finally reorient towards the Indo-Pacific – although there was no expectation of an actual “reset” with Moscow. Although the June meeting between Biden and Putin in Geneva appeared to pave the way for more predictable relations initially, Russia’s decision to pursue regional revanchism in Ukraine has laid any such plans to rest. The success of Ukraine in withstanding the Russian onslaught, with the help of Western weapons deliveries, has also enabled the U.S. to reframe its approach towards the Kremlin. In the words of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the U.S. “want[s] to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things it has done in invading Ukraine”.[30] This shift towards degrading Russia’s capacity is reflected in the investments the U.S. is willing to make to support Ukraine’s cause. These assets have broad bipartisan support, as manifested in the recent $40 billion bill that passed with comprehensive bipartisan support in both houses. [31]

To further complicate matters, just weeks before Russia embarked on its military adventure, Xi Jinping met Vladimir Putin at the Beijing Winter Olympics, and the two states released a statement asserting their friendship had “no limits”. While China has refrained from directly supporting Russia with military equipment, it has not condemned the invasion or gone along with Western sanctions, instead looking to benefit from cheaper Russian energy. While the Russia-China relationship is hardly a happy marriage, Beijing’s reaction proves it does not want to lose a partner who shares its distaste for American hegemony.[32] China is therefore unlikely to forsake Moscow, at least for the foreseeable future.[33]

The key question going forward is how the United States intends to maintain such a two-theatre posture in the great game of the 21st century. Obviously, this is a question of attaining and allocating the necessary resources to sustain such an approach, whether in terms of troops or materiel. Critics of the U.S. approach to Ukraine have already pointed out that the rejuvenated focus on the European theatre is a distraction, and the “U.S. Should […] husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia”.[34] Regardless of the constellation of capabilities the U.S. can muster for each theatre, the role of allies will be magnified, requiring astute relationship management from the United States in marrying the concerns and capabilities of its European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners.[35] This will be no mean feat, given the different threat perceptions and security concerns of U.S. friends across the globe.

Dilemmas of Democracy and Autocracy

President Biden has linked strategic competition to a broader contest between democracy and autocracy. For him safeguarding democracy is “the defining challenge of our time.”[36] To underline U.S. commitment to bolster democracy worldwide, the President fulfilled a campaign pledge by hosting the first ever Summit for Democracy in December 2021, albeit to little fanfare. While this narrative of the competition as a struggle between systems of governance plays to audiences at home and in the West writ large, it may actually operate in the converse direction in the rest of the world. Branding states as laggards is not ideal for enticing them into cooperation.[37] The world remains a messy place, and the ability of the U.S. to counter Chinese or Russian influence globally hinges on the U.S.’ ability to work pragmatically with regimes that possess few democratic credentials.

This dilemma has been on full display in the aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In its search for softening the spike in energy prices, the Biden administration has reached out to Saudi Arabia and its controversial crown prince Mohammed bin Salman and oil-rich Venezuela, a state under severe U.S. economic sanctions.[38] The current crisis has also opened up opportunities for authoritarian states to haggle with the hegemon. The opposition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, for instance, can be seen as a not-so-subtle ploy to obtain concessions from the U.S.[39] Of course, making deals and cultivating strategic relationships with unsavory regimes were part of the American toolbox in the bipolar competition of the Cold War and during the global “War on Terror.” The difficult task of balancing between the desire for bolstering democracy and the imperative of safeguarding U.S. interests will certainly remain at the heart of U.S. international engagement for decades to come.[40]

Domestic Concerns and Presidential Wildcards

The Trump era illustrated that the ability of the U.S. to sustain a globally engaged foreign policy is intimately tied to domestic politics. Trump consistently questioned the value of U.S. alliances and partnerships, was suspicious of multilateral institutions and opposed to free trade, and showed blatant disregard for democratic norms at home and abroad.[41] This “America First” foreign policy approach undercut U.S. influence globally as it pulled out of critical institutions and eroded allies’ and partners’ trust in U.S. security guarantees and America’s willingness to provide global public goods.[42] Doubts about the U.S. persisted throughout the Trump presidency, even though day-to-day U.S. diplomatic engagement and military cooperation with allies and partners remained intact, and the administration made substantial investments in its alliances, for instance in the auspices of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).[43] Trump’s rise to the presidency would not have been possible without the extreme polarization and hyperpartisanship that plagues American politics and the wariness of American voters regarding an active foreign policy. Despite Joe Biden’s pledges to unify the American people,[44] there are few signs of these phenomena abating. The world is thus justifiably holding its breath in anticipation of the 2024 presidential election.

It is unclear whether the war in Ukraine has created the conditions that will forestall a drastic foreign policy shift if a Republican candidate takes the White House in 2024. Admittedly, on Capitol Hill, the Republican party has, by and large, sought to portray itself as tough on Russia, creating an air of bipartisanship on the issue. The same goes for supporting building up NATO defenses on the Eastern flank or for the alliance’s open-door policy, particularly Finnish and Swedish NATO accession. At the same time, however, some Trumpian politicians and pundits have questioned the rationale of supporting Ukraine. Trump himself made headlines in the lead-up to the Russian invasion by praising Putin.[45]

Of course, beyond questions related to European security, Trump or a Trump-like President would likely retain the core parameters of the “America First” foreign policy approach. This would entail wariness regarding international institutions, a dogged focus on competition with China and resistance towards multilateralism and free trade. Even in the event of Democrats holding the White House, these tropes will continue to impact foreign policy. This is clear in the remarkable continuity between the China policies of the Trump and Biden administrations and Biden’s “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class”.[46] This entailed a pronounced focus on domestic initiatives during Biden's first year, including the $ 1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill and the initially $3.5 trillion Build Back Better framework, which never made it through Congress. In addition, the Biden administration has made little substantial progress on trade agreements, which has left it engaging China in great-power competition “with one hand tied behind its back” – much to the chagrin of its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.[47]

#### U.S. hegemony resists collapse

**Kovac 2/19** (Igor Kovac, PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and Foreign Policy Advisor for the Slovenian Prime Minister, 2/12/22, “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, pg ii-iii, accessed 6/18/22)//sfs

Most International Relations literature suggests that when power becomes imbalanced, such a situation will be corrected – hegemony cannot persist over time. However, history offers us several examples of hegemonies lasting over a century, e.g., Ancient Rome, Ming China. So far scholars have offered four explanations for such enduring hegemony (Coercive Hegemony, Cooperative Hegemony, Cultural Hegemony, and Opportunist Hegemony), with a common mechanism: ineffective balancing. Namely, the hegemon has the capacity to put balancing at bay using different strategies flowing from the nature and fundamental principles of its hegemony. Hence, the hegemon uses coercion, institutional leverage, ideological indoctrination, or buyout, in order to assure its hegemony can endure. Yet, through time and through crisis the capacities of the hegemon to make the balancing ineffective diminishes. As such, these theories all share a similar assumption – imbalance is transitory and thus hegemony will breakdown. But what if that common assumption is incorrect. What if under certain conditions, imbalance is not resisted, but rather serves interests of non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon? Twentieth and twenty-first century US hegemony suggests such conditions may exist. This American imbalance displays a different nature and fundamental mechanism behind its functioning. Although US relative power is declining, its global monetary network centrality is not. Moreover, even in times of severe crisis, such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, or the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, we have not witnessed US monetary centrality decline. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The dynamics associated with an imbalance of power in favor of the United States runs against the expectations of existing theories. Therefore, we need a different theory to make sense of these particularities and make better policy recommendations. Thus, I have developed a Pervasive Hegemony Theory, which is based on a ‘buy-in’ behavior, that better explains US hegemony compared to existing alternatives. The ‘buy-in’ behavior relates to non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon, in which all countries continue to use hegemon’s monetary unit in their monetary relations, even in times of severe economic crisis. This reinforces the hegemony. Even though non-hegemonic states may not prefer the imbalance of power, they prefer conducting their economic relations within the hegemon’s monetary unit and thus perpetuate the imbalance. Subsequently, they can only maximize their selfish interests and autonomy by buying-in to the hegemony and reproducing the imbalance of power. Conversely, the hegemon may not like the current rules and norms of the international system, but it can change those and obtain the support of the non-hegemonic states if it accepts to provide its monetary unit as the central currency of the system. In pursuing this argument, I use both quantitative (Network Analysis and Time Series) and qualitative methods (Process Tracing). I use the former on available economic data to establish the claim of US economic centrality, and that it is something different than what we have seen in the past. Second, I process trace the mechanisms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic state behavior in two international monetary systems (Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods) in order to isolate and identify the buy-in mechanism and provide an explanation of enduring imbalance – ownership over the central monetary unit in global economy. The dissertation, thus, assesses existing theories and indicates their inadequacies in explaining an important international phenomenon and provides a more robust explanation of enduring hegemony with the economic centrality, namely the ownership of the central monetary unit.

#### US heg promotes nonproliferation of nukes, biosecurity, democracy, human rights, responsible AI norms, and alternatives to combat climate change

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Welcome and good afternoon.

I want to thank all of you for joining me here today when I know how very busy all of you are.

Last Spring, Secretary Blinken set out the Biden-Harris Administration’s vision of a foreign policy that leads with diplomacy, revitalizes our global network of alliances to meet emerging global challenges, and delivers for the American people. It is a vison, as the Secretary noted, that springs from two fundamental principles: that American leadership and engagement matters, and those countries need to engage and cooperate, now more than ever. It is the role of the State Department – and America’s diplomats and development workers – to engage around the world and build that cooperation.

Today, I am happy to be here to present my priorities as Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security; known inside of the State Department as ‘T.’

The ideas I list today are in light of the many changes that we see in the international security landscape. I chose today to present my priorities, just as we mark the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972. To me, it is a humbling reminder that even as we face monumental international security challenges today, our predecessors prevailed through the power of diplomacy. In everything we do, we will look not only to make progress on short-term problems, but also to address their root causes and lay the groundwork for our long-term strength.

I should note that while I am presenting these ideas, adjustments will be made as we continue to better understand the changes that are taking place and the security environment around us settles. Little did we know last year at the beginning of the Biden Administration that Putin would invade Ukraine. Things are continuing to change on a large scale.

Some of today’s arms control and international security landscape remains the same, such as the DPRK’s insistence on advancing its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and refusing to engage in diplomacy. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), still the most viable option to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, remains unclear. We remain strongly committed to our efforts regarding both the DPRK and the JCPOA. In the meantime, there are other changes – like Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war in Ukraine and the growing challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that present us with many more questions than answers.

Now is the time to consider a new way to address what are new challenges. Russia’s unprovoked invasion has led us to consider what gaps now exist. What does the new landscape mean for us and the issues within T such as arms control, deterrence, nonproliferation, security assistance, and emerging technologies? The People’s Republic of China is also posing new challenges in many areas of our responsibility. How do we address those challenges? Technology is advancing, as are the opportunities and challenges posed by an increased interest in space, while at the same time, climate change and resource limitations can lead to conflict if not addressed. We need to focus on the headlines of today, while keeping an eye on the trendlines for the challenges to come.

The T Family is comprised of three Bureaus: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. It is my honor to lead these Bureaus and work closely with their leadership to use our diplomatic engagements and programs and when needed, sanctions and other pressure, working with the interagency, to implement these priorities of mine.

Let me give you a preview. I have nine priorities. They are as follows:

Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities

Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance

Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective

Protect and promote the U.S. and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages

Promote, protect, and advance the U.S. Civil – Nuclear Industry

Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships

Building the “T Family Brain Trust” to Address New and Emerging Challenges to International Security

Examine “New” Areas of Conflict in International Security

Strengthen and Amplify the T Bureaus

The three T Bureaus are developing or will develop a way forward on these priorities, including new priorities I have asked them to incorporate. While these are my priorities, I note that all of the work of the Bureaus are important to the U.S. and to international security.

Priority One: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities

The T Family will continue to engage the international community in strengthening existing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes, and related activities, including in light of recent challenges to those regimes. This includes, where possible, meaningful engagements and dialogues with Russia and the People’s Republic of China.

I have worked in the areas of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament for 30 years and I can say that arms control remains as important today as it ever was. While there have certainly been challenges to and violations of international arms control agreements by a handful of countries, arms control is not dead as some would like you to believe. Arms control remains an important means to increase allied and global security by reducing risk and enhancing stability. The importance of arms control will also grow as we face competitors pursuing reckless and destabilizing buildups of their nuclear forces combined with opaque, nontransparent nuclear use doctrines. However, progress can only be made in a situation of de-escalation, not escalation. In all cases, we need willing partners sitting across and around the table.

We remain committed to the implementation of New START and eventually getting back to the table to continue the dialogue on laying the groundwork for future arms control and to the pursuit of follow-on measures to the New START treaty. As you know, following Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, we have suspended our Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD). That said, the issues that have been laid out prior to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine are even more important now. In that respect, we want to sustain limits on the Russian systems covered under New START beyond 2026, limit the new kinds of nuclear weapons Russia has fielded or is developing, and address all nuclear weapons including Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.

We must also be flexible as we consider the ways in which we pursue risk reduction and future arms control measures. We will be looking at the different types of forms these efforts can take, including but not be limited to a traditional approach of focusing on negotiating treaties. The way forward in this new international security landscape may be in the form of initiatives like the U.S. voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing recently announced by Vice President Harris, or codes of conduct, or best practices. We can see from the current crisis that the security environment remains complex and is becoming more complex. There is no single, elegant solution to managing nuclear or other 21st century risks. The U.S. is prepared to be creative in finding ways forward and partnering with others to make the world safer. That is what being a leader in arms control is about.

On nuclear disarmament, we remain committed to a world without nuclear weapons in the context of enhancing international security overall. While our concerns about the ability of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to achieve its goals have not changed, we remain committed to engaging in pragmatic efforts to pursue effective measures related to nuclear disarmament. This includes work conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), with whom we work closely.

We support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will work to achieve its entry force while maintaining our moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to seek negotiations on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and call on all relevant countries to join us in declaring and maintaining a moratorium on such production. We will also continue to work with our P5 colleagues, circumstances permitting, to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its three pillars. The U.S. assumes coordination of the P5 Process in June, and we hope to build on previous efforts. The recent P5 statement on the prevention of nuclear war is a good example of the important work we can do together; we must hold each other to those commitments.

We will put renewed focus on these efforts and now that travel restrictions have lifted, we are looking at when we can meet face to face with partners in these forums and discuss ways to move ahead, especially taking into account how the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine has impacted the landscape of that work. Indeed, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling only underscores the importance of preserving the record of non-use of nuclear weapons.

Our Bureaus will also continue to lead efforts to maximize support for enhanced verification capabilities throughout the U.S. government by partnering with the interagency, academia, the scientific community, non-Governmental Organizations, private industry, and others.

There are other new challenges that require continued attention. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly building up a larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal. The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable it to have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the estimated size that the United States projected just two years ago in 2020.

As I noted in my speech last year at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Conference, and it remains true to this day, the U.S. continues to request that the PRC be more transparent about the purpose and direction of its nuclear strategy. There is currently no formal dialogue between our governments on this subject, and limited tools are available to mitigate risk and prevent crisis escalation with the PRC. We will continue to seek engagement with appropriate PRC officials on risk reduction.

As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, or NPT RevCon, will at long last take place in August in New York. With the Russian government’s reckless and destabilizing rhetoric, it is more important now than ever for all States Parties to reaffirm the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and recommit to its goals. The August NPT RevCon provides an opportunity to do that. While the U.S. recognizes the challenges that Russia’s actions pose to the NPT, we will emphasize practical actions responsible nuclear powers can take to reduce nuclear risks and pursue a realistic path on arms control and disarmament, and to ensure that all NPT Parties can realize its full benefits. The RevCon presents an opportunity to reflect both on how much has been accomplished and on what can and must be done to preserve and extend that progress. The NPT remains instrumental in limiting the risk of nuclear war by avoiding a cascade of nuclear proliferation and laying the groundwork for progress on disarmament.

The U.S. will use the Review Conference to promote its objectives in all three of the NPT’s pillars – the areas of nonproliferation and strengthened safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. We plan to find areas of common ground on measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war and a positive dialogue among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).

The U.S. is also committed to the third pillar of the NPT – the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. In that respect, the U.S. and the UK have co-led an effort to build a multilateral deliverable, called the “Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses,” to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. The Sustained Dialogue aims to integrate non-traditional stakeholders in the NPT process to promote broader acceptance of peaceful uses as a solution to development challenges and to create a lasting framework that better captures peaceful use assistance as a dividend of the NPT. It provides a benefit of the NPT that often gets overshadowed by political debates on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

Here, I want to thank my colleagues, Ambassador Adam Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, for his leadership as we prepare for the NPT Review Conference, and for the work that former Assistant Secretary Tom Countryman has accomplished since he agreed to return to us and assist in this process.

We also see the Review Conference as an opportunity to recognize the continued need for a strong International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its work on safeguards, safety, and security. The IAEA has been doing significant work in the area of peaceful uses as well as in other areas of concern, including convening the recent first Review Conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, its work on cybersecurity, on nuclear law, and in other areas. Strong U.S. leadership on nonproliferation will also involve continuing to promote the combination of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) as the de facto international standard for verifying that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. This year marks the 25th anniversary of the AP, and so now is the time to reinvigorate our efforts in support of its universal adoption. We will also reiterate our support for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and for all states to halt production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

Moving on to the other important areas in priority one, there is a renewed focus on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As I noted at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva last year, for the past two decades, efforts to strengthen the Convention have been treading water. States Parties have been unable to agree to significant action. We face a biological weapons threat that is real and, in many respects, growing. Some states continue to possess sophisticated, well-established biological weapons programs, while non-state actors have shown continuing interest in acquiring biological weapons capabilities. Additionally, the widespread availability of sophisticated scientific and technological tools and methods is gradually eroding barriers to the development of biological weapons.

COVID-19 is a wake-up call for all of us. The astonishing human toll of the pandemic has illustrated our shared vulnerability to novel pathogens.

In Geneva, I noted a two-pronged approach. The Review Conference should take near-term, concrete action to strengthen the Convention and benefit States Parties. These actions include further operationalizing assistance under Article VII; establishing a voluntary fund for technical cooperation; creating a mechanism to review advances in science and technology; deepening collaborations on biosafety and biosecurity; staffing the Implementation Support Unit to carry out these roles; and enabling more agile decision making. The second way forward is for the Review Conference to take steps to address the harder issues. It should establish a new expert working group to examine possible measures to strengthen implementation of the Convention, increase transparency, and enhance assurance of compliance.

I was very happy this year to appoint a new BWC Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative to lead the government’s engagements on the BWC. I am pleased that the States Parties reached consensus to delay the Review Conference until November, which allows time for the newly nominated RevCon President to prepare for the meeting. Our Special Representative Ken Ward will spend the next few months working closely with allies and like-minded countries as we turn our broad concepts into specific proposals.

Along with this effort is work by my team to enhance[s] biosafety and biosecurity norms, practices, tools, and resources to bolster cooperation in forums such as the BWC, Global Partnership, and the Global Health Security Agenda. We will work to ensure the tools needed to address these challenges have the attention and resources needed to confront biological challenges. We will work to build national capacity to mitigate biological threats.

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC, the United States is on track to complete destruction of its chemical weapons by September 2023, and we have destroyed over 97 percent of our fully declared stockpile. Given the potential chemical weapons threat to Ukraine, the United States is again leading and working closely with allies and partners. I am proud of the bilateral security assistance that the United States has provided to Ukraine, including over $100 million in life-saving protective and detection equipment and related medical countermeasures, in addition to funds provided to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that will be used to assist Ukraine to protect against the threat of chemical weapons.

The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance is also continuing to work with the OPCW to hold Russia and Syria accountable for their past chemical weapons use and to deter further use. We look forward to additional OPCW reports this summer from its Investigation and Identification Team that will identify those responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The Bureau will continue to make advances in chemical forensics to improve the ability of the United States, allies, partners, and the OPCW to attribute the use of chemical weapons. The CWC States Parties Review Conference in 2023 is another opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their commitment to the CWC and its implementation. We are now considering our goals for the Review Conference to advance its work.

In all our work, we will continue to combat disinformation against U.S. activities and engagements.

The U.S. has been a leader in the development of conventional arms control instruments, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, we continue to see a role for conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. This kind of arms control can enhance mutual confidence and transparency among states and reduce the risk of conflict. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance continues to support full compliance with existing conventional arms control agreements and the development of new ideas for future confidence- and security-building mechanisms, including the modernization of the Vienna Document to reflect the new political-military realities in Europe. It is important to have a base of existing conventional arms control instruments that we can build on to restore a more enduring peace.

Moving on to fortifying related activities as I also noted in this priority, we will enhance the role of export controls and counter proliferation measures in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, and related technologies. The multilateral export control regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group – remain important bodies through which we work with our allies and partners to address proliferation challenges. The regimes protect nonproliferation imperatives while providing predictability for exporters and are the basis for preventing advanced technologies from falling into adversarial competitors. These regimes and institutions must adjust to the challenges in the international security landscape. We will enhance U.S. leadership in these regimes and institutions and advance novel approaches to the challenges each regime face. We will also support the important work of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s programmatic offices that promote adherence to the regimes’ guidance and updates to the control lists among non-member countries, thereby expanding the reach of nonproliferation norms. In that respect, I commend you to go online and learn more about the extensive programmatic work of the T Bureaus.

Priority Two: Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance

The T Family will continue to promote democracy, transparency, and accountability among our allies and partners as we lead the Department’s Security Sector Governance (SSG) efforts. This includes ensuring SSG is accounted for in a methodical, transparent way in our arms transfer and security assistance decision-making, supported by holistic diplomatic engagement, and protecting human rights and civilian security. SSG is about encouraging the leadership and security institutions we partner with to provide security to their people as a public good, rather than leveraging their power to further the narrow interests of the elite. The T Family will reassert the imperative of democratic principles and human rights at the center of our nation’s security assistance programs.

A fundamental aspect of this future work is to ensure that we integrate SSG into larger issues of foreign policy. Assistance should be an integral part of a longer, holistic, diplomatic strategy for our foreign policy goals and approach with countries rather than be transactional. We seek SSG integrated in a methodical, transparent way in our arms transfer and security assistance decision-making with diplomatic engagement.

For example, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will continue providing advisory assistance through the Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), which seeks to improve security sector governance and institutional capacity of select partners at the service, ministerial, and national levels. By focusing on systems and processes, GDRP projects aim to build the resilience of U.S. partners and their security institutions, enhance effectiveness and accountability, and better align the security sector to the needs and challenges of the partner nation and its citizens.

SSG is shaped by hard lessons learned. Americans are rightly wary of prolonged U.S. military interventions abroad. We have seen how they have often come at far too high a cost, both to us and to others. When we look back at the past decades of our military involvement in the world, we must remember what we have learned about the limits of force alone to build a durable peace; that the day after a major military intervention is always harder than we imagine; and how critical it is to pursue every possible avenue to a diplomatic solution. Security sector assistance cannot overcome or ‘fix’ underlying structural or political challenges. Rather, it must be part of a broader effort alongside lines of effort in the areas of justice, democratization, economic growth, countering corruption, and addressing stakeholder equities and concerns across the political spectrum. It is not enough to build defense institutions in tandem with “train and equip” missions; security sector governance must be the pacesetter.

Priority Three: Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective

As part of the Secretary’s modernization efforts to address 21st Century threats, the T Family is important to the Department’s efforts to address emerging technologies from a national security perspective. That includes leading efforts to prevent the proliferation of these technologies for purposes related to weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, to enhance alliance military cooperation on these technologies, and to develop appropriate norms of responsible behavior regarding their use. T Bureaus will enhance their work on emerging technology with new offices and expertise.

Our Bureaus are also engaged in discussions on other threats posed by emerging national security challenges presented by new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information sciences, and biotechnology, among others. We are looking at ways in which these challenges can be addressed considering the changing nature of the technology and threats posed by adversarial uses. The PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which blurs the lines between civil and military development, further compounds these challenges. The risk that sensitive technologies can be transferred via intangible means make it critical to conduct outreach to academia and industry and ensure proper vetting of foreign visitors and students, so they do not contribute to programs of concern.

We will work to implement related national security-focused strategies developed by the T Bureaus and including by supporting related Department efforts in the United Nations. This work will focus on how new technologies could present opportunities and risks to the security of U.S. allies and partners.

The T Bureaus and I will also promote the use of norms of responsible behavior or codes of conduct when promoting risk reduction in areas of emerging technologies such as space. AVC’s Office of Emerging Security Challenges has been consulting with allies and partners at multilateral forums and there is broad support for this approach. Other areas where we will seek to advance efforts to develop norms of responsible behavior include artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing.

The U.S. is also part of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). In March 2022, the U.S. Delegation submitted a proposal for consideration by the GGE titled “Principles and Good Practices on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” cosponsored by delegations from a number of other countries. This document builds on how International Humanitarian Law applies to LAWS and proposes additional measures that will be discussed by the GGE in July 2022. I will continue to support this effort.

Priority Four: Protect and promote the US and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages

American and allied technological advancements are core elements of the U.S. industrial strategy and President Biden’s key priorities, and the T Family will continue efforts to keep such technology and advancements from illegal acquisition. As noted, we are particularly concerned with threats posed by the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy that will fuse together its civilian economy and defense establishment so that advanced and emerging technologies drive economic and military modernization simultaneously.

The T Family has led U.S. participation in the four nonproliferation export control regimes for over 30 years and is partnering with allies and partners in other regional and bilateral efforts as we further build on these coalitions to protect sensitive technologies from adversarial acquisition and exploitation.

The T Family will also continue its updates to the U.S. Munitions List, engaging foreign governments as well as industry and university partners at home and at abroad to bolster their understanding on how to comply with applicable U.S. export control regulations, and strengthen allies and partners’ end-use monitoring programs for U.S. defense articles and services.

Priority Five: Promote, protect, and advance the US Civil – Nuclear Industry

The T Family [The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs] supports the Department’s efforts to promote U.S. nuclear power alternatives that support global norms of nonproliferation, safety, and security, including traditional large nuclear power plants and new, innovative small modular reactors, as part of the solution to global climate change. The U.S. will also continue to promote and support global norms of nonproliferation, safety, and security, and help to protect allies and partners’ critical energy infrastructure.

The Foundational Infrastructure for the Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) is one such endeavor.

The FIRST program provides capacity-building support consistent with the IAEA’s Milestones Approach to enable partner countries to benefit from advanced nuclear technologies and meet their clean energy goals under the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.

We will continue to seek engagements with countries through FIRST and other efforts that build capacity under the highest international standards and meet their energy needs.

FIRST was one of the Presidential deliverables for the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit on Climate and at the COP26 Climate Change Conference. We spearheaded an announcement by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis on cooperation to build a first of a kind small modular reactor in Romania. We have begun engagements under FIRST in recent months with the Philippines and Ghana, and we continue to seek engagement with other countries considering nuclear power for their clean energy needs. We have also recently signed two Memorandum Of Understandings on nuclear cooperation with the Philippines and Armenia.

We will also continue to engage all who are looking to take advantage of nuclear energy’s benefits to carefully consider the larger political, economic, and strategic consequences of their choices for peaceful nuclear energy cooperation partners, and—as countries are reminded of the urgent security risks posed by Russia and others’ energy diplomacy—we will aim to greatly deepen cooperation and coordination among like-minded allied and partner nuclear suppliers.

Priority Six: Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships

This goal connects all the other priorities. While it remains important to strengthen our relationship with traditional allies and partners, it is also important that we build new relationships with other countries who also are within our national security interests. In that respect, the T Family will enhance consultations with allies and partners and establish dialogues with new partners to develop and deepen a shared understanding of the changing international security environment and thereby further national goals and objectives. We will also negotiate security agreements to support closer cooperation.

For example, where appropriate, arms transfers and defense trade offer a key tool to strengthening alliances and establishing new partnerships. In the wake of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, many of Russia’s traditional security partners express concern on their own dependance on Moscow in terms of the demonstrated performance of Russian systems in their inventories as well as potential future difficulties obtaining future support and sustainment. We will work with industry to encourage countries to diversify away from Russian dependance.

#### U.S. heg is a prerequisite to solve existential risks, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and climate change

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**The international order is in deep trouble**, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, **the world is in disarray.** The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quicklythe beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to ascreechinghalt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that **America’s hegemonic position**, which it assumed after World War II, **is on the wane and**, with it, **the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.”** Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from **hegemonic stability theory**, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory **posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power** capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. **Order and stability require**, among other things, **that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern** the **interactions** between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain. This was anything but a natural transition. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the United States had refused to get entangled in international affairs. America’s retreat from internationalism after World War I was epitomized by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations — and that despite the fact that the league had been the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson. Isolationism went hand in hand with protectionism. Throughout the 19th century and way into the beginning of the 20th, the United States boasted some of the highest tariffs in the world. The culmination was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a devastating impact on international trade and contributed to the Great Depression. It was not until the United States entered the war against Nazi Germany that it assumed the role commensurate to its position as the economically and militarily by far strongest power in the world. Alternative Options The failure of the most recent G20 meeting in Rome to arrive at a meaningful common position on global warming and climate change ahead of the COP26 in Glasgow is further proof that the United States is no longer in a position to fill this role. Instead of leading, President Joe Biden blamed China and Russia “for any disappointment over the level of commitment by G20 leaders to fight climate change.” This is not to deny that Biden has a point. But given the enormity of the impact climate change is bound to have on the natural environment and life on this planet, it is little more than an exercise in passing responsibility. Biden’s remark, however, does address a serious issue, namely the role of China in a rapidly changing world. A few weeks ago, Chinese coal production reached new historic highs, amounting to an estimated 4 billion tons for this year. Accelerated coal production is supposed to alleviate energy shortages that have threatened to slow down the country’s growth. Unfortunately, emissions-wise, coal happens to be one of the worst sources of energy. **A new study on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions** on coastal areas **predicts catastrophic devastation** as a result of rising sea levels for some of the world’s megacities, particularly in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China — all major coal consumers. Given the concentration of China’s population in a string of coastal cities, one might assume that it has a particular interest in **combating climate change**. In theory, this **would entail** an **active involvement** in global governance, a proposition that China has been more than reluctant to embrace, presumably because it would entail directly challenging the United States. At the same time, however, China has launched major initiatives, such as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and particularly the One Belt, One Road initiative. Together with China’s massive engagement in Africa, these projects leave the impression that they are part of a comprehensive drive designed to establish China as an alternative to the United States. This might herald the emergence of a new system, no longer dominated by one power but multipolar, and certainly very different from the one established after World War II. For, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry has noted a few years ago, **“there is no liberal internationalism without American and western hegemony — and that age is ending.”** With the decline of the United States and the parallel rise of China, countries have the option to “seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support.” **The end result might very well be a bifurcated world order, on the heels of a period of instability and turmoil**, or what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini have called a “G-Zero” world, **one without clear leadership and global cooperation.** Bifurcation means the coexistence of competing systems that follow fundamentally different rules. This can already be observed in the realm of economic governance. Olga Petricevic and David Teece have recently warned of a “noticeable defiance of the principles of classical economic liberalism and the rule-of-law” by Russia and China. The Chinese “alternative model of governance,” they note, “is deploying coordinated protectionist trade and investment policies and government intervention aimed at accessing and acquiring foreign intellectual property, thereby influencing the global economic and innovation system.” Its success is likely to inspire imitation and attempts to jump on the bandwagon, resulting not only in bifurcation but in polarization reminiscent of the Cold War period.

### 2NC -- HEG GOOD --- European Stability

#### Loss of US power now risks Russian conquest of Europe and global instability.

Brands 6/1 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 6-1-2022; "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America”; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-01/the-world-doesn-t-need-a-more-restrained-america#xj4y7vzkg>; Bloomberg; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply **reduced US role** in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though **not persuasive**. Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else. Some restrainers seek wholesale global retrenchment; others mainly decry ongoing US involvement in Europe and the Middle East. What unites them is a conviction that the overuse of US power has been catastrophic for America and the world. This coalition seemed ascendant a year ago, when President Joe Biden denounced the “forever wars” while pulling out of Afghanistan. That decision, two analysts argued, marked Biden as a hard-nosed realist — and perhaps an ally in the struggle to reshape American diplomacy. Yet the moment **didn’t last**. The collapse of the Afghan state even before the US finished withdrawing showed that, while waging wars is expensive, losing them can impose a **serious cost**. Then came Russia’s assault on Ukraine. As Vladimir Putin’s forces sought to restore the Soviet empire and murdered Ukrainian citizens, they revealed just **how awful** a world shaped by great powers other than Washington might be. Indeed, Biden isn’t getting much praise from self-proclaimed realists today. While refusing to intervene militarily, Biden has otherwise backed Ukraine with money, weapons and other support. NATO — whose peaceful expansion allegedly forced Putin to order a campaign of aggression and murder — now appears likely to add two new members, Finland and Sweden. Biden has even invoked the rhetorical legacy of his cold war predecessors, declaring that Ukraine is a vital front in the struggle to save the free world. In response, the restraint coalition has itself opened a new front, finding multiple reasons to attack Biden’s Ukraine policy. First is cost. Sustaining a medium-sized country under a ferocious military assault is fantastically expensive. The latest US support package for Ukraine totals some $40 billion — money, Hawley complained, that could be better spent on giving US military personnel a generous raise. Some Republicans in Congress seem to agree — 57 representatives and 11 senators voted, unsuccessfully, against the aid package. Second is risk. No one knows how the war in Ukraine will end. If the US helps Ukraine defend itself too successfully, the thinking goes, then perhaps a humiliated Russia will escalate wildly rather than accept defeat. Finally, there is politics. With Biden having gone all-in on Ukraine, there’s little space for the restraint contingent on the left. But Hawley and other Republicans seeking to inherit Donald Trump’s political base clearly believe that there is a constituency for claims that supporting a vulnerable democracy equates to putting “America last.” It is uncharitable to label such arguments “pro-Putin.” Forty billion dollars is real money, given that the Pentagon is struggling to find a 10th of that for urgent near-term improvements to America’s military posture in the Pacific. There is, undoubtedly, danger in a scenario where Putin worries that he is losing the war — and in consequence loses his head. But the perpetual problem with restraint is the corresponding unwillingness to consider what happens after America pulls back. Suppose Washington does slash support to Ukraine and leave European security to the Europeans. What does that bring? Judging by the past century — or even the past six months — the answer is **not a stable Europe** and a more solvent America. Rather, the result is likely to be a partially **successful Russian war of conquest** that creates **pervasive insecurity** in Europe; a continent that, lacking **American leadership**, is less united and confident in opposing Putin; and greater **global instability** that ultimately makes it harder to contain **China**, as well.

### 2NC -- HEG RESILIENCE

#### U.S. unipolarity is inevitable---no rivals are strong enough to challenge it

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CHAPTER 6 The Unipolar Era “If Sparta and Rome perished,” the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked, “what State can hope to endure forever?”1 The resounding answer given by history is “no state.” In time, perhaps in another century or so, the American empire will crumble and new powers will rise. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for many decades. We are living in the unipolar era, and it will probably outlive us. So what? The United States might be the most powerful country in his- tory, but it has a limited presence in many corners of the globe, and weaker nations routinely trample on U.S. interests.2 The United States failed to pre- vent the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rise of the Islamic State, the Russian inva- sion of Crimea, Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, North Korean nuclear proliferation, and Chinese island-building in the South China Sea. Unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity: What difference does it make? In this final chapter, I explain why this view is wrong by highlighting several ways that unipolarity transforms world politics. The good news is that unipolarity dramatically reduces the likelihood of great power war. The bad news is that it may increase the likelihood of asymmetric conflict and undermine American national unity and the liberal world order. No Hegemonic Rivalry The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past five hundred years when a rising power challenged a rul- ing power.3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium. The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conflict more likely—but none of these con- flicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry. To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identified by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-five years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths world- wide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars.4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent.5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined.6 What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life.7 Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans sud- denly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dra- matic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology.8 The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy fighting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conflict.9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than fight to overturn it.10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challeng- ers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions.11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

#### Renewed US leadership counters Russia and reinvigorates US hegemony

**Brands and Beckley, 22** (made the, 3-14-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, "The Return of Pax Americana? | AEI", https://www.aei.org/articles/the-return-of-pax-americana/)

The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse.

This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today.

## Public Trust

### 1NC –NO POPULISM

#### EU populism makes it inevitable

Maher 17 (Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. “Why populism is still a threat in Europe.” World Economic Forum. 12 Jun 2017 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/populism-is-still-a-threat-in-europe-heres-why)

Has the populist tide sweeping Europe crested? Six months ago, many European leaders worried that the wave of popular discontent that led to the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and propelled Donald Trump into the White House could empower nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties across Europe, shaking the very foundations of the bloc. Since then, however, populist movements have been turned back in Austria, the Netherlands and France. German Chancellor Angela Merkel looks likely to win her fourth term as chancellor in national elections this September. And with a young, energetic, pro-EU French president now in the Élysée Palace, some are predicting that the bloc is actually poised for a comeback. But it would be a mistake to think that populism no longer represents a serious threat to Europe and the EU. Populist authoritarians are in power in Hungary and Poland. Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front captured a third of the vote in the run-off of France’s election last month, and Geert Wilders’s anti-Islam Freedom Party is the second most powerful seat-holder in Holland’s parliament. Even in Germany, long thought to be resistant to right-wing populist currents, the anti-immigrant party Alternative for Germany (AfD) seems poised to gain parliamentary representation for the first time following national elections this year. And with early parliamentary elections scheduled for October 15 in Austria, it appears likely that the far-right Freedom Party, which was formed in the 1950s by former Nazis, will enter into a government coalition with the centre-right Austrian People’s Party. A rise in populism since the 1960s Post-war Europe has seen populist movements of both the left and the right, but they have mainly operated on the margins of national politics. While no populist party or politician has been able to actually win a national election in Western Europe over the past seven decades, research shows that populism has been advancing slowly yet steadily in Europe since the 1960s. Today, virtually every European country has a populist party represented in national or regional parliaments. Most are right-wing, like Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the National Front in France, Golden Dawn in Greece, Lega Nord in Italy, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party. These parties’ aims and agendas are driven by different national histories, traditions and circumstances, but all are anti-immigrant and anti-EU. Populism’s appeal remains too small to actually win elections in most of Europe, but it is shaping national and European politics in various ways, reframing debates on immigration, the Eurozone and national security, among other examples. Political views once considered extreme or taboo are now firmly present in mainstream political discourse. In response, some mainstream politicians have co-opted parts of the populists’ message or have felt pressure to move to the right on some issues to blunt the populist advance. To counter Wilders’s anti-immigrant message, for example, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte took a more hardline stance on immigration and refugees in the weeks leading up to parliamentary elections in March. Even Angela Merkel has placed limits on Germany’s absorption of new refugees in light of criticism from both the AfD and the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of her Christian Democratic Union. The period from the second world war to the present has been a remarkably stable one for Western Europe. Governments have largely alternated between the centre-right and the centre-left. With the rise of populist movements and candidates, we are, in a way, restoring the historical norm: for much of Europe’s modern history, liberals and social democrats have competed with populists of various stripes in national elections. What’s the plan? To effectively contain populism, Europe must accurately diagnose how and why it emerged in the first place. This means they cannot just ignore populists and their supporters, or ascribe their grievances as the product of envy, resentment or blind rage. Those in power must acknowledge constituents’ genuine worries and anxieties about immigration, national identity and terrorism, for example. Globalisation has produced rapid economic and social disruptions. It has contributed to economic displacement, rising income and wealth inequality, and what seems to some people to be the homogenisation of national cultures. Many people today face a level of economic insecurity that their parents or grandparents did not experience. And with large-scale immigration, they have legitimate concerns about the cultural and demographic future of their countries. The sources for such concerns are not likely to disappear, so populism is more of a long-term challenge than a temporary crisis. As Harvard’s Yascha Mounk has said, “the past two decades have represented not a populist moment but rather a populist turn — one that will exert significant influence on policy and public opinion for decades to come.”

### 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

#### Russia can’t escalate crisis --- low military spending

Stratfor ‘19- American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer (“Russia's Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” *Strafor Worldview*, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-defense-industry-finds-itself-tailspin)//BB>

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business.

#### No Russia war

Bandow ‘16 (Doug, Senior Fellow, the Cato Institute, “Western Paranoia Aside, Russia Unlikely to Attack the Baltics,” 2/16, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/western-paranoia-aside-ru_b_9325222.html>, CMR)

Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism distorts Moscow's interests and ambitions. Vladimir Putin is a nasty fellow, brutal at home and abroad. However, he seems to well represent much of his country's power elite and public. There is little apparent support for Western-style liberalism. Oust Putin and "le deluge" to follow would not likely be pretty. Putin's behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, "old" Europe, or even most of Russia's neighbors. He is behaving like a traditional Tsar, not a reincarnated Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government is not interested in an ideological crusade and sees no inherent conflict with the West. Rather, Moscow demands respect for its status], protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. In pursuing these ends Putin is practical and measured, if perhaps imprudent and myopic--and, of course, dismissive of the cost to others. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO--all certain to antagonize Moscow. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had resisted Georgian control in the past, giving Russia an easy means to weaken Tbilisi and pay back NATO over the latter's dismemberment of Serbia, with historic ties to Moscow. (Russia's defense of Belgrade helped turn an assassination into World War I.) Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Nevertheless, Russia accepted an independent Ukraine, even when ruled by the hostile, incompetent Viktor Yushchenko, who also pushed for his nation's membership in the alliance--then opposed by the majority of Ukrainians. Yushchenko's failure opened the way for the election of Viktor Yanukovich, nominally pro-Russian, though he resisted Moscow's control. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against Yanukovich. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. He seized Crimea, historically part of Russia, and backed ethnic Russian separatists in the east. Despite numerous predictions, Moscow did not absorb the Donbass, create a land bridge to Crimea, stage a coup de' main against Kiev, or launch a general assault on Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Ukrainians and Georgians would not likely act like docile Russian citizens today. Indeed, the former resisted the restoration of Soviet control after German forces were expelled in World War II. Nor was occupation necessary to bar those nations' way to NATO. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate similar resistance. They developed separate identities under the Russian Empire and enjoyed brief independence between World Wars I and II. They also have the advantage of having joined NATO before Moscow could cause much trouble. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia. Ukraine in NATO would look very different. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. Wrote Robert Person, a professor at West Point: "the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism." So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come. Worse, Moscow certainly would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and Europe and probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear conflict, whether intentional or inadvertent. Russia has destroyed Europe's peaceful equilibrium, but everything about Putin's presidency so far argues against reckless war for no rational purpose against the Baltics. Of course, they should act to reduce even minimal chances of such a war. However, the U.S. should not launch a multi-billion dollar allied build-up, one which, ironically, would create a perceived threat to Russia where none currently exists. Could NATO lose a war over the Baltics? As Rand warned, yes, at least in the short-term. But the allies could defeat Russia if they were prepared for World War III. That would be beyond foolish for Washington--another reason why the U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of other nations rather than America. If the Europeans, in contrast, are ready to make that commitment, they should be preparing their own defense.

#### No US-Russia war– 7 reasons

**Peck 14** [[Michael Peck](http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/) (Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”; 3/05/2014; http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/]

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the [Federation of American Scientists](http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html). Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “[Military Balance 2014″](http://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/january-1138/milbal-advertorial-dfa6)  from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the [2008 Russo-Georgia War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_war). American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn’t have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.” America‘s allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.

### 2NC—NO RUSSIA IMPACT

#### Ukraine means Russia won’t be able to develop AI.

Bendett 4/15 (Samuel Bendett, 4-15-2022, Defense One, Samuel Bendett is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an Adviser at the CNA Corporation; "Russia’s Artificial Intelligence Boom May Not Survive the War", https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/04/russias-artificial-intelligence-boom-may-not-survive-war/365743/ AY)

Ever since Putin [extolled](https://ria.ru/20211221/putin-1764712935.html) the development of robotic combat systems in the new State Armaments Program in 2020, the Russian Ministry of Defense has been hyper-focused on AI. We have learned more about the Russian military’s [focus on AI](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/russia-ai/Russia-Artificial-Intelligence-Autonomy-Putin-Military.pdf) in the past year thanks to several public revelations. But talk of AI has been muted since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Apart from the widespread [use of UAVs](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/where-are-russias-drones/362612/) for [reconnaissance](https://www.wired.com/story/ai-drones-russia-ukraine/) and target acquisition and a single [display](https://t.me/milinfolive/80147) of a mine-clearing robot—all of which are remote-controlled—there is no overt evidence of Russian AI in C4ISR or decision-making among the Russian military forces, other than a single public [deepfake](https://www.wired.com/story/zelensky-deepfake-facebook-twitter-playbook/) attempt to discredit the Ukrainian government. That does not mean AI isn’t used, considering how Ukrainians are now [utilizing](https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-ukraine-has-started-using-clearview-ais-facial-recognition-during-war-2022-03-13/) artificial intelligence in data analysis—but there is a notable absence of larger discussion about this technology in open-source Russian media. The gap between Russian military aspirations for high-tech warfare of the future and the [actual conduct](https://www.rferl.org/a/nuland-ukraine-incredible-losses/31777845.html) of war today is becoming clear. In January 2021, Colonel-General Vladimir Zarudnitsky, the head of the Military Academy of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, wrote that the development and use of unmanned and autonomous military systems, the “robotization” of all spheres of armed conflict, and the development of AI for robotics will have the greatest medium-term effect on the Russian armed forces’ ability to meet their future challenges. Other MOD military experts also [debated](https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=712) the impact of these emerging technologies on the Russian military and future balance of forces. Russia continued to upgrade and replace Soviet-made systems, part of the MOD’s [drive](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/centers/CNA/sppp/rsp/russia-ai/Russia-Artificial-Intelligence-Autonomy-Putin-Military.pdf) from “digitization” (weapons with modern information technologies for C4ISR) to “intellectualization” (widespread implementation of AI capable of performing human-like creative thinking functions). These and other developments were covered in detail during Russia’s “[Army-2021” conference](https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/12191791), with AI as a key element in C4ISR at the tactical and strategic levels. Meanwhile, Russian military developers and researchers worked on [multiple](https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/russians-hope-shturm-can-weather-ugv-problems/) AI-enabled robotics projects, including the “[Marker](https://tass.ru/ekonomika/13181449)” concept unmanned ground vehicle and its autonomous operation in groups and with UAVs. Toward the end of 2021, the state agency responsible for exporting Russian military technology even [announced plans](https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/13332043) to offer unmanned aviation, robotics, and high-tech products with artificial intelligence elements to potential customers this year. The agency emphasized the equipment is geared toward defensive, border protection, and counter-terrorism capabilities. Since the invasion, things have changed. Russia’s defense-industrial complex—especially military high-tech and AI research and development—may be affected by the international [sanctions](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/25/ukraine-russia-chips-sanctions-tsmc/) and cascading effects of Russia being cut off from semi-conductor and microprocessor imports. Throughout 2021, the Russian government was pushing for the adoption of its AI civilian initiatives across the country, such as nationwide [hackathons](https://iz.ru/1273011/2022-01-03/v-tekhnopolise-era-nachalsia-novogodnii-khakaton) aimed at different age groups with the aim of making artificial intelligence familiar at home, work, and school. The government also pushed for the digital transformation of science and higher education, emphasizing the development of AI, big data, and the internet of things. Russian academic AI R&D efforts drove predictive analytics; development of chat bots that process text and voice messages and resolve user issues without human intervention; and technologies for working with biometric data. Russia’s development of [facial recognition](https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai) technology continued apace, with key efforts implemented across Moscow and other large cities. AI as a key image recognition and data analytical tool was used in many [medical projects and efforts](https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai) dealing with large data sets. Russian government officials [noted](https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13273673) their country’s efforts in promoting the ethics of artificial intelligence, and expressed confidence in Russia’s continued participation in this UN-sponsored work. The Russian Council for the Development of the Digital Economy has [officially called](https://www.interfax.ru/russia/811935) for a ban on artificial intelligence algorithms that discriminate against people. Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development was asked to “create a mechanism for assessing the humanitarian impact of the consequences of the introduction of such [AI] technologies, including in the provision of state and municipal services to citizens,” and to prepare a “road map” for effective regulation, use, and implementation. [According to](https://www.interfax.ru/russia/811935) the council, citizens should be able to appeal AI decisions digitally, and such a complaint should only be considered by a human. The council also proposed developing legal mechanisms to compensate for damage caused as a result of AI use. In October, Russia’s leading information and communications companies [adopted](https://ict.moscow/en/news/russias-leading-it-companies-adopt-the-national-code-of-ethics-in-the-field-of-ai/) the National Code of Ethics in the Field of AI; the code was recommended for all participants in the AI market, including government, business, Russian and foreign developers. Among the basic principles in the code are a [human-centered approach](https://ict.moscow/en/news/russias-leading-it-companies-adopt-the-national-code-of-ethics-in-the-field-of-ai/) to the development of this technology and the safety of working with data. AI workforce development was spelled out as a key requirement when the government officially unveiled the national AI roadmap in 2019. A 2021 government [poll](https://www.cnews.ru/news/line/2021-12-24_issledovanie_64_spetsialistov) that tried to gauge the level of confidence in the government’s AI efforts showed that only about 64 percent of domestic AI specialists were satisfied with the working conditions in Russia. The survey reflected the microcosm of AI research, development, testing, and evaluation in Russia—lots of government activity and different efforts that did not automatically translate into a productive ecosystem conducive for developing AI, some major efforts notwithstanding. Among some of the [reasons](https://www.pnp.ru/economics/eksperty-nazvali-prepyatstviya-dlya-razvitiya-sfery-iskusstvennogo-intellekta-v-rossii.html) in 2021 that Russia was lagging behind in the development of artificial intelligence technologies were the personnel shortage and the weakness of the venture capital market. The civilian developer community also noted the low penetration of Russian products into foreign markets, dependence on imports, slow introduction of products into business and government bodies, and a weak connection between AI theory and practice. Russia’s likely plans to concentrate on these areas in 2022 were revised or put on hold once Russia invaded Ukraine. The sudden [pull-out](https://www.cnet.com/news/politics/what-companies-have-left-russia-see-the-list-across-tech-entertainment-and-financial-institutions/) of major IT and high-tech companies from Russia, coupled with a [rapid brain drain](https://www.cnews.ru/news/top/2022-03-22_poslableniya_ne_pomogayut) of Russia’s IT workers, and the [ever-expanding](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-additional-russia-related-sanctions-treasury-website-2022-03-31/) high-tech sanctions against the Russian state may hobble domestic AI research and development for years to come. While the Russian government is trying to [prop up](https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14234785) its AI and high-tech industry with subsidies, funding, and legislative support, the impact of the above-mentioned consequences may be too much for the still-growing and evolving Russian AI ecosystem. That does not mean AI research and development will stop—on the contrary, many 2021 trends, efforts, and inventions [are being implemented](https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/14212133) into the Russian economy and society in 2022, and there are domestic high-tech companies and public-private partnerships which are [trying](https://www.cnews.ru/articles/7-rossiyskih-analogov-inostrannomu-po) to fill the [void](http://energyland.info/news-show--atom-226912) left by the departed global IT majors. But the effects of the invasion will be felt in the AI ecosystem for a long time, especially with so many IT workers [leaving](https://ria.ru/20220408/nauka-1782583365.html) the country, either because of the massive impact on the high-tech economy, or because they disagree with the war, or both. One of the most-felt sanctions aftereffects has been the severing of international cooperation on AI among Russian universities and research instructions, which earlier was enshrined as one of the most important drivers for domestic AI R&D, and reinforced by support from the Kremlin. For most high-tech institutions around the world, the impact of [civilian destruction](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-war-crimes-7791e247ce7087dddf64a2bbdcc5b888) across Ukraine by the Russian military greatly outweighs the need to engage Russia on AI. At the same time, much of the Russian military AI R&D took place in a siloed environment—in many cases behind a classified firewall and without significant public-private cooperation—so it’s hard to estimate just how sanctions will affect Russian military AI efforts. While many in Russia now [look to China](https://tass.ru/ekonomika/13945187) as a substitute for departed global commercial relationships and products, it’s not clear if Beijing could fully replace the software and hardware products and services that left Russian markets at this point. Recent events may not stop Russian civilians and military experts from discussing how AI influences the conduct of war and peace—but the [practical](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/A%20Technological-Divorce-The-impact-of-sanctions-and-the-end-of-cooperation-on-Russias-technology-and-AI-sector.pdf) implementation of these deliberations may become increasingly more difficult for a country under global high-tech isolation.

### 1NC—REGS BAD

#### Overregulation kills new AI innovations—existing ones move to less regulated countries

Mark Minevich, 5/15/2021 (‘Going Global Ventures’ president, Boston Consulting Group adviser, IPsoft digital fellow and AI expert, digital cognitive strategist, venture capitalist; Tech Crunch; “European AI Needs Strategic Leadership, Not Overregulation”; <https://techcrunch.com/2021/05/15/european-ai-needs-strategic-leadership-not-overregulation///EF>)

The EU Commission recently proposed a [new set of stringent rules to regulate AI](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/16/business/artificial-intelligence-regulation.html), citing an urgent need. With the global race to regulate AI officially on, the EU published a detailed proposal on how AI should be regulated, explicitly banning some uses and defining those it considers “high-risk,” planning to ban the use of AI that threatens people’s rights and safety. We can all agree with the [sentiment of Margrethe Vestager](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1682), the European Commission executive vice president, when she said that when it comes to “artificial intelligence, trust is a must, not a nice to have,” but is regulation the most effective and efficient way to secure this reality? The [takeaways from the commission](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1682) are incredibly in-depth, but the ones that make the most sense to me are those that stress regulated AI should aim to increase human well-being. However, regulation should not overly constrain experimentation and development of AI systems. High-risk AI systems should always have unalterable built-in human oversight and control mechanisms. AI systems intended to interact with people or to generate content, whether high-risk or not, should be subject to specific transparency obligations. In addition, AI-based remote biometric systems in publicly accessible places shall be only authorized by EU or member state law and serve the objective of preventing, detecting or investigating serious crime and terrorism. Partnership between AI and humanity The set of laws and legal framework enacted in Europe will have a profound impact on AI regulation around the world, similar to the effects the GDPR regulations created over the past decade. But will these laws assist us in moving away from the EU-wide haphazard regulatory approach toward a singularity of common classification? In my opinion, this will cripple AI development in the EU while China and the United States leap forward. It would limit the use cases and innovation of artificial intelligence and put the EU in a technologically inferior position globally. In the U.S, AI is being optimized to maximize corporate profitability and efficiency. In China, AI is being optimized to maximize the government’s grip on the population with the preservation of power. The overly regulated environment in the EU will lead to complete chaos when regulations in various EU bodies start contradicting. Negative effects on EU entrepreneurship A lack of investment in AI in the EU is a major factor why the EU is [losing the AI race to the U.S. and China](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-AI-Index-Report_Master.pdf). There are currently about 446 million people living in the EU and 331 million people living in the U.S. But in the EU, $2 billion was [invested](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1226538/ai-private-investments-by-area/) in AI in 2020, while in the U.S., $23.6 billion was invested. If the EU continues pushing with aggressive regulations and lack of funding, it will enjoy global leadership in AI regulations, but I won’t be surprised if many European entrepreneurs decide to launch their startups in more AI-friendly countries. To create an EU that is friendly to innovation and entrepreneurs, we must create a collaborative network of AI pioneers to lead the way. In turn, other nations will take advantage of the EU’s push toward strict regulations by fostering innovation and generating a stronger hold on the future of global technology. A recent World Bank report showed the [EU launched 38% of investigations into data compliance in 2019, compared to only 12% in North America.](https://www.zdnet.com/article/europe-wants-to-set-the-rules-for-ai-not-everyone-thinks-its-going-to-work/) With policies this stringent and burdensome to companies, it should be no surprise if innovators and entrepreneurs begin to move to more business-friendly parts of the globe. Regulation leads to relegation The regulation proposal suggests fines of up to [€20 million, or up to 4% of total annual turnover](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/draft-eu-regulation-for-artificial-7284484/)of the AI provider for noncompliance. If we consider prior EU legislation and subsequent lack of digital innovation, these proposed regulations will cause chronic stagnation of digital innovation and adoption in the EU bloc. In short, if these regulations become law, the EU will not become a pioneer but a laggard. The “real” use cases of AI are yet to emerge, uncovering the true potential of AI. The massive bureaucracy for high-risk use cases will undercut any entrepreneurship or bottom-up innovation efforts. With historical markers trending to the [EU heading to a recession](https://www.ft.com/content/e7152f72-2494-43fa-86fa-4a8236a4db12), now is not the time to stifle innovation. If AI is to be broadly accepted, we need a human face showing AI helping people solve their problems and challenges. We must highlight engaging stories that are true and showcase the real people behind them. For the population at large to accept the potential of AI, they must see people like themselves benefiting from the goodness of AI. AI funding means, above all, startup funding. Startups form the bridge between the discovery and development of disruptive technologies to their everyday use by the general public. Europe is already doing a significant amount of planning, but must accelerate. [European venture capital is lagging behind the U.S. model](https://www.forbes.com/sites/markminevich/2021/01/18/how-the-eu-is-leading-the-way-in-ai-powered-social-innovation/?sh=30675c956bb7). Fast-growing startups are mostly dependent on American and Asian investors. This requires a rethinking of the investment culture and sensible promotion of a dynamic investment environment; for example, through the targeted relaxation of investment restrictions on the part of institutional investors. We’re living during the age of “moonshots,” a time when entrepreneurs and scientists are able to go further than ever before. Competing in the next economy requires playing a new innovation game, one whose goal is to boost innovation tenfold. In order to reach this level, incremental optimizations do not help. The focus needs to pivot to big innovations — moonshots. Taking risk is acceptable and implementation of a large and risky idea should become normal. To create an EU that is friendly to innovation and entrepreneurs, we must create a collaborative network of AI pioneers to lead the way. Entrepreneurs and data science leaders must use their energies to focus on AI for good to improve the world in the longer term and advocate for deregulation. To accomplish this, we need to set up a global AI pioneers council on AI for good, consisting of participants from leading research institutions, businesses, the public sector and civil society to develop a shared understanding of best practices. AI is no longer just a tool for optimizing corporate systems and societal infrastructures; its potential reaches much further into solving the various crises facing mankind, from climate change to uncontrolled pandemics. Responsible AI and AI for good application across all the world’s superpowers can address these crises. The EU cannot afford to be the region of the globe disincentivizing innovation and discouraging entrepreneurship. The EU must move not toward super regulation, but toward strategic leadership of AI based on AI for good. The path of overregulation leads to the depths of stagnation. It is up to the EU to decide what it wants its future to look like.

#### AI regulations hurt US-European geopolitical standing—current regulation views are divergent

Samuel Stolton, 1/15/2020 (Euractiv; “Avoid heavy AI regulation, White House tells EU”;  [https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/avoid-heavy-ai-regulation-white-house-tells-eu///EF](https://techcrunch.com/2021/05/15/european-ai-needs-strategic-leadership-not-overregulation///EF))

The US administration has urged European lawmakers to avoid heavy regulation frameworks in the future rollout of Artificial Intelligence technologies on the continent. The call comes ahead of the European Commission’s planned presentation of its AI strategy, set to be announced early this year. On Tuesday (7 January), the White House put forward a set of regulatory principles aimed at avoiding the overregulation of Artificial Intelligence technologies in the private sector. In a statement, the US said AI regulation should not be pursued until risk assessment exercises and cost-benefit analyses have been carried out, adding that the government hopes its European counterparts would adopt a similar approach. “Europe and our allies should avoid heavy-handed innovation-killing models, and instead consider a similar regulatory approach,” a statement from the White House read. “The best way to counter authoritarian uses of AI is to make sure America and our international partners remain the global hubs of innovation, shaping the evolution of technology in a manner consistent with our common values.” In a call with reporters ahead of the news, the US’s Chief Technology Officer Michael Kratsios said America is leading the way in shaping the AI revolution “in a way that reflects our values of freedom, human rights, and civil liberties.” “We encourage Europe to use the U.S. AI principles as a framework,” Kratsios said, referring to the Commission’s forthcoming AI strategy. “The best way to counter authoritarian uses of AI is to make America and our national partners remain the global hub of innovation, advancing our common values,” he added, revealing that he brought up the issue with the EU’s digital tsar Margrethe Vestager during their meeting at Lisbon’s Web Summit in November. Kratsios is set to formally announce America’s AI principles on Wednesday at the CES convention in Las Vegas. **European landscape** Meanwhile, European countries continue to pursue a divergent approach to AI technologies. Over the weekend, a report from the German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel revealed that a draft law by the interior ministry is set to expand the competencies of the federal police force, in rolling out facial recognition technologies at 135 train station and 14 airports across the country. This introduction of the draft law follows a series of testing periods in the country over the past few years that have seen a number of tech firms taking part in the process, including German outfits IBM Deutschland, Funkwerk, and the G2K Group, in addition to Japan’s Hitachi consortium – featuring several multinational tech companies. Elsewhere in Europe, concerns have been raised about facial recognition technologies by data protection authorities in Sweden and France, as well as the EU’s European Data Protection Supervisor. There has also been a sense of disquietude in France surrounding the country’s new ID programme, ‘Alicem’, which will employ facial recognition technologies for identity verification purposes. However, France’s Secretary of State for Digital Cédric O has recently adopted a more cautious approach to the project’s take-off in France, in an interview with [Le Parisien](http://www.leparisien.fr/high-tech/reconnaissance-faciale-cedric-o-n-est-pas-certain-qu-alicem-soit-un-jour-deployee-24-12-2019-8223705.php). In Brussels, a report published [in June](https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/adverse-impacts-of-artificial-intelligence-could-pave-way-for-regulation-eu-report-says/) by the Commission’s High-Level Group on AI suggested that the EU  should consider the need for new regulation to “ensure adequate protection from adverse impacts.” This could include issues arising from biometric recognition, the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), AI systems built on children’s profiles, and the impact AI may have on fundamental rights. In terms of how AI technologies could impact consumer rights, Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders told his parliamentary hearing in October he would advocate for an **‘**ethics-by-design**’** approach, whereby products and services using AI take into account ethical guidelines at the earliest possible stage in their development. For her part, the EU’s digital chief, Margrethe Vestager, told [EURACTIV](https://www.euractiv.com/section/copyright/news/vestager-takes-aim-at-biopower-of-tech-giants/) in November that “great opportunities come with great risks,” but that she has “strong reservations” with the ‘blanket’ application of some technologies in Artificial Intelligence technologies in particular, such as facial recognition software. The US statement on Tuesday follows the recent passing of new rules to restrict the exports of American Artificial Intelligence technologies, which the administration hopes will keep rival governments from taking advantage of US innovation. The new measures, which came into force on Monday (6 January), mean that firms exporting types of geospatial imagery software from the US have to apply for a license to send it abroad.

### 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

#### Military a goes bad- can escalate scenarios & other warrants

Horowitz and Scharre**,** 2021 **-** Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

Even if military AI systems are adequately tested, the use of AI to enable more autonomous machine behavior in military systems raises an additional set of risks. In delegating decision-making from humans to machines, policymakers may de facto be fielding forces with less flexibility and ability to understand context, which would then have **deleterious effects on crisis stability and managing escalation**. While machines have many advantages in speed, precision, and repeatable actions, machines today cannot come close to human intelligence in understanding context and flexibly adapting to novel situations. This brittleness of machine decision-making may particularly be a challenge in pre-conflict crisis situations, where tensions among nations run high. Military forces from competing nations regularly interact in militarized disputes below the threshold of war in a variety of contested regions (e.g., the India-Pakistan border, China-India border, South China Sea, Black Sea, Syria, etc.). These interactions among deployed forces sometimes run the risk of escalation due to incidents or skirmishes that can inflame tensions on all sides. This poses a challenge for national leaders, who have imperfect command-and-control over their own military forces. Today, however, deployed military forces rely on human decision-making. Humans can understand broad guidance from their national leadership and commander’s intent, such as “defend our territorial claims, but don’t start a war.” Relative to humans, even the most advanced AI systems today have no ability to understand broad guidance, nor do they exhibit the kinds of contextual understanding that humans frequently label “common sense.”27 Militaries already employ uninhabited vehicles (drones) in contested areas, which have been involved in a number of escalatory incidents in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Syria, and Strait of Hormuz.28 Over time, as militaries incorporate more autonomous functionality into uninhabited vehicles, that functionality could complicate interactions in these and other contested areas. Autonomous systems may take actions based on programming that, while not a malfunction, are other than what a commander would have wanted a similarly situated human to do in the same situation. While the degree of flexibility afforded subordinates varies considerably by military culture and doctrine, humans have a greater ability to flexibly respond to complex and potentially ambiguous escalatory incidents in ways that may balance competing demands of ensuring national resolve while managing escalation.29 Autonomous systems will simply follow their programming, whatever that may be, even if those rules no longer make sense or are inconsistent with a commander’s intent in the given situation. This challenge is compounded by the fact that human commanders cannot anticipate all of the possible situations that forward-deployed military forces in contested regions may face. Employing autonomous systems in a crisis effectively forces human decision makers to tie their own hands with certain pre-specified actions, even if they would rather not. Unintended actions by autonomous systems in militarized disputes or contested areas are a challenge for militaries as they adopt more autonomous systems into their forces. The complexity of many autonomous systems used today, even ones that rely on rule-based decision-making, may mean that the humans employing autonomous systems lack sufficient understanding of what actions the system may take in certain situations.30 Humans’ ability to flexibly interpret guidance from higher commanders, even to the point of disregarding guidance if it no longer seems applicable, is by contrast a boon to managing escalation risks by retaining human decision-making at the point of interaction among military forces in contested regions.31 Unintended escalation is not merely confined to lethal actions, such as firing on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions, such as crossing into another state’s territory, can be **perceived as escalatory**. Even if such actions do not lead directly to war, they could **heighten tensions, increase suspicion** about an adversary’s intentions, or **inflame public sentiment**. While in most cases, humans would still retain agency over how to respond to an incident, competing autonomous systems could create unexpected interactions or **escalatory spirals**. Complex, interactive dynamics between algorithms have been seen in other settings, including financial markets,32 and even in situations where the algorithms are relatively simple.33 Another problem stems from the potential inability of humans to call off autonomous systems once deployed. One reason for employing autonomous functionality is so that uninhabited vehicles can continue their missions even if they are operating without reliable communication links to human controllers. When there is no communication link between human operators and an autonomous system, human operators would have no ability to recall the autonomous system if political circumstances changed such that the system’s behavior was no longer appropriate. This could be a challenge in de-escalating a conflict, if political leaders decide to terminate hostilities but have no ability to recall autonomous systems, at least for some period of time. The result could be a continuation of hostilities even after political leaders desire a cease-fire. Alternatively, the inability to fully cease hostilities could undermine truce negotiations, leading to the continuation of conflict. These problems are not unique to autonomous systems. Political leaders have imperfect command-and-control over human military forces, which has, at times, led to similar incidents with human-commanded deployed forces. For example, the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 was fought after a peace treaty ended the war because of the slowness of communications to deployed forces.

#### Further adoption of AI into military means hyperwar- even if not LAWS- causes escalation

Horowitz and Scharre**,** 2021 **-** Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

It is reasonable and, in fact, vital to examine whether the integration of AI into warfare might also pose risks that policymakers should attend. Some AI researchers themselves have raised alarm at militaries’ adoption of AI and the way it could increase the risk of war and international instability.5 Understanding risks stemming from military use of AI is complicated, however, by the fact that AI is not a discrete technology like missiles or submarines. As a general-purpose technology, AI has many applications, any of which could, individually, improve or undermine stability in various ways. Militaries are only beginning the process of adopting AI, and in the near term, military AI use is likely to be limited and incremental. Over time, the cognization of warfare through the introduction of artificial intelligence could change warfare in profound ways, just as industrial revolutions in the past shaped warfare.6 Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. For example, both Chinese and American scholars have hypothesized that the introduction of AI and autonomous systems in combat operations could accelerate the tempo of warfare beyond the pace of human control. Chinese scholars have referred to this concept as a battlefield “singularity,”7 while some Americans have coined the term “**hyperwar”** to refer to a similar idea.8 If warfare evolves to a point where the pace of combat outpaces humans’ ability to keep up, and therefore control over military operations must be handed to machines, it would pose **significant risks for international stability,** even if the delegation decision seems necessary due to competitive pressure. Humans might lose control over managing escalation, and war termination could be significantly complicated if machines fight at a pace that is faster than humans can respond. In addition, delegation of escalation control to machines could mean that minor tactical missteps or accidents that are part and parcel of military operations in the **chaos and fog of war,** including **fratricide, civilian casualties, and poor military judgment**, could spiral out of control and reach **catastrophic proportions** before humans have time to intervene. Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. The logic of a battlefield singularity, or hyperwar, is troubling precisely because competitive pressures could drive militaries to accelerate the tempo of operations and remove humans “from the loop,” even if they would rather not, in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work succinctly captured this dilemma when he posed the question, “If our competitors go to Terminators ... and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”9 While this “arms race in speed” is often characterized tactically in the context of lethal autonomous weapon systems, the **same dynamic** could emerge operationally involving **algorithms designed as decision aids.** The perception by policymakers that war is evolving to an era of machine-dominated conflict in which humans must cede control to machines to remain competitive could also hasten such a development, particularly if decision makers lack appropriate education about the limits of AI. In extremis, the shift toward the use of algorithms for military decision-making, combined with a more roboticized battlefield, could potentially change the nature of war. War would still be the continuation of politics by other means in the broadest sense, but in the most extreme case it might feature so little human engagement that it is no longer a fundamentally human endeavor.

#### Military AI lack of human cognition psychology card- not great but could be useful- doesn’t necessarily bad just says scary which is fair tbh

Horowitz and Scharre**,** 2021 **-** Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

The widespread adoption of AI could have a net effect on international stability in other ways. AI systems could change strategy in war, including by substituting machines for human decision-making in some mission areas, and therefore **removing certain aspects of human psychology** from parts of war.11 Warfare today is waged by humans through physical machinery (rockets, missiles, machine guns, etc.), but decision-making is almost universally human. As algorithms creep closer to the battlefield, some decisions will be made by machines even if warfare remains a human-directed activity that is fought for human political purposes. The widespread integration of machine decision-making across tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare could have **far-reaching implications**. Already, AI agents playing real-time computer strategy games such as StarCraft and Dota 2 have **demonstrated superhuman aggressiveness**, precision, and coordination. In other strategy games such as poker and go, AI agents have demonstrated an ability to radically adjust playing styles and risk-taking in ways that would be, at best, challenging for humans to mimic for psychological reasons. AI dogfighting agents have similarly demonstrated superhuman precision and employed different tactics because of the ability to take greater risk to themselves.12 In many ways, AI systems have the ability to be the perfect strategic agents, **unencumbered by fear, loss aversion, commitment bias,** or other human emotional or cognitive biases and limitations.13 While the specific algorithms and models used for computer games are unlikely to transfer well to combat applications, the general characteristics and advantages of AI agents relative to humans could have applications in the military domain. As in the case of speed, the net consequence of machine decision-making on the psychology of combat could change the character of warfare in profound ways.14

### 1NC—NATO BAD

#### NATO fails at deterrence but antagonizes Russia and China.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 19, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323>, jy

NATO EXPANSION—TOWARD OR AGAINST RUSSIA?

Another constant feature of U.S. policy toward Russia has been the primacy of NATO as the cornerstone of the post–Cold War European security architecture, including its expansion to some of the former Soviet states. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO enlargement has been the principal instrument of U.S. security policy in Europe and Eurasia. It reflects a U.S. commitment to a whole, free, democratic, and peaceful Europe, as well as a view that the alliance should serve as the vehicle of the continent’s post–Cold War transformation. What went largely unnoticed were Moscow’s warnings beginning in 1994 that a “whole Europe” was not compatible with an expanding NATO, which would never be open to Russia.

Although NATO’s expansion has not necessarily been directed against Russia, it has negatively affected the Kremlin’s assessment of U.S. motivations and intentions and has been met with strong objections from Russians across the political spectrum. NATO enlargement also has shaped Russia’s perceptions of its own security requirements, which have had a profound impact on East-West relations. The issue is whether the U.S. transatlantic commitment necessitates the alliance’s continued eastward expansion and Open Door policy.31

The Clinton administration launched NATO expansion in 1997 when it led the alliance to offer memberships to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—a policy that the George W. Bush and Obama administrations subsequently embraced. In addition to extending a security umbrella to former Soviet bloc countries, NATO membership encouraged their domestic postcommunist transition to democracy. NATO was and remains an alliance based on shared democratic values. And since, as Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union address, “democracies do not attack each other,” the democratic transitions of new NATO members would strengthen European security. In this way, NATO also became an instrument of democracy promotion.32

Map

Description automatically generated

Russia has opposed NATO enlargement almost from the time it was raised as a possibility in the early 1990s.33 The Kremlin has maintained that NATO’s push to the east threatened Russian security and the alliance’s central role in Europe’s security architecture marginalized Russia as a nonmember. However, Russia’s objections proved insufficient to halt the alliance’s expansion; most officials and observers in the West treated such opinions as remnants of the old Soviet ideology that Russia would shed as it transitioned to a free market, liberal democracy. For those who did not believe that Russia would make this transition, NATO expansion made all the more sense as a hedge against Russia reemerging as a threat to Europe—a prospect that loomed ever larger as Russia recovered a good measure of its economic health, authoritarian-leaning domestic politics, and geopolitical ambitions.34 In 2007, Putin personally delivered an ominous warning to NATO not to expand further east, though most in the West regarded such rhetoric as an outdated blast from the Cold War era.35 Even though the alliance’s dual purpose—as a defense organization and instrument of democracy promotion—had emerged as a major irritant in the United States’ relations with Russia, Putin’s warning effectively was dismissed.36

In 2008, NATO promised membership to Ukraine and Georgia, crossing the red line that Putin had drawn around the territory of the former Soviet states.37 In the eyes of U.S. policymakers, NATO was in effect the only legitimate and viable security manager for Europe and Eurasia, and its expansion was the only sensible policy for the entire region.38 Putin’s response was the 2008 war with Georgia, which reaffirmed the red line around the former Soviet space, stopped NATO’s eastward expansion, and marked a major turning point in European security and in the relationship between NATO and Russia.39 In 2014, the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s undeclared war against Ukraine symbolized the end of the post–Cold War era and the reemergence of a new East-West divide in Europe.

Could this outcome have been avoided? NATO expansion undoubtedly benefited many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, providing a much-needed security framework for the region when it was left without one in the aftermath of the Cold War. It also played an important role in consolidating these former Soviet bloc countries’ transition from communism. But one size does not fit all. Political culture, history, geography, culture, and economic ties are crucially important in shaping individual countries’ trajectories. The ties between Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia—and Moscow’s strenuous objections to NATO membership for these former Soviet republics—mattered little to the George W. Bush administration or to the president, who reportedly lobbied for both countries to be admitted to NATO over many NATO allies’ major reservations.40

The promise of membership to Ukraine and Georgia—without a date or plan for their accession—was made as a compromise between Bush and many other NATO leaders, most notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who were opposed to the idea. The promise was vague and lacked concrete details. However, it was significant as a symbol of U.S. and NATO commitments to the policy of NATO’s eastward expansion regardless of any red lines drawn by Putin.

When Putin spoke about the breakup of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, his message resonated with its intended domestic audience, reflecting widely held opinions among average Russians—a fact overlooked by Western policymakers.41 In retrospect, these warning signs were harbingers of future strife. But in the prevailing atmosphere of the West’s post–Cold War triumphalism, they were repeatedly dismissed as Russia’s atavistic attachment to an outdated, obsolete past rather than a vision of its future.42

With the 2008 promise of membership to Georgia and Ukraine, the United States led NATO across an invisible but distinct line. None of the other Soviet bloc countries that joined NATO after the Cold War had ties to Russia comparable to those of Ukraine and Georgia. The countries of Central Europe had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Poland reemerged as an independent state after World War I and had an adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union until it was crushed by Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. The Baltic states had long been part of the Russian Empire, but they had closer ties to the German than to the Russian world. Following two decades of independence, they were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, and they viewed Russia as an occupying power—a sentiment that survived Soviet occupation and propelled them to freedom in the late 1980s, helping to unravel the Soviet Union.

Ukraine and Georgia share a different history with Russia. Until 1991, Ukraine had been part of imperial and later Soviet Russia for more than three hundred years. It was the empire’s industrial heartland, home to its defense industry and breadbasket, and a bridge to the outside world. Georgia became a Russian protectorate in 1783 and part of the Russian Empire in 1801. Unlike the Baltic countries, both were integral parts of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and although both countries gave rise to powerful independence movements and played critical roles in the dissolution of the USSR, many of those ties survive to the present day, even after Russia went to war against both countries to keep them in its orbit.43

NATO’s 2008 pledge of eventual membership to Georgia and Ukraine was a powerful restatement of its Open Door policy. For both countries—and perhaps for other Soviet states harboring similar hopes—it was taken as a Western promise to help them escape Russia’s orbit. But for Russia, it was seen as another perilous sign of NATO’s boundless ambitions, and it raised the prospect that it would lose control, or at least immediate influence, over two neighbors that it saw as critical to its security, well-being, and prestige as a major power.44 Given the alliance’s commitment to spreading democracy, Russia also perceived its neighbors’ intended accession as a threat to its domestic stability. Thus, the U.S. rejection of Russia’s geopolitical concerns as “atavistic” overlooked Russian sensitivities.45 Russia’s response to it was an outright repudiation of several key assumptions underpinning the original arguments for expansion—that Russia would gradually change its views, come to share the alliance’s founding values, and eventually accept NATO’s eastward push as it was intended by its proponents; in other words, Moscow would see expansion as a move toward Russia, rather than against it.

Russia’s opposition to NATO’s eastward push lived up to the expectations of those who argued for the expansion as a hedge against a resurgent, irredentist Russia. However, the architects of expansion had not thought through the consequences of that scenario. Having made the promise of membership to Georgia and Ukraine and encouraged their aspirations to join NATO, the alliance had not planned for and did not come to their defense when the two became victims of Russian aggression. The alliance had made a political but not legal commitment to their security. In effect, NATO chose to hide behind this narrow legalistic interpretation of its obligations to member states, rather than act upon the expansive political commitments that permeated the official declarations and speeches of its leaders.46

In choosing inaction, NATO reaffirmed what had long been obvious to many observers—that it was not committed to the two countries’ security. Russia’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated the importance of interests as drivers of Russian, U.S., and NATO actions: Russia had more at stake in both Georgia and Ukraine than the United States and NATO and was prepared to go to war to protect those equities. The United States and its NATO allies did not see their stake in Ukraine and Georgia, or their commitment to shared values, as important enough to warrant war with Russia.

Moreover, in promising membership to Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO in the first place, the leaders of the alliance seemed to overlook the importance of geography. Even the most ardent advocates of NATO expansion recognize now that geographic proximity to Russia has been a powerful obstacle to realizing their aspirations of NATO membership and the alliance’s eastward push. Russia’s proximity to both countries has endowed it with a formidable military advantage, and the alliance would face a daunting challenge in overcoming that advantage if it chose to come to either country’s defense in a conflict with Russia. That challenge has been made abundantly clear by the ongoing discussion among defense experts about how the alliance would be able to defend the Baltic states in a hypothetical future conflict with Russia, given the latter’s overwhelming geographic advantages in such a conflict.47

Finally, the costs and benefits to the alliance of NATO enlargement, as well as the overall geopolitical context, have changed since the early 1990s in two fundamental ways. First, the promise of a Europe whole, free, and at peace with itself and its neighbors, which seemed within reach in the aftermath of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has been replaced with a new division in Europe between Russia and NATO. Several countries that belong to neither camp are now stuck in a geopolitical no man’s land, unwilling to return to Russia’s sphere of influence but unable to reach out to an alliance whose promises of protection are vague at best. Second, at the time of NATO’s first wave of enlargement in the 1990s, the prospect of a NATO-Russia military confrontation seemed to have been relegated to Europe’s past, and NATO was preparing to go “out of area.”48 Today, NATO officials and military planners are deeply preoccupied with augmenting capabilities to defend alliance territory against Russian aggression. As a consequence, the costs of opening NATO’s door to Europe’s east have risen dramatically with respect to new members and aspiring applicants. With the alliance focused on dealing with the new division of Europe and the adversarial relationship with Russia, the prospect of membership for Georgia and Ukraine has been pushed into a distant, indefinite future.

#### That causes Russia and China to create an Axis of Evil against the US.

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Putin’s war against Ukraine, preceded by his demands for the United States and its NATO allies to fundamentally alter post–Cold War European security arrangements, has dispelled all doubts—to the extent that any remained—about the primacy of Europe as the principal theater where Russia’s strategic interests reside, from where the principal threats to the country’s security emanate, and where the principal efforts to defend it from those threats are concentrated. As a critical strategic theater, Asia pales in comparison with Europe. The attack on Ukraine demonstrates the dominance of Europe and the unimportance of Asia—beyond China—in Russian strategic thinking.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, the view that Russian strategic thinking was myopic and misguided was widespread in the U.S. national security community. According to this view, the real threat to Russia in the medium and long term would emerge from China rather than the West. Sooner or later, the Russian strategic community would realize that. And the sooner it could be disabused of its mistaken approach to China, the better for the United States, whose interests would be best served by preventing Russia from becoming an ally and force multiplier of China. U.S. policy, therefore, should de-emphasize rivalry with Russia and instead seek to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. In other words, it was a policy prescription for a partnership with Russia on the basis of perceiving a shared threat from China.

That prescription is no longer viable. However, for many years before the invasion of Ukraine, Western analysts and policymakers ignored the basic fact that Russia’s partnership with China is not a short-term marriage of convenience but grounded in a set of coherent, complementary, and well-thought-out strategic rationales. This should have been obvious to anyone who followed the strategic discourse in Russia, read its national security documents, and sought to understand the basics of its domestic politics, national security decisionmaking, and economy.

One striking aspect of the Russian national security discourse largely overlooked by many in the U.S. strategic community is its all-consuming preoccupation with perceived threats from the West. Insecurity vis-à-vis the West has been the defining feature of official security documents since the 1990s, when the United States and Europe considered the Cold War to be over. In Russia, by contrast, the West’s security policy has always been viewed as a continuation in one form or another of its Cold War policies, initially as a “Cold War light” version, but increasingly as a manifestation of the West’s hostile intentions toward Russia.

Another striking aspect of Russian national security documents that has been overlooked is the absence in them of any references to China as a challenge, let alone a potential source of threats to Russia. As alarm about China and its growing ambitions on the world stage became louder in the United States, Russia’s national security documents avoided any mention of the country other than as a partner, and instead increasingly concentrated on the West as the principal source of threats. These documents, however, reflect the actual thinking of the country’s national security leadership and its strategic posture.

This paper first provides an overview of these documents, their evolution since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the strategic backdrop to that evolution. It then focuses on the treatment of China in these documents and explores the reasons why they have ignored the country as a threat or a challenge to Russian national security. Next, the paper explores the unofficial Russian debate about China, considers the practical manifestations in Russian defense policy of its Euro-centric preoccupation, and concludes with implications for the United States.

IT IS ABOUT EUROPE

The war in Ukraine is but the latest conflict in the long historic cycle of war and peace in the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe. Virtually the entire history of Russia as a modern state is one of wars waged in the European theater—against Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Prussia, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Austria, Germany, and so on.

The history of Russia’s relationship with Asia contains nothing similar. Compared to the major European wars, the conquest of Siberia was a series of skirmishes, few of which are recognized as milestones in Russian history. Two major military undertakings stand out—the lost Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and the August 1945 campaign against Japan in Manchuria, which is extolled in Russian historiography as the final chapter of the Second World War. The latter lasted just a few weeks and is generally considered a footnote to the main war effort in the European theater, where the victory is celebrated on May 9 as the end of the Great Patriotic War.

Since the emergence of post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the insecurity of the country’s western flank has manifested itself on multiple occasions, and in defiance of indisputable trends in European security since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Russian leaders objected to NATO admitting new members from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Russia’s president at the time, Boris Yeltsin, accused U.S. president Bill Clinton of trying to split the continent again.1 Russia’s military threatened prospective members of the alliance with nuclear weapons, its foreign intelligence service warned about military retaliation in general, and its diplomats charged that the “NATO-centrism” and “NATO-mania” of U.S. policy “cannot suit Russia.”2 All of these accusations became the major, persistent theme in Russian policy toward Europe, culminating in the demands to fundamentally revise European security arrangements presented to the United States and NATO in December 2021 as the prelude to the war against Ukraine.3

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia’s objections to NATO’s eastward expansion made little sense to an outside observer as the country’s struggles and biggest challenges were domestic during that period—the bloody campaign to suppress the separatist guerilla movement in Chechnya, the instability in the wider North Caucasus region, the sputtering efforts to revive the economy, and the political chaos. The United States and its NATO allies had nothing to do with any of these, and they provided financial and technical assistance to the Russian government on a wide range of economic and societal reforms.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s breakup, the United States and its allies spent vast amounts of money on programs that were essential to Russian national security. They financed and in many other ways facilitated the removal to Russia and securing of the vast nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction scattered across several former Soviet republics. Although this Cooperative Threat Reduction program was one of the key U.S. national security priorities, its immediate beneficiary was Russia.4

As NATO’s eastward expansion got underway, the United States, eager to collect the post–Cold War “peace dividend,” drastically reduced its military presence in Europe.5 At the end of the Cold War, it had some 300,000 troops in the continent. By 1995, that number had decreased to just over 100,000, where it remained approximately for the next decade. By 2008, it dropped to about 65,000, where it has been ever since. By 2013—the last year before the annexation of Crimea by Russia—the United States had reduced the number of its tanks deployed in the European theater from 5,000 in 1989 to zero.6 Other NATO members had carried out equally drastic changes to reduce their defense spending and the size of their militaries.7

Thus, NATO’s expansion was accompanied by a process of its demilitarization. In speeches by its leaders and in official statements, the alliance embraced as its purpose securing “a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”8 That purpose at times seemed to overshadow its original mission of common defense, which was expected—or almost presumed—to become obsolete as common values would become the foundation of European security. In two strategic concepts—in 1999 and 2010—NATO also declared achieving “partnership” with Russia as a goal.9 In some documents it already referred to its relationship with Russia as a “partnership.”10

Senior U.S. officials in speeches and testimonies throughout the pivotal 1990s stated that expansion would not involve greater deployments of U.S. troops to the territories of new members but would instead result in an overall reduction of the U.S. military presence on the continent, which would be transformed into an “area where wars simply do not happen.”11 The alliance also pledged to Russia that it had

no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.12

And, given their small size and military capabilities, none of the new members could pose individually or collectively a meaningful threat to Russia.

In addition to its three pillars of propagation of shared democratic values, reduction of NATO’s military forces, and eastward expansion, the revamped European security architecture was buttressed by two key treaties intended to enhance the stability and security of all European nations. The first was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, which eliminated an entire class of weapons that Soviet leaders had found threatening to their heartland and destabilizing for international security.13 The other was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990, which imposed limits on and regulated military deployments by all its signatories.14 In addition, Vienna Document 99 provided for increased transparency of military activities to build mutual confidence and reduce the risk of inadvertent and accidental escalation.

In addition to these treaties and documents governing primarily European security matters, the United States and Russia signed several arms-control treaties that greatly reduced the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means of their delivery in their arsenals. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and New START in 2010 were major contributions to both countries’ security.

When measured by such indicators as the presence of powerful hostile neighbors, the military footprint as well as the declarations and actions of its presumed principal adversary in the European theater, and the framework of legally binding treaties, Russia entered the twenty-first century with the security of its western flank assured as never before. That, however, was not enough for it.

IT IS OFFICIAL

These positive changes in European security were noted in a succession of Russian national security documents of the 1990s and the 2000s. However, these documents also expressed a clear unease about the eastward expansion of NATO. Beginning with the 1993 military doctrine, “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security” was noted as a “danger” that could become an actual threat in the event of “the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation.”15 The expansion of NATO became a key theme in subsequent iterations of military doctrine and national security strategy, with growing apprehension that “military dangers to the Russian Federation [were] intensifying,” chief among them the “military infrastructure of NATO member countries” approaching Russia’s borders.16

The most notable official pronouncement in this regard was Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he issued a stern warning to the United States and its allies not to expand NATO further eastward.17 The Kremlin followed up on Putin’s warning by crushing the Georgian military in the brief 2008 war to make clear that it would not tolerate Tbilisi’s ambitions to join NATO.

The war was followed by the resumption of cooperative relations with the West.18 But the détente with the West during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency did not diminish Russian opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its security interests.19

Russia’s balancing act between cooperation and competition with NATO ended following its 2014 annexation of Crimea and the start of its undeclared war in eastern Ukraine. NATO was officially and unequivocally declared the principal source of military danger to the country.20 Russia’s most recent National Security Strategy, published in July 2021, describes the United States and NATO as developing options for nuclear and conventional strikes against the country.21

The war against Ukraine, launched by the Kremlin in response to the West’s refusal to accept its demands to fundamentally revise the post–Cold War security arrangements, has put an end to the few remaining hopes of managing the tense relationship through such channels as the NATO–Russia Council, the Normandy Format to resolve the stalemate in eastern Ukraine, and the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue.22 The post–Cold War chapter in relations has ended with a major war between Russia and Ukraine backed by NATO in effect with all measures just short of direct participation by alliance troops. The ongoing conflict underscores the primacy of the European theater for Russia and the role of the United States and NATO as the pacing challenge for its defense and national security policy.

CHINA MISSING

By contrast, China is virtually absent from the Russian official statements, national security documents, and narratives spanning the three post–Cold War decades. The most recent National Security Strategy contains two references to the country: one in the context of “developing a relationship of all-encompassing partnership and strategic cooperation,” and the other in the context of deepening cooperation with it in the context of the BRICS (Brazil-India-China-South Africa) counterpart to the U.S.-led G7 group of advanced democracies.23 Earlier iterations similarly referred to China as a partner with whom Russia planned to sustain and expand cooperative relations.24

Partnership with China has been the counterweight to Russia’s increasingly adversarial relations with the United States and NATO. The two have progressed in synch over the course of Putin’s leadership, and the war against Ukraine is the most recent manifestation of this dynamic. Just before the war, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping jointly announced the “no limits” friendship and declared that there were “no ‘forbidden’ areas for cooperation” between their two countries. These statements confirmed that balancing against the West by aligning ever closer with China is at the heart of Russian policy.25

From Russia’s perspective, the partnership with China rests on solid reasoning. This includes political complementarity between two authoritarian governments and economic complementarity between China’s manufacturing sector and Russia’s resource wealth. For Russia’s ruling elite, the relationship is particularly important for two reasons. First, unlike the United States and the European Union, China does not seek to impose its values or demand domestic political changes that would loosen its hold on power in exchange for partnership. Beijing would also probably look unfavorably at attempts by Moscow to liberalize domestic politics. Second, Russia’s ruling elite derives significant material benefits from controlling the commanding heights of the economy. It has little incentive to change the resource sector’s dominant role in the economy, which benefits from trade with China.

Beyond these ideological, political, and economic factors, Russia has sound strategic reasons for pursuing and strengthening its partnership with China. Their priorities complement rather than contradict each other. Since Russia’s primary theater is Europe and China’s is the Asia-Pacific, their strategic interests overlap only in Central Asia, a region that is of secondary importance for both and where they can deconflict their interests as long as no strategic competitor like the United States is present.

Russia and China share a common adversary in the United States, which has global capabilities and presence that they see as challenging their interests in their critical theaters. Both consider U.S. defense programs, such as missile defenses deployed in Europe and the Asia-Pacific or to protect the homeland, as a threat to their security and an attempt by the United States to deny them the ability to deter and retaliate against it in the event of war. Russia and China also in effect function as a force multiplier for each other by tying up U.S. capabilities in their respective critical theaters and thus preventing it from focusing its efforts on one or the other.

AVOIDING A TWO-THEATER CONFRONTATION

For Russia, which during most of the Cold War faced a major confrontation in two strategic theaters—with the United States and NATO in Europe and with China in Asia—the repeat of that experience, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet economy and the breakup of the Soviet Union, is not an option. The Kremlin sees the West as by far the most serious threat, which must be prioritized while disagreements with China have to be managed and resolved through diplomacy.

A great deal has been written about the successful diplomatic maneuver that was the opening of U.S. relations with China during former president Richard Nixon’s administration. For the Soviet Union, already facing a hostile China in its Far East since the early 1960s as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the prospect of an alignment between Washington and Beijing translated into a major military and economic burden. At the height of the Cold War, it had to maintain as many as fifty divisions facing China along a border of 4,200 kilometers.26 That was in addition to the sixty-five divisions in the western Soviet Union, twenty on its southern flank, and thirty in Eastern Europe.27 If the West’s victory in the Cold War is attributed to the inability of the Soviet economy to sustain the burden of competition with the United States and its allies, significant credit is owed to China as a force multiplier in that competition.

The imperative to avoid a two-theater confrontation with powerful adversaries is also a lesson of the Soviet experience during the Second World War. After the experience of tense relations in the 1930s, which culminated in a major battle in 1939 in Mongolia, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan in 1941.28 Combined with intelligence that Japan would not launch an attack against its Far East, this secured the Soviet Union’s strategic rear.29 No longer threatened with a two-front war in Europe and in Asia, Moscow was able to concentrate its effort on the war with Germany. This is a lesson well remembered in Russia today.30

The only major military campaign carried out by the Soviet army in the Pacific took place after the defeat of Germany. Launched against Japan in August 1945, when the outcome of the war in the Pacific was not in doubt, this lasted just a few weeks and was concluded in early September. Known as the Manchurian campaign, it resulted in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.31

In Soviet and Russian military literature, which relies heavily on historical experience to inform future concepts of operations, the Manchurian campaign has long been held up as a successful example of rapid offensive operations designed to bring about a quick defeat of the enemy as early as in the initial phase of the war.32 In preparation for it, in early 1945, the Soviet High Command undertook major troop redeployments to the Far East from Europe, where the outcome of the war with Germany was already certain. In April 1945, the Soviet Union renounced its nonaggression treaty with Japan.33 It issued a declaration of war on August 8 and the following day launched its offensive—three days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The operation was concluded on September 2, when Japan surrendered. During the Cold War and the long period of tension with China, the Manchurian campaign was seen as the prototype for potential future operations against it.34

However, more recent Russian historiography reflects a different understanding of the Manchurian campaign. Instead of offering lessons for the conduct of hypothetical future operations against China, it is used to correct what Russia sees as the false historical narrative propagated in the West that the campaign was of marginal impact on the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the campaign in 2015, the dean of Russian military scientists, Army General Mahmut Gareev, who as a young officer fought in the Second World War and participated in the campaign, published an article challenging the proposition that the U.S. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had played the decisive role in the defeat of Japan, arguing instead that the Manchurian campaign was of the “greatest military-political significance.”35 The campaign, he stated, had precipitated the capitulation of Japan.

Instead of the anti-China bias evident in Russian Cold War writings, more recent ones reflect a clear anti-Japan bias and emphasize the Japanese threat to the Soviet Union and China during the Second World War. Also on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Manchurian campaign, the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta charged that “Japanese aggression had for many years posed a serious threat to the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, [and] millions of Chinese were enslaved by treacherous occupiers.”36 Gareev wrote in his article that the defeat of the Japanese army in Manchuria “washed away the shame of [Russia’s] defeat” in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, which had weighed as “a heavy memory in the conscience of our country.”

The shift in Russian official historiography from the Cold War preoccupation with China to the post–Cold War focus on Japan is consistent with changes in security policy. Russia’s ever-closer partnership with China has relegated the prospect of a military confrontation between them to the margins, whereas the deteriorating relationship with the United States has elevated the perception of threat from its treaty ally Japan.

Japan is also the only country—other than Ukraine, after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia—that maintains active territorial claims against Russia. The Russian military doctrine published in 2003 highlights the threat of maritime landing operations in the Far East.37 The potential culprit in such contingencies could only be Japan, possibly in coalition with the United States. The document also notes that inadequate transport links between central Russia and the Far East could have a “negative impact” on the course of military operations.38 The combination of Japanese territorial claims and inferior Russian capabilities in this theater could in the event of a conflict leave Russia with few alternatives to resorting to nuclear strikes against the invaders.

Japan hosts U.S. troops on its territory and participates in joint military activities with the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Although it has canceled two previously planned sites for the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile system, it has decided to procure two Aegis-equipped ships and thus to contribute to what Russian officials perceive as the U.S.-led effort to build global missile defenses, which they consider to be a threat to Russia.39 Russian analysts have also criticized Japan’s changes in its defense posture that entail, in their view, growing geographic ambitions, capabilities beyond self-defense, and participation in presumably U.S.-led coalition wars.40

Overall, however, the Far East and the Asia-Pacific do not hold a special place as an independent theater of operations in Russian official military thinking. Rather, its importance reflects threat perceptions driven by adversarial relations with the United States and its NATO allies centered on Europe and the imperative of avoiding a simultaneous confrontation in two far-flung theaters.

#### It’s impossible to defend against both. China’s the larger threat, but Russia will punish the US if the relationship doesn’t stabilize.

Hal Brands 22, Prof of Global Affairs at John Hopkins University, 1-18-2022, "The Overstretched Superpower," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower?check\_logged\_in=1&utm\_medium=promo\_email&utm\_source=lo\_flows&utm\_campaign=registered\_user\_welcome&utm\_term=email\_1&utm\_content=20220618, jy

ASIA FIRST

Biden’s initial theory of foreign policy was straightforward: don’t let smaller challenges distract from the big one. Of all the threats Washington faces, Biden’s interim national security strategy argued, China “is the only competitor” able to “mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” That challenge has become greater as China has accelerated its efforts to overturn the balance of power in Asia. When Biden took office, U.S. military leaders publicly warned that Beijing could invade Taiwan by 2027. Biden was not naive enough to think that other problems would simply vanish. With trouble brewing on this central front, however, he did seek a measure of calm on others.

Biden avoided another doomed “reset” with Russia, but held an early summit with Putin in a bid to establish a “stable and predictable” relationship. He also sought to find a path back to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, thereby reducing the growing risk of confrontation in the Middle East. Finally, Biden ended the U.S. war in Afghanistan, a decision he justified by arguing that it was time to refocus attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific. Relations with U.S. allies followed the same pattern: the administration dropped U.S. opposition to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia and western Europe, wagering that ending a contentious dispute with Germany would make it easier to win Berlin’s cooperation vis-à-vis Beijing.

Biden’s emerging defense strategy has a similar thrust. The Trump administration made a major shift in U.S. defense planning, arguing that the Pentagon must relentlessly prepare for a conflict against a great-power challenge—particularly from China—even though that meant accepting greater risk in other regions. Biden’s Pentagon likewise spent 2021 focusing on how to deter or defeat Chinese aggression, withdrawing scarce assets such as missile defense batteries from the Middle East, and making longer-term budgetary investments meant to “prioritize China and its military modernization as our pacing challenge.”

TROUBLE EVERYWHERE

Biden is undoubtedly right that the Chinese challenge overshadows all others, despite unresolved debates in Washington over exactly when that challenge will become most severe. His administration has made major moves in the Sino-American competition during its first year—expanding multilateral military planning and exercises in the western Pacific, focusing bodies such as NATO and the G-7 on Beijing’s belligerence, and launching the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. Yet Biden hasn’t enjoyed anything resembling a respite on other fronts.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan precipitated the collapse of the government there, generating a near-term crisis that consumed Washington’s attention and leaving longer-term legacies—strategic and humanitarian—that are likely to do the same. Meanwhile, a brutal internal conflict in Ethiopia destabilized one of Africa’s most important countries. Most problematic of all, U.S. relations with Iran and Russia became worse, not better.

The United States is an overstretched hegemon, with a defense strategy out of balance with the foreign policy it supports.

Iran has taken a hard-line stance in negotiations on a revived nuclear deal while steadily decreasing the amount of time it would need to produce a potential weapon. Tehran’s proxies have also conducted periodic attacks against U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East as part of an ongoing effort to force an American withdrawal from the region.

Putin, for his part, has authorized or at least permitted significant cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in the United States. He threatened war against Ukraine in the spring and has now mobilized forces for what U.S. officials fear could be a major invasion and prolonged occupation of that country. To preserve the peace, Moscow has demanded an acknowledged Russian sphere of influence and the rollback of NATO’s military presence in eastern Europe. What exactly Putin has in mind for Ukraine is uncertain, but “stable and predictable” is clearly not how he envisions his relationship with the United States.

These are ominous signs for 2022. The United States could find itself facing grave security crises in Europe and the Middle East in addition to persistent and elevated tensions in the Pacific. And these possibilities hint at a deeper problem in U.S. statecraft, one that has been accumulating for years: strategic overstretch.

MORE WITH LESS

Facing trouble on many fronts is business as usual for a global power. U.S. foreign policy—and the defense strategy that buttresses it—has long been designed with that problem in mind. After the Cold War, the United States adopted a “two major regional contingencies” approach to defense planning. In essence, it committed to maintaining a military large and capable enough to fight two serious wars in separate regions at roughly the same time. U.S. planners were under no illusion that Washington could fully indemnify itself against all the threats it faced if they happened to manifest simultaneously. Their aim was to limit the risk inherent in a global foreign policy by ensuring that an enemy in one theater could not wage a successful war of aggression while the Pentagon was busy with a crisis in another. Just as the United Kingdom, the superpower of its day, had a two-power naval standard in the nineteenth century, a unipolar United States had a two-war standard for a generation after 1991.

Over time, however, the two-war standard became impossible to sustain. The defense spending cuts associated with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (later compounded by the sequestration cuts of 2013) forced the Pentagon to adopt a somewhat stingier “one-plus” war standard aimed at defeating one capable aggressor and stalemating or “imposing unacceptable costs” on another. Meanwhile, the number of threats was increasing. During the post-Cold War era, the Pentagon worried mostly about potential conflicts in the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. But the events of 2014 and 2015—the Islamic State’s rampage through Iraq and Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and China’s drive for dominance in the South China Sea, along with ongoing operations in Afghanistan—showed that U.S. allies and interests were now imperiled in several regions at once.

Leaders in Moscow and Tehran see that the United States is stretched thin and eager to pay more attention to China.

Washington’s enemies were also growing more formidable. The two-war standard was primarily focused on rogue states with second-class militaries. Now, the United States had to contend with two near-peer competitors, China and Russia, that boasted world-class conventional capabilities alongside the advantages that would come from fighting on their own geopolitical doorsteps. By the end of Barack Obama’s presidency, it was an open question whether the United States could defeat China if Beijing assaulted Taiwan, or Russia if Moscow invaded the Baltic region. What was clear was that any such war would require the overwhelming majority of the Pentagon’s combat power, along with virtually all of its airlift and sealift capabilities.

This realization prompted a major change in U.S. defense planning. The Trump administration’s defense strategy declared that the two-war standard was history. The U.S. military would henceforth be sized and shaped to win one major war against a great-power competitor. The United States would still be capable of “deterring” aggression in other theaters, but, as a bipartisan commission that included several current Biden administration officials pointed out, how exactly the Pentagon would do so without the capability to defeat such aggression remained ambiguous.

Shifting to a one-war standard was a sensible way to motivate the lethargic Pentagon bureaucracy to find creative solutions to the urgent, daunting challenge of war with a near-peer rival. It involved a sober recognition that losing a great-power war could inflict a death blow on the U.S.-led international order. Yet the 2018 defense strategy was also an acknowledgment of overstretch: the United States could focus on its primary challenge only by reducing its ability to focus on others. This limitation is the root of the problem Biden has inherited, and it has some dangerous implications.

THE CREDIBILITY GAP

The most glaring danger, highlighted by the concurrent crises in eastern Europe and East Asia, is that the United States could have to fight wars against China and Russia simultaneously. This would indeed be a nightmare scenario for a one-war military. But it wouldn’t take a global security meltdown to reveal the problems caused by Washington’s predicament.

First, overstretch limits U.S. options in a crisis. Where the United States should draw the line against Russian aggression in eastern Europe, how hard it should push back against Tehran’s provocations in the Middle East, and whether it should use force to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state are matters that reasonable people can debate. But the fact that the United States increasingly has a China centric defense strategy has a constraining effect in other theaters. If a U.S. president knows that the Pentagon will need everything it has for an all-too-plausible war with China, he or she will be less inclined to use force against Iran or Russia, lest Washington be caught short if violence erupts in the Pacific.

This issue leads to a second problem: the loss of diplomatic influence in situations short of war. Since the Taiwan and Ukraine crises of early 2021, some observers have speculated that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are coordinating their coercion as a way of threatening Washington with a two-front war. The reality is that explicit coordination is hardly necessary to profit from U.S. overextension.

Historically, overstretched superpowers have eventually faced hard choices.

Leaders in Moscow and Tehran can see that the United States is stretched thin militarily and eager to pay more attention to China. This gives them an incentive to push Washington harder in hopes of achieving gains at the expense of a distracted superpower. As the Russia expert Michael Kofman has written, Putin’s strategy of using military coercion to revise the post-Cold War order in Europe is premised on his belief that the “greater threat from China” will eventually “force Washington to compromise and renegotiate.” The more intense its focus on China, the higher the price the United States may be willing to pay for restraint in other places.

The perils of overstretch, however, are not confined to secondary theaters. Weakness at the periphery can ultimately cause weakness at the center. A decade ago, the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq to economize in the Middle East and pivot toward the Pacific. Iraq’s subsequent collapse forced Washington to reengage there, fighting a multi-year conflict that devoured resources and attention.

Similarly, if the United States finds itself in a showdown with Iran or if Russia attempts to revise the status quo in eastern Europe, Washington may once again find itself pivoting away from the Pacific to reinforce under-resourced regions that still matter to U.S. security. America’s defense strategy is increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific, but its foreign policy remains stubbornly global. That’s a recipe for trouble all around.

TOUGH CHOICES

To be clear, military power is hardly the only thing that matters in global affairs. But it is a necessary component of an effective foreign policy, if only because force remains the ultimate arbiter of international disputes. Xi, Putin, and other U.S. adversaries are unlikely to be swayed by Biden’s “relentless diplomacy” unless they are also awed by the military power that backs it up.

Historically, overstretched superpowers have eventually faced hard choices about how to address mismatches between commitments and capabilities. When the United Kingdom found itself with more rivals than it could handle in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it began appeasing those that were less dangerous and proximate—including the United States—to concentrate on containing Germany. When the Korean War revealed that Washington’s containment policy outstripped its military resources, the United States was forced to undertake a significant defense buildup to close the gap.

The Biden administration may try to skirt this dilemma by managing tensions with Iran, Russia, and other challengers while encouraging allies in Europe and partners in the Middle East to take greater responsibility for their own defense. That’s an understandable instinct. In the near term, both the geopolitical costs of true retrenchment and the financial costs of rearmament may seem to exceed the difficulties of muddling along. Yet Biden’s first year has already shown that overstretch inflicts damage on the installment plan. Eventually, the world will punish a superpower that allows its strategic deficit to grow too big for too long.

#### Overstretch cedes competition with China, making hotspots escalate.

Nishtha Kaushiki 21, Assistant Prof of International Studies at the Central University of Punjab, 12-10-21, "China: A nemesis that NATO wouldn’t want," https://www.dailypioneer.com/2021/columnists/china--a-nemesis-that-nato-wouldn---t-want.html, jy

The mention of China as a potential challenger to NATO first emerged in one of its documents in 2019, and by 2020-21, it has become its "systemic rival". From a Euro-Atlantic perspective, Russia is a direct military threat that does not shy away from a head-on clash. Its primary focus is on its immediate strategic backyard- Eastern Europe and Central Asia. On the other hand, China has violent tendencies towards its neighbours and politically intimidates the countries of other regions by actively using its economic and political clout. Further, it has forged strategic partnerships with authoritarian countries, attempts to change the existing security architectures by challenging the freedom of navigation of commercial ships by buying or financing strategic assets worldwide. Thus, it has a global strategic agenda and is far more dangerous than Russia for the EU and NATO.

There has been an upward trend of trade between the EU and China. During the first nine months of 2020, the bilateral trade between the two was Euro 425.5 billion. Simultaneously, the EU-US trade saw a downward trend of -11.4 percent for imports and -10 percent for exports. With regard to the Chinese BRI, in 2018, China marked its strategic presence in North-Western Europe with the takeover of Zeebrugge terminal in Belgium and Greece's Piraeus seaport,followed by crucial infrastructural development projects in Spain, Italy and Greece. Germany's Duisburg inland port should not be missed either. The EU and NATO essentially see the 17+1 format as a leapfrog approach by Beijing that threatens the region's security.

In 2019, two significant developments took place. First, at the EU-China summit in April 2019, a few states opposed a standard EU stand against China, given its strategic influence. Second, Italy was the first G7 country to join the BRI. Thus, the cracks in the solidarity of the EU began to appear. In the investments sector, the regulatory preferences for the 5G rollout have been chiefly guided by the US. The EU security concerns have vetted the domestic legal guidelines of individual states, and hence, all efforts have been made to sideline Huawei, which is primarily seen as a "Trojan Horse". As China aims to become a world leader in Artificial Intelligence by 2030, the penetration of Huawei and other such critical technologies such as biotechnology and robotics, the propaganda warfare through disinformation campaigns challenges both Europe and the US. The additional challenge 'democratic backsliding' due to the Chinese influence over the fragile partners of the EU and the 'potential members' can also not be missed. In light of this, the 2021 summit communiqué acknowledged the evolving nature of warfare involving the malicious use of AI apart from simultaneous attacks with hypersonic missiles. The threat has thus become three-fold -- a fully modernised conventional attack with the potential of a supplemented nuclear attack apart from the emerging contours of hybrid warfare and the questions of the continuance of supply chains. In a nutshell, the Chinese policies of geostrategic and geo-economic penetration apart from its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy constitute the core of its "systemic challenge".

During the Cold War, it was asserted that the security of Western Europe depended upon the containment of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with the 'unipolar moment' gradually coming to an end with the US overstretch with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the incorporation of Russia in the Atlantic partnership would probably have allowed NATO to geographically and politically cross the barriers of Eurasia. Consequently, today from "spoiler states", Russia and China have rapidly transformed themselves into "revisionist states", and the role of China is a much profound one. With Joint exercises of both the countries in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea and Beijing's recent outreach to Equatorial Guinea to establish its first permanent military mission in the Atlantic, the Euro Atlantic insecurities will increase all the more.

Had the Sino-Russo strategic convergences been nipped in the bud itself by strategic re-evaluation and the inclusion of Russia in NATO, the story of geopolitics perhaps could have been fundamentally different, both for the EU and as for South Asia. Acceptance of Russia as an "equal" would have probably done away with the heartburns that Moscow has right now. The inability to accept that hybrid warfare (4th and 5th generation) would necessitate politically expanding the horizons of deterrence against a new rising power (China) has done more harm than good to NATO. The visionary approach of including Russia in NATO was discouraged when Russia's request to join the organisation was turned down by the U.S. not once but thrice, leading to the creation of new political faultlines. It also led to strengthening the Sino-Russo alliance apart from leaving a geopolitical vacuum in which China and Russia could attempt to downplay the EU and NATO. Today, the takeover or annexation of the Crimea, the Ukrainian crisis, the refugee dispute between Poland and Belarus, and the inclusion of the EU countries in the BRI Corridor have become the larger geopolitical testers of a 'United' EU and NATO, apart from the US sphere of influence.

There is still a lack of political cohesion on the methodologies to tackle China in this direction. While the US and Britain have decided to boycott Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, the EU, on the other hand, has refrained from taking a collective stand on the issue. Given the increasingly intertwined stakes that the Union has with China, it is hesitant to take a joint stand fearing its retaliatory "economic coercion". France's position is contrary to the US, which is well grasped in the backdrop of the formation of the AUKUS and the severed deal between Canberra and Paris. Such emerging diverging approaches within the EU that China would possibly try to use in its favour to increase its strategic foothold, thereby weakening the Atlantic alliance.

Early this year, G7 partners announced the 'Build Back Better World Initiative' (B3W), followed by the 'Global Gateway' initiative that aims to mobilise Euro 300 billion between 2021 and 2027. As one can see, the developments are similar to the 'Greek-Turkish Aid Bill' — the US initial response to contain Communist expansion. However, in the contemporary scenario, additions such as hybrid warfare, hostile economic takeovers, and dual-use ports have ushered in new dimensions of geopolitics. A full-blown 'New Cold War' is in place.

China and Russia would probably seek to militarily distract the EU and the US with small but essential 'hotspots' such as Taiwan and Ukraine. The risks of escalation and misjudgement have increased the chances of open hostilities all the more, but, given the constraints of economic dependencies, especially the questions of the continuance of supply chain routes, one can be still doubtful of the NATO response. Nevertheless, territorial nibbling would also not be taken lightly by NATO. The vicious circle thus seems to continue with more of trade wars, sanctions, and hostile takeovers, thereby creating sharp polarisations throughout the globe and regional and other organisations such as the EU and NATO.

#### BUT, stabilization of relations solves a litany of existential threats.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 19, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323>, jy

A military confrontation between the two countries could have profoundly destabilizing and even catastrophic effects on global order and security. In contrast, a more cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship could yield progress on threats to U.S. national security and prosperity—challenges that the United States cannot tackle effectively alone. Preventing further nuclear proliferation, including the complex problem of securing nuclear materials and other components of weapons of mass destruction, will require not only greater U.S.-Russia collaboration but also preserving at least some elements of the remaining arms control framework and inspection regimes. Efforts to combat transnational threats, from terrorist movements to criminal organizations and illicit trafficking, would also benefit from U.S.-Russian cooperation. Likewise, it will not be possible to resolve long-standing regional conflicts, for example on the Korean Peninsula and in Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, without U.S. and Russian cooperation and willingness to negotiate. Finally, the United States and Russia will need to find practical ways to avoid escalation of tensions in cyberspace and outer space, and restrain the growth of Chinese influence.

POST–COLD WAR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS—WHAT WENT WRONG?

U.S. policy toward Russia since the end of the Cold War is a story of different administrations pursuing essentially the same set of policies. Two aspects stand out as major irritants in the bilateral relationship: a refusal to accept Russia as it is, as evidenced by repeated initiatives to reform and remake its political system; and the extension of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture into the Eurasian space surrounding Russia. Both of these highly ambitious pursuits have been attempted repeatedly and unsuccessfully, yet both continue to be cornerstones of official U.S. policy toward Russia. In retrospect, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a less ambitious U.S. approach to dealing with Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union could have established a better basis for a less rocky U.S.-Russian relationship.

BOOM TO BUST

Addressing a joint session of Congress in January 1991, then president George H. W. Bush spoke about his desire “to continue to build a lasting basis” for cooperation with Russia.6 His wish, no doubt sincere, was expressed at a time of widely held hopes that the Cold War was ending and the two superpowers would put their differences aside and begin collaborating on the world’s many problems “for a more peaceful future for all mankind.”7

It was indeed a promising phase in relations between Washington and Moscow, full of significant accomplishments and optimism about the future. In a short period of time, the two Cold War adversaries negotiated a treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (START II), signed a multilateral treaty on conventional forces in Europe, negotiated the terms for German reunification and a unified Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and agreed on a charter for European security and stability after the Cold War. Moreover, their cooperation was not confined to Europe; they also jointly sponsored a major conference in Madrid on the Middle East and successfully dealt with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait. Most important, they entered into all of these endeavors with a new spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, a far cry from the threatening rhetoric and tensions that had been a hallmark of their relationship for more than a generation.

For the three decades that followed, the U.S.-Russian relationship went through a series of boom-bust cycles, reaching its nadir after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Through the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations, U.S. policy toward Russia followed a familiar pattern. First, a new presidential administration comes into the White House deeply dissatisfied with the state of the U.S.-Russia relationship. It commits to do better and launches a policy review that generates a new approach—a “reset”—toward Russia aimed at developing a partnership. The road toward partnership looks promising, but obstacles gradually begin to emerge and eventually escalate into a full-blown crisis. By the end of the administration’s time in office, the relationship is at the lowest point since the Cold War.

Thus, the spirit of partnership that marked the end of the Cold War did not last long. The elder Bush’s hope for a new relationship with Russia in a new world order ran into the harsh reality of the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and the chaos that engulfed Russia less than a year after his speech. The Bush administration had little chance to prepare for such a dramatic turn of events and develop a policy commensurate with the magnitude of the change in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Consumed by domestic economic and political crises, Russia largely retreated from the world stage and for the most part was rendered largely incapable of acting as a partner to the United States as envisioned by Bush. Demoralized and embittered Russian elites soon constructed a narrative—greatly amplified by the Kremlin throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency—that the United States had taken advantage of their country at a moment of weakness, which created a sense of victimhood and soured the overall atmosphere in U.S.-Russian relations.

The Clinton administration, frustrated with what it saw as its predecessor’s insufficiently robust engagement to support reforms in Russia, declared its intent in 1993 to build “the foundation for a new democratic partnership between the United States and Russia.”8 Speaking in Vancouver, Canada, in April 1993, at the first of his many summits with Russia’s then president Boris Yeltsin, Clinton promised:

Mr. President, our nation will not stand on the sidelines when it comes to democracy and Russia. We know where we stand. We are with Russian democracy, we are with Russian reforms, we are with Russian markets. We support freedom of conscience and speech and religion. We support respect for ethnic minorities. We actively support reform and reformers and you in Russia.9

Soon after these hopeful words were spoken, the relationship encountered its first bumps. In late September and early October 1993, tensions between the Russian executive and legislative branches came to a head in a bloody confrontation in Moscow, as the constitutional crisis between Yeltsin and his rebellious parliament led to violence in the streets. When the dust settled, Yeltsin had managed to push through a new constitution that consolidated executive power to such an extent that in effect it placed the presidency above all other branches of government. That same autumn, Russian officials expressed their strong opposition to NATO enlargement1, which was emerging as the principal pillar of U.S. policy in Europe.0

### 2NC—NATO BAD

#### NATO forces Russia’s hand to cementing the axis.

Bradley Devlin 22, MA Political Economy from UC Berkeley, 2-11-22, “Thank NATO For The New Russia-China Pact,” <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/thank-nato-for-the-new-russia-china-pact/>, jy

The new partnership between Russia and China is America's *chickens coming home to roost.*

Russia and China announced the formation of a “no-limits” partnership last week, the predictable consequence of America’s misguided policy towards post-Soviet Russia and ill-advised embrace of a rising China.

Putin and Xi publicized the agreement, spanning over 5,000 words in English, just before the two leaders were seen at the opening ceremonies of the Winter Olympics in Beijing, which is under diplomatic boycott by the U.S. and other Western nations over the CCP’s human-rights abuses. “Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation,” the signatory nations said in a joint statement.

In the new bilateral pact, the nations pledged mutual support on issues that are sure to enflame the U.S. and its allies. Russia proclaimed its support of the One-China principle—the idea that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China—and expressed opposition to Taiwanese independence. For its part, China joined Russia’s call to end NATO enlargement. The pair also reiterated their opposition to the trilateral “AUKUS” agreement, which would help provide the Australians with nuclear-powered submarines, and “the advancement of U.S. plans to develop global missile [defense] and deploy its elements in various regions of the world, combined with capacity building of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for disarming strikes and other strategic objectives.”

Further, China and Russia pledged to cooperate on the development of artificial intelligence, information security, and space technologies. The nations also unveiled an energy deal worth $117.5 billion that will bolster Russia’s gas exports to East Asia.

Evolving circumstances in Ukraine and the South China Sea provide the backdrop, and considerable incentive, for the new agreement between China and Russia. Russia has amassed over 100,000 troops on its border with Ukraine over the past few months. The Biden administration has responded by announcing the deployment of about 3,000 additional U.S. troops to Europe, keeping another 8,500 on standby. Aside from the AUKUS agreement, things have grown more complicated in the South China Sea due to an increased number of Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and rumors that Washington might shed its strategic ambiguity with respect to Taiwan. These developments are the latest in a long line of miscalculations by the U.S. foreign policy apparatus over 30 years.

In 1949, many core European countries were still recovering from the Second World War. The Soviet Union was, too, but its economy had recovered more rapidly than expected and it was developing and testing nuclear weapons. Thus, trans-Atlanticists saw a need for a defensive alliance to stave off whatever territorial ambitions the Soviet Union had in Western Europe. Et voilà, NATO was born. Originally, the alliance had 12 members. Only one, Norway, shared a border with Russia. The Soviets responded with the creation of their own alliance, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955. By then, NATO had already added Greece, Turkey, and West Germany.

Thirty-six years later, increased pressure from the West and contradictions within the Soviet system resulted in the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The U.S. and its NATO allies outlasted the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. Just like that, NATO’s raison d’être disappeared. NATO was forced to reckon with the consequences of victory. More than four decades of bureaucratic entrenchment and military-industrial expansion made the thought of ending NATO unpopular—not to mention the fact that the United States, unquestionably the leader of the NATO alliance, saw the alliance as a means to cement its global hegemony.

So, instead of going out of business, NATO went out of area, wading into conflicts in the Middle East and micromanaging European instability. Since the fall of the USSR, NATO has pursued a dual track of diplomacy with Russia—simultaneously cooperating with Russia on its chosen campaigns to remain relevant and maintaining the Cold War frame that Russia is the main menace in Europe.

From 1994-1997, it appeared NATO and Russia were making real efforts to find areas of mutual cooperation. Russia entered into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994, and three years later, the two parties signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, stating “the reasons why NATO and Russia believe that it is in their shared interest to cooperate more broadly and intensively.”

In 1999, however, NATO returned to its old ways, accepting Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as members of the alliance. The move angered the Russians, as NATO expansion was still a sore point for even post-Soviet Russia. The Russians had already felt betrayed by the fact that, in subsequent negotiations between the USSR and president George H.W. Bush’s administration, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s alleged promise to the USSR that NATO would move “not one inch” eastward never reappeared. NATO’s expansion in 1999 confirmed Russia’s fears.

Nevertheless, NATO continued to court Russian cooperation. At the 2002 NATO Summit in Rome, the alliance and Russia signed another agreement to create the NATO-Russia Council, which produced results in issue areas such as counterterrorism.

Yet NATO continued to undercut its progress with Russia in other areas by its continued expansion. In 2004, NATO expanded for the fifth time, adding Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), two of which share a border with Russia. NATO then made Albania and Croatia members in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia as recently as 2020. “Not one inch” turned into nearly 1,000 miles pretty quickly.

Russia believes NATO expansion won’t end there. Given the precedent NATO has set, it’s hard to blame them. In fact, NATO and some of its key member states like the U.S. have openly expressed desires to keep expanding up to Russia’s western border. NATO has been courting Ukraine and Georgia, two vital nations in the Russian cultural imagination, since 1994.

While the U.S.-led NATO alliance was pursuing its muddled, incoherent approach to Russia, Russia and China started patching up the holes in their relationship left by the Sino-Soviet split. The two nations solved a decades-long border dispute, increased trade in vital industries like machine goods, textiles, energy, and other natural resources. The U.S. encouraged China’s rise to global prominence by, among other things, allowing it to enter the World Trade Organization. As one Joe Biden said in 2011, “a rising China is a positive, positive development, not only for China but for America and the world writ large.”

Which brings us to the present moment, in which the trans-Atlantic foreign policy elites, bolstered by their beneficiaries in the military-industrial complex, refuse to offer any prudent course-correction to prevent the formation of a full-fledged axis against the United States. This could end with America’s sons and daughters dying overseas to solve the problems they created. But it doesn’t have to.

#### NATO’s very functionality gives them shared ground.

Michael Cox 14, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, and Director of LSE IDEAS, 2014, “'Not just 'convenient': China and Russia's new strategic partnership in the age of geopolitics',” <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83632/1/Cox_Not%20just%20convenient.pdf>, jy

Hegemony and its discontents

"China opposes hegemonism and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion"

Xi Jinping at the 18th Party Congress. 2012.

The lessons drawn from the collapse of Soviet power thus provided, and still provides, China and Russia with a common point of historical reference. But it was the structure of the new international system that concerned them more. Both of course recognized that with the passing of the old order the world had changed for ever; and both would now have to sink or swim in a word dominated by the market. There could be no going back to the past. On the other hand, the world as seen from Beijing and Moscow was not one in which either could feel especially comfortable. For one thing, the established rules governing the world had all been written by the West. The metaphorical table around which the main players then sat was also made and designed in the West. And sitting at the top of the table of course was the established hegemon: United States.

To add material insult to injury, in this world the United States not only possessed a vast amount of power - soft and hard - but an extensive alliance system as well. Its very existence not only reminded China and Russia how few genuine friends they had themselves; it also contributed in significant ways to America's ability to place pressure on the two countries. The US may have proclaimed its innocence, insisting that the last thing it was thinking about when it enlarged NATO was to encircle Russia, or that when it tilted to Asia it was looking to contain China rather than engage it. However, that is not how things were viewed in either Moscow or Beijing. Indeed, for the Chinese the so-called 'tilt' (accompanied as it was by what they saw as a change in US military doctrine)29 was seen as a highly aggressive act; and the only legitimate response, it was felt, was to fight fire with fire which it did with an 'outpouring' of increased 'anti-American sentiment' in China itself followed up by what looked to many as a final abandonment in practice, if not in theory, of the tried and true Deng principle of keeping a low profile. To underscore the point, it also began to refer to the US less frequently as global partner - though such language did not disappear entirely from the Chinese foreign policy discourse31 - and more as a potential rival which would for ever seek to maintain its position of primacy in Asia through the manipulation of its still highly dependent allies. This in turn connects to a wider debate in which China and Russia have been engaged for some time about the structure of the world system after the Cold War; and one thing has emerged from these: neither feels that their interests, singly or collectively, are best protected in a system in which power is so heavily concentrated in the hands of a single 'hegemon', especially when that hegemon happens to be a liberal power like the United States of America. This not only flows from their very strongly held realist belief that hegemony by definition confers great status on the hegemon. The concentration of power in the hands of a single power they argue is also likely to encourage greater assertiveness. Clinton may have resisted the temptation for a while, though not entirely as the NATO-led bombing of Kosovo showed. But post 9/11 the situation changed dramatically, and buoyed up by a American public fearful of yet another attack, and taking full advantage of the freedom afforded it by the much debated unipolar 'moment', the US launched a war on terror with the ostensible goal of combatting global jihad (of which the Chinese and Russians approved) but with the unwritten purpose (to which they did not) of reasserting US power after what many on the republican political right saw as a post-Cold War decade of drift.34 The lesson drawn in China and Russia from all this were obvious: until and when the distribution of power in the international system had become more evenly distributed - in short had become 'multipolar' - then the world would not only remain a deeply disturbed place but one in which their voice would remain marginal at best, insignificant at worst. 35

#### Mutual containment causes a formal alliance.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, *International Politics*; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 1. The continuation of the Sino-Russian entente It is quite likely that, even seven or 10 years into the future, the forces that currently sustain the Moscow–Beijing axis will remain in place or could even intensify. Russia and China’s rivalry with the USA could grow more acute, while their illiberal autocracies would become even more entrenched. This will result in the continuation of the Sino-Russian entente, with ever tighter political, ideological, military and economic ties between Moscow and Beijing, and could even see the elevation of their ‘strategic partnership’ to the level of a full alliance based on a formal treaty.

#### Concessions would detract from their pursuit.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, *International Politics*; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 2. Russia-US rapprochement Even though Russian-American relations are presently at a very low point and unlikely to substantially recover any time soon, in the long term their normalization is not impossible. In fact, the USA will be under increasing structural pressure to make peace with Russia as China looms as by far the biggest threat to America’s positions in the international system. At some point, Washington might be forced to seek Moscow’s collaboration in managing the massive challenge from Beijing. Although Russia is unlikely to participate in any overt containment of China, it might, at least, agree to become a neutral player. However, Washington will have to make some significant concessions to Moscow, such as recognizing Russia’s special interests in Eastern Europe and lifting sanctions. The hypothetical normalization of US-Russia relations would likely have a dual effect on Russia’s policy toward China. First, Russia would relax its systemic balancing of the USA and thus have much less incentive to strategically collaborate with China, especially in the political-military domain. Second, if Russia feels secure on its western borders, it will have more freedom to play its own game in East Asia, rather than siding with Beijing, which would, to a degree, help balance China’s ambitions.

## Solvency

### 1NC—NATO CAN’T SOLVE

#### NATO efforts fail to solve for the Global South AND their motives are unethical

Burt ’21 (Peter, researcher at Drone Wars UK working on issues relating to artificial intelligence and autonomy and their role in the future development of drones, “NATO’s new AI strategy: lacking in substance and lacking in leadership”, Published 11/8/2021, Accessed 7/17/2022, <https://natowatch.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/briefing_88_nato_ai_strategy.pdf//EA>)

Whilst publication of the AI strategy is a step in the right direction for NATO, although perhaps not a particularly ambitious one, a number of questions about NATO's position on the use of AI remain unanswered. So far NATO has only published a 'summary' of its AI strategy, raising an obvious question: what does the rest of the document say? Does it expand upon resolving ethical and human rights concerns in more detail and include clear monitoring processes to do this, or does it set out a manifesto for tackling the realities of how NATO expects to take forward the use of AI for military purposes? Running through the strategy is the mantra of interoperability – the desire for different systems to be able to work with each other across NATO's different forces and nations without any restrictions. An article in the NATO Review journal by two of the authors of the strategy, Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Edward Hunter Christie, makes it clear that “the aim of NATO’s AI Strategy is to accelerate AI adoption”, and NATO evidently intends AI to be adopted at all levels within the organisation and across all its roles. Despite the good intentions behind the ethical principles, a key thrust of the new strategy is to enable the uptake of AI for military purposes. In the same article Stanley-Lockman and Christie also talk of AI as an enabler to “out-adapt competitors and adversaries”, and the strategy itself states that collaboration and cooperation on AI among NATO allies is necessary “in order to maintain NATO’s technological edge”. NATO clearly sees the adoption of AI in terms of a zerosum arms race against rivals such as China and Russia, which are also investing heavily in AI, and presumably believes it can win the race. This is problematic, as arms races have the potential to escalate, as has been the case with other weapons. Competition has no absolute end goal—merely the relative goal of staying ahead of the other competitors. Should one player cross an ethical line, such as developing and deploying autonomous weapon systems, others may be expected to follow suit with destabilising consequences. NATO's ethical principles for the responsible use of AI, though welcome, raise several issues. Such statements of principle are now commonplace in the corporate sector and are increasingly being adopted by governments on both a unilateral and multilateral basis. NATO's principles are similar to principles adopted by the US Department of Defense for the ethical use of AI: indeed, in some places the wording is the same as that in the Department of Defense principles. As with many such statements of principle, the NATO principles have no coherent means of implementation or enforcement. Their successful adoption will in many ways depend upon leadership and political and military culture, which is different in each of NATO's 30 member states. Will Turkey, for example, which has been a keen proponent of automated warfare and by some accounts has already developed AI-based loitering munitions with an autonomous capability to identify targets, be willing to follow the same rules as the USA? And would the USA under a second Trump administration follow the same rules as a Biden administration? In the absence of any binding enforcement mechanism NATO's principles may provide useful for public relations purposes but are likely to be less useful in preventing harm to humans, particularly those in the Global South who are already in situations of conflict, and historically marginalised groups. Despite the plethora of corporate statements on ethical principles, those working in the tech sector are skeptical about the prospect that ethical AI design will be adopted as a norm over the next decade. A non-random poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in early 2021 found that 68% of experts in the field thought that ethical principles focused primarily on the public good will not be employed in most AI systems by 2030. Their concerns recognised that the main developers and deployers of AI are focused on profit-seeking and social control, and that global competition will matter more to the development of AI than any ethical issues. This latter factor will very much influence NATO's future adoption of AI. Although NATO's ethical AI principles are stated to have been developed on the basis of “Allied approaches and relevant work in applicable international fora”, it is not clear whether they draw on views from the wide range of professional disciplines necessary to develop a representative and rounded view of the ethical pitfalls and risks associated for AI, or from a diversity of perspectives. There has certainly been no open consultation on their formulation, and it is possible that the principles may only represent the perceptions of a relatively narrow range of predominantly white male technocrats and military planners drawn from within NATO, member governments (notably the USA), and the arms industry. Ordinary people, particularly marginalised groups and those in the Global South, will ultimately face the consequences and impacts of NATO's decisions on AI systems, yet the public have certainly not been involved in making decisions on this strategy, which will set the framework for NATO's future AI choices. NATO's AI strategy does not discuss the development of AI-driven autonomous weapon systems – a significant omission, given the ethical issues that this application of AI would raise and the challenges to human rights that such weapons would pose. As a bare minimum, the strategy could—and should—have endorsed the 'Guiding Principles' on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons which have recently been adopted by consensus by High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Despite increasing pressure for a ban on the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons, key NATO states including the USA and UK have been lukewarm about the need for a ban, arguing that current laws of war are adequate to regulate any such weapons. This seems optimistic, given the rapid development of AI technology and the push by some states over recent years to redefine the rules that govern use of armed force to suit their own purposes. To date no NATO member states have supported the call for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. If NATO members were serious about ensuring that the military use of AI adheres to international humanitarian law and human rights law, they would call for and engage in negotiations on a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems at the CCW; which is expected to take a historic decision on this issue at its Review Conference in December 2021. Investment and innovation in artificial intelligence is being led by the private sector, and not by the world’s militaries. Recognising this, NATO's AI strategy places a premium on engaging with “start-ups, innovative small and medium enterprises, and academic researchers that either have not considered working on defence and security solutions, or simply find the adoption pathways too slow or restrictive for their business models”. NATO wants to “make defence and security a more attractive sector for civilian innovators to partner with”. Aiming to capture the civilian tech sector in this way risks increasing the influence of the military-industrialpolitical complex to an even greater extent than is already the case. Will this really help advance NATO's liberal and democratic values? Conclusion Although NATO's AI strategy contains a few worthwhile nuggets, on balance it is tame and unambitious. It is depressingly clear that NATO sees AI as basically another way of using technology to wage war more effectively, and is not willing to show any real leadership to mitigate the risks that AI poses to human rights and dignity. War is, after all, the highest area of risk when it comes to the potential for human rights abuses, yet NATO's strategy says nothing about measures to effectively govern military AI and autonomous weapon systems. AI has the potential to help humanity tackle intractable 'wicked problems' such as climate change and unsustainable development, and tackle the course of dangerous behaviour which is threatening the survival of our species. But this will only happen if it is employed under wise and decisive human leadership, otherwise it may dramatically compound the problems we face, threatening international security and human rights even more. NATO, unfortunately, seems unwilling to provide that leadership.

### 1NC—NO NATO CONSENSUS

#### NATO will not agree on universal regulations

Heikkila 21(Melissa, Journalist for Politico newspaper, “NATO wants to set AI standards.  If only its members agreed on the basics.”, Politico.eu, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/)

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have [expressed serious concerns](https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/action-and-achievements/) about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 [called](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-11-05/remarks-web-summit) for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led [AI Partnership for Defense](https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/09/france-israel-s-korea-japan-others-join-pentagons-ai-partnership/168533/), which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the [Stop Killer Robots](https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/) campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

### 1NC—SQUO SOLVES COOP

#### Squo CBMs over AI solve coop

Horowitz and Scharre**,** 2021 **-** Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

One confidence-building measure is already underway: Track II dialogues between academic experts from different countries with expertise surrounding military uses of AI.54 Because these dialogues occur among experts who are not government officials, they are **low risk** because they **do not commit countries** to actually doing anything. This also places a cap on their potential benefits. Track II dialogues can nevertheless be useful building blocks for more substantive cooperation among countries and an avenue to explore various potential modes of cooperation without fear of commitment by states. Track II dialogues can help **facilitate mutual understanding** among expert communities in different states and **build shared trust** between experts.55 Additionally, if some of those experts transition into government positions in the future, the lessons from these dialogues can **improve the prospects for cooperation** in more formal venues. While there are risks to misleading statements in the context of formal government dialogues, as discussed below, the consequences of such activities in a Track II context are minimal. The nature of the dialogue is that participants are not government officials and it is to be expected that some of their statements may not be entirely in line with their government’s policies. Thus, Track II dialogues can build trust and be an end in themselves, even as they serve as the **means to broader cooperation** and understanding.

### 1NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

#### Squo solves: NATO has invested $1 billion into an AI strategy

Wiggers ’21 (Kyle, writer about artificial intelligence for VentureBeat, “NATO launches AI strategy and $1B fund as defense race heats up”, Published October 21, 2021, Accessed 7/15/2022, https://venturebeat.com/2021/10/21/nato-launches-ai-strategy-and-1b-fund-as-defense-race-heats-up/)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance of 30 countries that border the North Atlantic Ocean, this week announced that it would adopt an 18-point AI strategy and launch a “future-proofing” fund with the goal of investing around $1 billion. Military.com [reports](https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/10/21/nato-plans-ai-strategy-1b-investment-fund-it-seeks-stay-ahead-tech-realm.html) that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will join other NATO members in Brussels, Belgium, the alliance’s headquarters, to formally approve the plans over two days of talks. Speaking at a news conference, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the effort was in response to “authoritarian regimes racing to develop new technologies.” NATO’s AI strategy will cover areas including data analysis, imagery, cyberdefense, he added. NATO said in a July press release that it was “currently finalizing” its strategy on AI” and that principles of responsible use of AI in defense will be “at the core” of the strategy. Speaking to Politico in March, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges David van Weel [said](https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/) that the strategy would identify ways to operate AI systems ethically, pinpoint military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it’s up to NATO standards.” van Weel said. “Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and bombs, but also with bytes and big data,” Stoltenberg said. “We must keep our technological edge.”

### 2NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

#### EU regulations means our allies don’t need US assistance

Kop ’21 (Mauritz, Stanford Law School TTLF Fellow at Stanford University and is Managing Partner at AIRecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, “EU Artificial Intelligence Act: The European Approach to AI, Accessed 7/9/2022, <https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021-10/Kop_EU%20Artificial%20Intelligence%20Act%20-%20The%20European%20Approach%20to%20AI_21092021_0.pdf>)

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission presented the Artificial Intelligence Act. As a Fellow at Stanford University’s Transatlantic Technology Law Forum and a Member of the European AI Alliance, I made independent strategic recommendations to the European Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen's team adopted some of the suggestions that I offered them, or has itself arrived to the same conclusions. That is encouraging. This contribution will list the main points of this novel regulatory framework for AI. 1 Mauritz Kop is Stanford Law School TTLF Fellow at Stanford University and is Managing Partner at AIRecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 2 Core horizontal rules for AI The EU AI Act sets out horizontal rules for the development, commodification and use of AI-driven products, services and systems within the territory of the EU. The draft regulation provides core artificial intelligence rules that apply to all industries. The EU AI Act introduces a sophisticated ‘product safety framework’ constructed around a set of 4 risk categories. It imposes requirements for market entrance and certification of High-Risk AI Systems through a mandatory CE-marking procedure. To ensure equitable outcomes, this pre-market conformity regime also applies to machine learning training, testing and validation datasets. The Act seeks to codify the high standards of the EU trustworthy AI paradigm, which requires AI to be legally, ethically and technically robust, while respecting democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. Objectives of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act The proposed regulatory framework on Artificial Intelligence has the following objectives: 1. ensure that AI systems placed on the Union market and used are safe and respect existing law on fundamental rights and Union values; 2. ensure legal certainty to facilitate investment and innovation in AI; 3. enhance governance and effective enforcement of existing law on fundamental rights and safety requirements applicable to AI systems; 4. facilitate the development of a single market for lawful, safe and trustworthy AI applications and prevent market fragmentation. Subject Matter of the EU AI Act The scope of the AI Act is largely determined by the subject matter to which the rules apply. In that regard, Article 1 states that: Article 1 Subject matter This Regulation lays down: (a) harmonised rules for the placing on the market, the putting into service and the use of artificial intelligence systems (‘AI systems’) in the Union; (a) prohibitions of certain artificial intelligence practices; (b) specific requirements for high-risk AI systems and obligations for operators of such systems; (c) harmonised transparency rules for AI systems intended to interact with natural persons, emotion recognition systems and biometric categorisation systems, and AI systems used to generate or manipulate image, audio or video content; (d) rules on market monitoring and surveillance.

#### Squo solves: EU already has GDPR that enforces AI clarity.

**Thelisson et al. 17** - (Eva, Co-founder and CEO of the AI Transparency Institute with a PhD in Law at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland on the General Data Protection Regulation. ANd invited expert at the EU Commission, at the Swiss Government and at international conferences; Kirtan Padh, current PhD Candidate at Helmholtz AI and former graduate from EPFL with a specialization in data analytics and research; Elisa Celis, Assistant Professor of Statistics & Data Science at Yale University)

Despite the incredible boon that computational techniques have been to society, certain red flags have recently appeared which demonstrate that algorithms, in particular AI/ML techniques that rely on data, can be biased. A growing number of global leaders and experts including Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Georges Church and Stephen Hawking have publicly voiced their concern regarding the speed and pervasiveness of the developments of AI/ML. In the US, President Obama’s administration produced a report which states that “big data technologies can cause societal harms beyond damages to privacy” [Executive office of the President et al., 2014]. In particular, it expressed concerns about the possibility that decisions informed by big data could have discriminatory effects, even in the absence of discriminatory intent. The 2017 edition of the World Economics Forum Global Risks Report, which surveyed 745 leaders in business, government, academia and members of the Institute of Risk Management, listed AI as “the emerging technology with the greatest potential for negative consequences over the coming decade”. Many negative instances have now been demonstrated [O’Neil, 2016; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Barocas and Selbst, 2015]. For instance, Google’s online advertising system displayed ads for high-income jobs to men much more often than it did to women [Datta et al., 2015], and ads for arrest records were significantly more likely to show up on searches for distinctively black names or a historically black fraternity [Sweeney, 2013]. Recent events have shown that such algorithmic bias is affecting society in a multitude of ways, e.g., exacerbating systemic bias in the racial composition of the American prison population [Angwin et al., 2016], inadvertently promoting extremist ideology [Costello et al., 2016] and affecting the results of elections [Baer, 2016; Bakshy et al., 2015]. Despite these serious concerns, algorithms, at a fundamental level, pervade everything we do. Simply eliminating them is not an option. Hence it is essential to design algorithmic tools and regulatory mechanisms to empower society at large to mitigate any resulting discrimination, inequality and bias. For AI/ML to remain beneficial, we must build trust in the systems that are transforming our social, political and business environments and are making decisions on our behalf. We consider at the technical aspect of how bias and discrimination can creep into decisions made by AI, often despite the best intentions of the developers of the algorithm, and how can we prevent such negative outcomes. We then outline the necessary regulatory mechanisms and techniques that must be developed in order to prevent such biases in the future.

2 Algorithmic Bias

One must first understand how such biases occur. Indeed, computers are inherently impartial, and computer scientists and programmers are not malicious. The problem lies at all points in the cycle of collecting, encoding, modeling and optimizing the data.

2.1 Sources of Algorithmic Biases

Input Data The problem begins with the data that the algorithms build upon, or even the realities of the world itself. Unconscious and systemic biases, rather than intentional choices, account for a large part of the disparate treatment observed in employment, housing, credit, and consumer markets [Pager and Shepherd, 2008]. Such biases can lead to misrepresentation of particular groups in the training data. If the set of examples in the training data do not fairly represent the data on which the algorithm is supposed to run then misrepresented groups could be disadvantaged [Barocas and Selbst, 2014].

Data Vectorization and Cleaning

The raw data must be converted into a digital form (i.e., represented by some kind of vector) that an algorithm can use. This process can also introduce biases. This effect is most striking when the training data is labeled manually; the inherent subjectivity in labeling the data can naturally lead to a bias in the dataset. Consider the real life example of St. Georges Hospital in the United Kingdom in where an algorithm for admission decision was developed based on the previous decisions by the admissions committee [Lowry and Macpherson, 1988]. This algorithm simply learned existing biases in the admissions process and resulted in being systematically unfavorable towards minorities.

Model Building

AI/ML algorithms then take as input a subset of vectorized and/or labeled data, and output a model that can take decisions or make predictions. In making these predictions, algorithms can not only propagate biases as discussed above, but in fact amplify them. One potential solution would be to strip away any identifying information that could lead to discrimination, intended or otherwise. However, this could unnecessarily (or undesirably) hamstring the algorithm itself, rendering it useless.

Behavioral Impact

This in turn affects users’ actions, feeding back into the real world. For example, it has been hypothesized that increasingly polarized content in search results and online feeds such as Facebook and Twitter can lead to increasingly polarized opinions and behavior [Epstein and Robertson, 2015]. Hence, the steps in the AI/ML life cycle become a destructive feedback loop that can not only propagate, but also exacerbate, societal biases. Thus, if approached without care, algorithms can end up duplicating or even aggravate existing patterns of discrimination that persist in society.

2.2 A Rising Level of Awareness in the EU

On 25 May 2018, **the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will be directly applicable in all Member States of the European Union**. It brings some **substantial changes on data protection and decision making based on algorithms.** The GDPR aims at creating a free data flow market in the EU, while making the rules on data protection in the EU consistent, reinforcing data subject’s fundamental rights and increasing the liability of companies that control and process such data. Its scope is global (Art. 3, §1). In particular**, it reaffirms the data subject’s right to explanation and places restrictions on automated decision-making.** The GDPR will be applicable in all EU countries and will introduce EU-wide maximum penalties of e20 million or 4% of Global revenue, whichever is greater (Art. 83, Paragraph 5). Data processors (i.e., entities who process personal data) will now be obliged to comply with data protection requirements which previously only applied to data controllers (i.e., entities who determine why and how personal data are processed). **The GDPR will apply regardless whether the processing takes place in the EU or not,** and applies processing activities that are related to the offering of goods or services and monitoring their behavior**. This regulation gives data subjects the right to access information collected about them, and also requires data processors to ensure data subjects are notified about the data collected (Articles 13 – 15). It further recognizes that transparency is a key principle. Data must be treated in a transparent manner (Art. 5, §1a)), transparency may occur in the treatment itself (Art. 13, §2 and Art. 14, §2), and the information communicated by the data controller to the data subject must be transparent (Art. 12, §1).** The codes of conduct and certification mechanisms must also respect this transparency principle (Art. 40, §2a) and (Art. 42, §3), and transparency also applies to decisionmaking (Art. 22). Furthermore, this article gives individuals the right to object to decisions made about them purely on the basis of automated processing when those decisions have significant/legal effects. **Other provisions in the Regulation gives data subjects the right to obtain information about the existence of an automated decision making system, the logic involved and its significance and envisaged consequences.** In addition, the article 22 of the regulation provides the obligation for the data processor to add additional “safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject”, when profiling takes place. Although the article does not elaborate what these safeguards are beyond “the right to obtain human intervention”, Articles 13 and 14 state that, when profiling takes place, a data subject has the right to “meaningful information about the logic involved”. Towards satisfying various points of this regulation, and more generally ensuring that the worst fears about AI and ML do not come into effect, we propose various types of solutions which must be developed in collaboration between lawyers, policy makers, and computer scientists in order to ensure a fair and balanced society in the presence of algorithms.

3 Proposed Solutions

To begin, we draw a comparison between the regulation of algorithms and regulations ensuring food safety. **Consumers must trust the food that producers and distributors provide on the market**. The EU General Food Law Regulation establishes basic criteria for whether a food item is safe. **If we instead think of data and algorithms instead of food, one could similarly build a system that is meant to guarantee safety to the functioning of algorithms, following the same reasoning as the EU General Food Law Regulation.** Figure 1 draws this parallel between the food law regulation and our proposed regulation of algorithms. Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 lays down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety. On a similar basis, we propose that an EU Regulation dedicated to algorithms, accompanied with European Algorithms Safety Authority laying down procedures in matters of algorithms. This could involve establishing codes of conduct (such as the Food Law Practice guidance), developing third party quality control labels (such as organic certification) and establishing transparency by careful regulation and monitoring of data use as it propagates through various algorithms and tools (as is done when tracing food through the food chain). Lastly, we call on algorithm designers to further push towards developing the technical tools required to detect, prevent, and correct algorithmic and data biases.

3.1 Codes of Conduct

On 27 June 2017, the European Commission fined Google a record-breaking e2.42 billion for antitrust violations pertaining to its shopping search comparison service. It ordered Google to comply with the simple principle of giving equal treatment to rival comparison shopping services and its own service. Competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager said that “Google has given its own comparison shopping service an illegal advantage by abusing its dominance in general internet search. It has promoted its own service, and demoted rival services. It has harmed competition and consumers. That’s illegal under EU antitrust rules.” In effect, Google systematically gave disproportionately prominent placement to its own shopping service in its search results. As a result, Google’s comparison shopping service is much more visible to consumers in Google’s search results, whilst rival comparison shopping services are much less visible. This appeared to be the result of an explicit code in Google’s algorithm whose intent was to discriminate against other services. Burrell identifies between three barriers to transparency [Burrell, 2016]: 1) intentional concealment on the part of corporations or other institutions, 2) gaps in technical literacy which, for most people, mean that having access to underlying code is insufficient, and 3) a lack of interpretability of the decisions made by the algorithm even to experts. For barrier 1, clear codes of conduct that are enforceable, as demonstrated in the example with Google above, is a crucial first step.

3.2 Quality Labels and Audits

**To increase transparency, one possibility could be to open the code to public scrutiny.** The main drawback to this approach would be the harm it could cause to the valuable intellectual property exposed, and barriers 2 and 3, which state that, even if made public, the results would not be interpretable. As [Lisboa, 2013] notes, “machine learning approaches are alone in the spectrum in their lack of interpretability”. Hence, **we instead propose that quality labels – similar, e.g., to organic certification, Minergie label, quality management systems and insurance certification (9001 ISO norms), IT security certification (ISO 27 001 norms or Information Technology Infrastructure Library) be made available on a voluntary basis.** The GDPR allows the data controller or processor to draft approved codes of conduct or get a certification on data protection to demonstrate the fulfillment of its duties. The codes of conduct will be approved by the competent authority. The monitoring of compliance with a code of conduct pursuant to Article 40 of GDPR may be carried out by a body which has an appropriate level of expertise in relation to the subjectmatter of the code, and is accredited for that purpose by the competent supervisory authority. The certification can be done by a limited number of certification bodies (Art. 43 GDPR) or by the competent supervisory authority, on the basis of criteria approved by that competent supervisory authority pursuant to Art. 58, §3 GDPR or by the Board (Art. 63 GDPR). Where the criteria are approved by the Board, this may result in a common certification - the European Data Protection Seal. Certification may be issued for a maximal period of three years (renewable). The Board shall collate all certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks in a register and shall make them publicly available by any appropriate means (Art. 42 GDPR). The GDPR empowers the regulator to conduct audits and inspections of companies on demand. Strict new compliance requirements are imposed. For example, entities have to perform “Privacy Impact Assessments” and privacy audits as a matter of course. They have to implement “Privacy by Design” methodologies into their business, so that compliance is baked-in to everything they do. They also have to deliver on a new “Accountability” obligation, which means creating written compliance plans, which they will have to deliver to regulators on demand.

3.3 Transparency in the Data Chain

Algorithms must be designed so that a human can interpret the outcome [Goodman and Flaxman, 2016]. However, there is a trade-off between the representation and interpretation of algorithms. Simpler models are easier to explain, but also fail to capture complex interactions among many variables. This also happens to be one of the biggest issues with neural networks, because while they give excellent results in practice, we have very sparse theoretical understanding for them and therefore they are almost completely uninterpretable. Making reference to the GDPR, [Goodman and Flaxman, 2016] highlighted that “while this law will pose large challenges for industry, it highlights opportunities for computer scientists to take the lead in designing algorithms and evaluation frameworks which avoid discrimination and enable explanation”. The notion of a “right to explanation” [Goodman and Flaxman, 2016] for an automated decision is correlated to the right to obtain an “explanation of system’s functionality”. Meaningful information must be provided about the logic involved as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such a processing to the data subject (under Articles 15.1.h and 14.2.g). **Appropriate safeguards should include the ability of data subjects “to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment” (recital 71). Data controllers will have to provide satisfactory explanations for specific automated decisions, i.e., they will have to give the reason why the AI/ML model gives the outputs it does.** This will be especially difficult for AI/ML systems, whose outcome may vary from one test to another even if the attributes remain the same. Providing transparency to machine learning systems and black boxes will be a significant technical challenge. Transparency about the personal attributes used by the organizations may allow the data subject to use the decision tree [Rivest, 1987] to follow its logic and gain meaningful information about its significance and the envisaged consequences of such a processing [Wachter et al., 2017]. The data subject could work out what decisions the model would recommend based on a variety of different values for the attributes it considers. Transparency about the logic and likely effects of the automated decision-making system given the person’s personal circumstances, transparency about the values used by the algorithm and how it was trained should be guaranteed. Log files may help bringing those guarantees. We propose to create a data chain traceability, based on the same pattern as the food chain cycle (see Figure 1). Farm Processing Center Logistic Warehouse Food Chain Cycle Transparent Algorithm Development Training Data Collection Algorithm Design Transparent Model Training Deployment Figure 1: This figure illustrates the symmetries between the food chain cycle and the transparent algorithm development. Different regulations and codes of conducts can be devised for each of the steps in algorithm development to ensure overall transparency.

3.4 De-biasing Datasets and Algorithms

According to [Zliobait ˇ e, 2017 ˙ ], “Discrimination-aware data mining studies how to make predictive models free from discrimination, when historical data, on which they are built, may be biased, incomplete, or even contain past discriminatory decisions”. There are two main parts to discriminationaware machine learning, namely discrimination detection and discrimination prevention. Discrimination detection involves finding discriminatory patterns in the training data. Discrimination prevention, on the other hand, entails the development of algorithms which are free from discrimination even on datasets on which standard AI models may discriminate. The traditional approach to discrimination detection is to fit a regression model to the training data and look at the regression coefficients of the potentially discriminating features such as race, gender etc. The magnitude and the statistical significance of these coefficients can tell us about the possibility of discrimination in the dataset. Discrimination prevention on the other hand can be applied in one of the following three stages of the data processing pipeline according to [Zliobait ˇ e, 2017 ˙ ]: a) data preprocessing, b) model postprocessing, and c) model regularization. Data preprocessing is when the training data is preprocessed to remove the discrimination from it and then standard AI models are used for prediction on the cleaned data. Model post-processing starts with standard model and modifies it to incorporate the nondiscrimination condition in it. And model regularization adds some constraints to the optimization problem to ensure nondiscrimination. Discrimination-aware machine learning is still in its nascent stage of research and much more needs to be done before it can be incorporated as part of the law.

4 Conclusion

As the new economic business models worldwide are based on data mining and algorithms, **a balance has to be found between encouraging innovation with a flexible regulation while protecting the fundamental rights and freedom of people.** In the EU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding on the European Union in December of 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Charter contains rights and freedoms under six titles: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, and Justice. Building AI Safeguards in order to ensure the respect of those fundamental rights as well as a proper, safe, and reliable functioning of algorithms must be a priority. These safeguards should consider designing accountable algorithms in a way that ensures that ethical principles are encoded in the algorithms. **Transparency and trust of algorithms is of key importance to ensure the equal treatment among people and the adequate functioning of a true democratic system**. In this paper we surveyed recent formal advances, and consider what other mechanisms should be put in place. We consider this to be an important first step – enacting this vision will require a concerted effort by policy makers, lawyers and computer scientist alike.

### 1NC—CANT SOLVE CHINESE AI

#### CCP State Control guarantees that Chinese AI continues to be unregulated

Zeng ’20(Jinghan, professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University, “Artificial intelligence and China’s authoritarian governance”, Published October 13th, 2020, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/96/6/1441/5922010?login=true, Accessed 7/9/2022)

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform our governments and societies. An AI revolution may make future governments more digital, efficient and economic than ever before. Yet despite all the benefits that AI offers when applied in governance, western democratic societies have considerable concerns regarding civil rights. The authoritarian regime in China, on the other hand, has chosen to fully embrace the age of AI. Nowadays, AI has become a buzzword not only in the capital market but also in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To develop AI is now considered China's national strategy, with a clear goal of making the country a leading AI power.1 China's open ambition in this field has alarmed many of its competitors, especially in the United States and Europe, where many view it as an open challenge to American AI supremacy.2 In the context of global power transition, the so-called ‘AI race’ between China and the United States has opened up a new front in their already intense geopolitical competition. The US–China AI race is not only a technological competition but also an ideological one. China's bold practices of applying AI technologies in state governance have further contested the superiority of western liberal democracy.3 This article examines the Chinese governance approach towards AI. It shows that China's bold use of AI practices in governance represents an attempt not only to build a more efficient and capable government to deliver better public services, but also to strengthen state control to ensure the continuation of the authoritarian order. The article argues that the application of AI in China's governance should be understood in the wider context of the CCP's broad and incoherent strategy of adaptation to governance by digital means. The CCP's successful employment of digital technologies to strengthen its governance is made possible by China's unique socio-political environment. China's huge internet market has provided, in effect, unlimited data with which to train and advance AI programs. As the world shifts from ‘the age of expertise to the age of data’,4 data are a strategic resource that lays the foundation for digital technologies such as AI. As Kaifu Lee, one of the most prominent figures in the Chinese internet sector, points out, data—rather than computing power and AI talents—constitute the most important factor to ensure successful AI algorithms, as ‘once computing power and engineering talent reach a certain threshold, the quantity of data becomes decisive in determining the overall power and accuracy of an algorithm’.5 In 2019, China had over 854 million internet users—and, with this representing only 61.2 per cent of its 1.3 billion population, long-term growth potential;6 by comparison, the United States had only 312 million users with less than 10 per cent offline population in which to expand.7 In this respect, as the ‘Saudi Arabia of data’, China has considerable comparative advantage in developing its AI industry.8 Moreover, weak civil awareness within Chinese society, combined with the CCP's strong state power, including a well-resourced domestic security sector, has put the regime in a favourable position not only to exploit its data advantage but also to enhance state control via digital means. For example, China is now leading AI technology in areas such as facial recognition that Europe and the United States have put on hold—or even banned—owing to privacy concerns. In contrast to western democratic societies, for China the key barrier to AI advancement lies in technological rather than legal constraints. More importantly, AI is not just another powerful tech tool to boost China's digital surveillance; AI's automation of decision-making capability without human intervention is unleashing the potential of China's sophisticated digital surveillance network in ways that this article will explore. In this respect, the Chinese approach towards digital technology has to date been successful in furthering state power and capacity.

### 2NC—NO SOLVENCY

#### Cyber deterrence fails

Whyte 20 Christopher Whyte, 11/25/2020, assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University;  Strategic Studies Quarterly, "Poison, Persistence, and Cascade Effect," https://www.jstor.org/stable/26956151 //EZJ

In terms of the strategic logic of engagement in the domain, the PE strategy largely emerges from the work of Richard Harknett and Michael Fischerkeller during their time as scholars attached to Cyber Command. The authors argue that the unique character of cyberspace means that traditional deterrent approaches are **doomed to failure.**36 Given that deterrence involves strong demonstrations of defense or meaningful statements of punishment, they contend, prospects for developing a sustainable deterrent posture online are limited (or so the architects of the new approach hold).37 It **is extremely difficult** to demonstrate defensive capabilities at the scale demanded by a national cyber deterrent strategy, and **punishment rarely works** in the way it is intended. Communicating specific meaning in retaliation is difficult, particularly where the diversity of activities that constitute cyber conflict is immensely high. Moreover, response options are often not ready to execute in the time frame required by policy makers that seek to deter. And conceptual agreement on the significance or role of certain elements of the domain is not easy to come by, with poor understanding of what might be meant—if anything—by sovereignty online being a hallmark of the digital world.

### 1NC—PLAN FAILS

#### Military adoption of AI fails- insert warrants

Horowitz and Scharre**,** 2021 **-** Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” [https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22](https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures%20Acc%206/6/22) EZG]

A challenge for military adoption of AI is that two key risks associated with new technology adoption are in tension. First, militaries could fail to adopt—or adopt quickly enough or employ in the right manner—a new technology that yields significant battlefield advantage. As a recent example, despite the overall growth in the military uninhabited, or unmanned, aircraft market, the adoption of uninhabited vehicles has, at times, been a source of contention within the U.S. defense establishment, principally based on debates over the merits of this new technology relative to existing alternatives.17 Alternatively, militaries could adopt an immature technology too quickly, betting heavily and incorrectly on new and untested propositions about how a technology may change warfare. Given the natural incentive militaries have in ensuring their capabilities work on the battlefield, it may be reasonable to assume that militaries would manage these risks reasonably well, although not without some mishaps. But when balancing the risk of accidents versus falling behind adversaries in technological innovation, militaries arguably place safety as a secondary consideration.18 Militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents in the pursuit of technological advantage, since accidents are a routine element of military operations, even in training.19 Nevertheless, there are strong bureaucratic interests in ultimately ensuring that fielded capabilities are robust and secure, and existing institutional processes may be able to manage AI safety and security risks with some adaptation. For militaries, balancing between the risks of going too slow versus going too fast with AI adoption is complicated by the fact that AI, and deep learning in particular, is a relatively **immature technology** with **significant vulnerabilities and reliability concerns**.20 These concerns are heightened in situations where there may not be ample data on which to train machine learning systems. Machine learning systems generally rely on very large data sets, which may not exist in some military settings, particularly when it comes to early warning of rare events (such as a nuclear attack) or tracking adversary behavior in a multidimensional battlefield. When trained with inadequate data sets or employed outside the narrow context of their design, **AI systems are often unreliable and brittle.** AI systems can often seem deceptively capable, performing well (sometimes better than humans) in some laboratory settings, then **failing dramatically** under changing environmental conditions **in the real world**. Self-driving cars, for example, may be safer than human drivers in some settings, then inexplicably turn deadly in situations where a human operator would not have trouble. Additionally, deep learning methods may, at present, be insufficiently reliable for safety-critical applications even when operating within the bounds of their design specifications.21 For example, concerns about limits to the reliability of algorithms across demographic groups have hindered the deployment of facial recognition technology in the United States, particularly in high-consequence applications such as law enforcement. Militaries, too, should be **concerned about technical limitations and vulnerabilities** in their AI systems. Militaries want technologies that work, especially on the battlefield. Accordingly, the AI strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) calls for AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”22 This is undoubtedly the correct approach but a challenge, at least in the near term, given the reliability issues facing many uses of algorithms today and the **highly dynamic conditions of battlefield use**. An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. **Competitive pressures** could **lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation** (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots.23 Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, **feel pressure to hasten deployment** if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I.24 Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war.25 This **dynamic risk** might **spark a self-fulfilling prophecy** in which **countries accelerate deployment** of **insufficiently tested AI systems** out of the fear that others will deploy first.26 The net effect is not an arms race but a “**race to the bottom” on safety**, leading to the **deployment of unsafe AI systems** and **heightening the risk of accidents and instability.**

## UN CP

### 1NC

**The UN should create a subcommittee that [plan]**

#### A subcommittee encourages multilateralism and facilitates effective AI governance.

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What role for the United Nations? In his address to the General Assembly in September 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that ‘multilateralism is under fire precisely when we need it most’. But among the many pressing problems that call for a multilateral approach to be properly addressed, he highlighted two ‘epochal challenges’ in particular: climate change, which is of course of great concern but not covered in this article, and risks associated with advances in technology. Indeed, ‘rapidly developing fields such as artificial intelligence, blockchain and biotechnology have the potential to turbocharge progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals’, Guterres said. On the other hand, new technologies also present serious perils along the way, from mass economic unemployment to cybercrime and malicious use of digital tools.35 Guterres cautioned against the weaponization of AI and the possibility of a dangerous arms race in this domain, including the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems, going so far as to contend that ‘the prospect of machines with the discretion and power to take human life is morally repugnant’. Less oversight over these weapons could severely compromise efforts to contain threats, prevent escalation, and ensure compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. He urged Member States ‘to use the United Nations as a platform to draw global attention to these crucial matters and to nurture a digital future that is safe and beneficial for all’. To lead by example and engage the UN Secretariat in this enterprise, the SecretaryGeneral launched his own Strategy on New Technologies, with the objective of defining how the UN system will support the use of these technologies to accelerate the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and to facilitate their alignment with the values enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the norms and standards of international law. Among the pledges and commitments to pursue this strategy were deepening the UN’s internal capacities and exposure to emerging technologies; increasing understanding, advocacy, and dialogue; supporting dialogue on normative and cooperation frameworks; and enhancing UN system support to government capacity development. 37 In the same vein, the High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation was established by the Secretary-General in 2017 to promote dialogue and look into proposals to build trust and cooperation between countries and other stakeholders, the private sector, research centers, civil society, and academia. In its report, released in June 2019, the Panel envisaged several potential roles for the UN to add value in the digital transformation: as a convener; providing a space for debating values and norms; generating standard setting; holding multi-stakeholder or bilateral initiatives on specific issues; developing the capacity of Member States; ranking, mapping, and measuring cybersecurity; and making available arbitration and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The report put forward various recommendations, such as adopting by 2020 a ‘Global Commitment for Digital Cooperation’ to consolidate in a single political document shared values, principles, understandings, and objectives regarding the governance of cyberspace. Also, it did not shy away from making principled statements of ethical significance, the stipulation that ‘life and death decisions should not be delegated to machines’ being a case in point.38 Most of the UN initiatives on new technologies are focused upon the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, such as the annual ECOSOC’s Science, Technology, and Innovation Forum, which had its fourth edition in May 2019. On the AI front, the flagship UN platform for global dialogue with the wider public is the AI for Good Global Summit, hosted every year in Geneva by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in partnership with other UN agencies, the XPrize Foundation (organization offering incentivize prize competitions) and the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).39 This interdisciplinary event brings together speakers from governments, industry, academia, media, and the research community to discuss how AI can be utilized to achieve inter alia results in ending poverty, alleviating hunger, promoting health, and identifying development solutions. The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) established in 2017 a Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in The Hague, with the aim of disseminating information, undertaking training activities, and promoting public awareness. The Center has notably been active in cybercrime, law enforcement, criminal justice, counter-terrorism, and malicious use of AI.40 Also important is UNESCO’s humanistic approach on ethics, policy, and capacity building in response to new emerging challenges related to AI technologies, including philosophical reflections on what it means to be human in the face of disruptive technologies from the ethical perspective. 41 The New York-based Centre for Policy Research of the United Nations University (UNU) has been conducting foresight analyses, developing collaborative research projects with external partners, and convening policy seminars and events. In 2018, the Centre launched an on-line platform on AI and Global Governance to foster cross-disciplinary insights and ‘inform existing debates from the lens of multilateralism’, as a tool for Member States, multilateral agencies, funds, programs, and other stakeholders.42 The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has a research project on the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies since 2013, anchored in the idea that mitigating or reducing potential harms caused by AI will be crucial to harness ‘AI for Good’. 43 More broadly, UNIDIR’s objectives in studying the relationship between AI and international security aim at further clarifying functional concerns in the development and future deployment of autonomous weapons systems, including the risk of accidents; manipulation and other vulnerabilities in weaponization; changes in the nature of conflict and their impact upon strategic stability; commercial development of AI-related technologies and its links with the defense industry; access to sensitive technologies and their use to conduct asymmetric warfare; and the structural effects of the AI revolution on geopolitics and power dynamics in the international system.44 In turn, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), both in New York and in Geneva, has been working to implement the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament (Securing Our Common Future), which includes the consideration of possible challenges posed by new weapon technologies. One of the action points of the Agenda seeks to support efforts by Member States ‘to elaborate new measures, including through political or legally binding arrangements, to ensure that humans remain at all times in control over the use of force’.45 Other initiatives include the UN Innovation Network, connecting a collaborative community of innovators within the UN System, as well as a myriad of projects developed by UN agencies to apply AI tools in their daily practice in the field Despite the relative lack of clarity on the way forward, the future role of the UN will be inextricably linked to the global governance of AI. Research and policy proposals on this topic are beginning to shed light upon the likelihood of international cooperation on transformative AI-related issues, incentives needed for the parties to reach meaningful agreements, proper conditions for compliance, and costs of defection or unilateral, non-cooperative measures. 46 Proposals range from informal mechanisms in narrowly-focused domains to much more ambitious, institutionalized forums, such as the establishment of an international regulatory agency, to be named, for example, the ‘International Artificial Intelligence Organization’ (IAIO), aimed at setting standards and benchmarks across numerous areas to be regulated. However, even the proponents of such broad-spectrum organization concede that reaching a workable international consensus on this idea seems rather a remote possibility in the short term. 47 Another proposition to consider is creating a new body modeled on the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide policymakers with technical, neutral assessments, subject to review by states, underlining the opportunities, implications, and potential risks of AI, always through evidence-based research by the tech and scientific communities.48 A case can be made for an ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Artificial Intelligence’ (IPAI), as Miailhe did, to gather a large interdisciplinary group of experts with a mandate to collect, organize, and analyze credible and up-to-date information on AI challenges. 49 As technologies become more and more sophisticated and indecipherable to the layman, sound technical advice will be in high demand if intergovernmental negotiations are to be launched to tackle these thorny issues, separating myth, hype, and misinformation from what is in tune with the body of evidence and human knowledge available so far. Politicians obviously have no need to know technicalities about reinforcement learning, multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural networks, or Boltzmann machines. But as AI puzzles and their impact upon society become increasingly relevant in the real world, AI researchers cannot deny that suitable communication with the political leadership will be of paramount importance to guide decisionmaking in the right direction. One key challenge is to keep the major players engaged, so that AI governance can be instrumental in providing stability to safeguard the system in everyone’s interest. Even though some proposals may require more time for maturation, others could be implemented in a more straightforward manner, without the need for a fully-fledged, previous commitment from governments on the parameters and preconditions deemed appropriate for establishing new criteria at the international level. Advisory and non-binding settings involving states, the private sector, and civil society could be a first step if focused upon information gathering, independent analyses, and recommendations geared at prevention rather than regulation per se. Traditional, institutionally-based intergovernmental diplomacy seems too slow if compared with the staggering pace of technological innovation. Informal, ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives spurred by some like-minded countries (‘coalitions of the willing’) may at times promote added value in governance, but they usually lack universal appeal and raise suspicious of their agendas in the eyes of states left outside these groups. A better solution to escape shortterm paralysis [immobilization] is for the UN, with the authority and legitimacy conferred to it by Member States, to take the lead and offer a collective space, open to all, strictly voluntary, to encourage cooperation and work on prevention, capacity-building, and normative recommendations. A good example along these lines would be the creation of a ‘Global Foresight Observatory’ on the convergence of AI with other emerging technologies, under the auspices of the UN, as envisaged in the report of UNU’s Centre for Policy Research, i.e. a multi-stakeholder, inclusive platform to foster cooperation in technological and political preparedness for responsive innovation.50 This sort of initiative fits well with what the UN can do even in hardknock situations. Trying to be too ambitious from the very beginning may backlash and lead nowhere. It is essential not to allow resistance from becoming lethargic and continue exploring alternatives to take concrete steps in AI governance in a robust and comprehensive manner.

### 2NC

#### Debates about AI tend to leave the global South behind—the growing, militarized issue should involve their input.

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Artificial intelligence (AI) will have a profound impact upon world politics across the board, as much as upon society generally. Converging technologies that often overlap and affect each other have become drivers of innovation, as in the case of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science (NBIC). Usage of AI in business, government, and everyday life has been developing at breakneck pace, fueled by powerful hardware capacity, abundant data, and online training of self-learning algorithms. As the discipline of International Relations (IR) takes on this expanding research field and its systemic implications, a coming AI race has frequently been portrayed as a perilous trend capable of reshaping the character of international security. 1 An overview of state initiatives, strategies, and related governmental investments in AI reported that at the time of writing less than 20 countries had active AI national plans and, not surprisingly, almost all of them were developed countries.2 Indeed, there is no shortage of analyses focusing upon great-power competition and an epic struggle for AI global supremacy, picturing prominently the United States and China, followed closely by military powers and wealthy nations (Russia, G7 countries, Israel, and others), and a few second-tier, aspiring tech players, which may occupy someday a special place in the AI landscape.3 The Global South, however, is clearly underrepresented in this debate, with many areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean completely absent in terms of scholars, politicians, and policymakers engaged in this vital conversation. And yet, when it comes to assess global risks in peace and security and identify where new AI weapons are likely to be deployed in the first place, both researchers and practitioners in the developing world have reasons to be concerned. It is no wonder that proponents of a Global IR have been urging for greater participation from actors of the non-Western world as a means to ‘bring the Rest in’. 4 This article will take as a starting point the fact that the militarization of AI has already begun and will pose many challenges beyond the realm of security itself. I argue that AI governance is also bound to gain traction and the United Nations will eventually get further involved in providing space for international cooperation and facilitating negotiations on how to deal with controversies surrounding AI policymaking. In this context, diplomatic deliberations in Geneva on lethal autonomous weapons systems are a revealing case-study of opportunities and predicaments encountered along the way, insofar as they highlight inter alia how critical it is for the Global South to be abreast of developments in this area, prepare in advance, and act accordingly on distinct fronts.

#### The UN works within international frameworks, more so than NATO

Fournier-Tombs ’21 (Eleonore, data scientist, researcher and author at United Nations University Institute Macau, “Towards a United Nations Internal Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, Published August 30, 2021, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI) (European Commission, 2021), the first of its kind to attempt to integrate the multi-tentacled beast that is AI. The document enters into detail in terms of definitions and uses of the technologies, as well as very important sections on the forbidden uses of AI and high-risk activities, proposing that the latter go through an authorisation process much like a drug or a car would before being made available to the public. However, as set out in Article 2, the regulation does not apply to international organisations, regardless of whether they are operating in European Union (EU) territory. Naturally, the EU does not have jurisdiction over international organisations such as the United Nations, which is governed by international law (United Nations, 2021). The exclusion therefore does not come as a surprise but does point to a gap in the AI regulation, especially since technologies that are classified as forbidden or high risk for European citizens would presumably be also very risky for all other citizens, regardless of nationality. Furthermore, as explained by Bradford (2020) in *The Brussels Effect,* the EU is known to set regulatory precedents globally. It is therefore likely that the new regulation will have a ripple effect, which would reach many other countries. In that context, regulating at the United Nations itself would be an important way for the organisation to demonstrate its leadership on this important societal issue. The activities of the United Nations are regulated in a series of legal instruments in international law that have been developed since the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945). The UN Charter sets out the role of the Secretary General, the General Assembly, and the Security Council, as well as the activities of UN Peacekeepers. Since 1945, there have been a few amendments to the Charter, as well as Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on issues that were not considered at the onset of the organisation. The United Nations itself is very likely to develop a convention on AI, which member countries would likely sign and possibly ratify (Garcia, 2020; [Latonero, 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)). However, such a document, like other United Nations conventions, would consist of a commitment by its member states to more ethical AI practices, rather than a regulation for the organisation itself to follow. This article therefore sets out the rationale for a United Nations Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, which is needed to set out the modes of engagement of the organisation when using AI technologies in the attainment of its mission. It argues that given the increasing use of AI by the United Nations, including in some activities considered high risk by the European Commission, a regulation is urgent. It also contends that rules of engagement for AI at the United Nations would support the development of ‘good artificial intelligence’1, by giving developers clear pathways for authorisation that would build trust in these technologies. Finally, it argues that an internal regulation would build upon the work in AI ethics and best practices already initiated in the organisation that could, like the Brussels Effect, set an important precedent for regulations in other countries. The United Nations’ artificial intelligence ecosystem AI technologies have, over the past decade, been increasingly used by United Nations agencies, funds and programs. Several research and development labs, including the United Nations Secretariat’s Global Pulse Lab (2021), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR's) Jetson initiative (UNHCR, 2021), Innovation Labs (UNICEF, 2021) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Centre for Humanitarian Data (OCHA, 2021a) have focused their work on developing AI solutions that would support the UN's mission, notably in terms of anticipating and responding to humanitarian crises. These research labs are largely composed of United Nations staff members and consultants trained in data science technologies. Many of the research labs have developed proofs of concept, which are yet to be integrated into the United Nations’ activities.2 They aim, for example, to explore the use of AI modelling in anticipating refugee arrivals (Jetson), predict coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) cases in countries with ongoing humanitarian crises or better understand risks to the Sustainable Development Goals (Global Pulse). United Nations agencies have also used biometric identification to manage humanitarian logistics and refugee claims. For example, Population Registration and Identity Management Ecosystem (PRIMES) was launched in 2018 by UNHCR to provide a centralised platform for the management of refugee data. By the end of 2018, the biometrics of 7.1 million refugees were managed by the platform (UNHCR, 2019). The World Food Programme (WFP) has also used biometric identification in aid distribution to refugees, coming under some criticism in 2019 for its use of this technology in Yemen (Raftree and Steinacker, 2019). In parallel, however, the organisation has begun partnering with private companies that provide advanced analytical services. A notable example is the WFP, that in 2019 signed a USD45-million-dollar contract with Palantir, an American firm which specialised in data collection and AI modelling (Greenwood, 2019). In 2014, the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) awarded a USD20 billion-dollar contract to Palantir, to track undocumented immigrants in the United States (Woodman, 2017). Their methodology was a classic case of what is called the ‘Mosaic Effect’, which is a technique used by intelligence agencies, which involves using multiple data sources to find personally identifiable information that might otherwise have been obscured. This technique is discussed in some detail by OCHA (OCHA 2021c), which explains that these databases can be used to reidentify highly vulnerable populations such as migrants to expel them from an area, recruit children for warfare, or otherwise threaten their safety. Palantir used this technique as part of its ICE contract by collecting and centralising large numbers of databases to reveal the location of migrants, leading to their eventual expulsion. Several human rights watchdogs, however, including Amnesty International, have raised concerns about Palantir, writing in a September 2020 report that: ‘Given Palantir's increasingly entrenched role in government operations and its multiple contracts across federal agencies, concerns about its human rights record are growing in urgency and deserve scrutiny’ (Amnesty International, 2020).

#### The UN can create ethical standards that globally build trust

Fournier-Tombs ’21 (Eleonore, data scientist, researcher and author at United Nations University Institute Macau, “Towards a United Nations Internal Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, Published August 30, 2021, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211039493)

Ethical frameworks and best practices As we have seen, just like most AI initiatives developed in recent years globally, this work has happened largely without regulatory oversight. However, there have been many attempts within the organisation to set up ethical modes of operation, as well as to influence AI ethics globally. For example, OCHA's Peer Review Framework sets out a method for overseeing the technical development and implementation of AI models (OCHA, 2021b). Its objective is to provide a method for the review of models developed by humanitarian organisations by peers in the same sector, thereby providing a layer of validation that might hitherto not have existed. While there is no legal obligation for developers working with vulnerable populations to use it, it does attempt to increase accountability and transparency of models, in the hope of attenuating its risks and building trust ITU has also sought to encourage ethical uses of AI through its yearly conference entitled *AI for Good*, which is specifically oriented towards uses of AI that promote the Sustainable Development Goals. Several of *AI for Good* talks listed for 2021 address the ethics of AI use in specific cases, such as democratic participation or self-driving cars. However, the approach appears more focused on promoting implementations that drive sustainable development, rather than mitigating their possible risks (ITU, 2021). Finally, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has done considerable work in AI ethics, notably by convening intergovernmental meetings since 2019 to articulate a recommendation on the ethics of AI. The 2020 draft of this document focuses on values, such as transparency, gender equity, human rights and fairness, among others. While different from the European Commission's risks-based approach, this is certainly aligned with other United Nations documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Like the various United Nations Conventions, this document is therefore aimed at Member States, and could possibly inform the future United Nations convention on AI (UNESCO, 2020). Going a step further than the recommendation, the convention would be voluntarily ratified by Member States, who would then commit to following its principles in their own jurisdictions. Even without a convention, the United Nations would certainly have an incentive to apply internally its own recommendations to Member States. As such, the UNESCO work, along with other efforts of the ITU, OCHA and other agencies, can certainly be seen as building blocks towards a regulatory framework. However, without legal backing, they are not sufficient to ensure the safety of AI technologies as they are currently being used. Regulation to build trust in implementations In addition, the lack of AI regulation at the United Nations can be considered a barrier for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. While some systems, such as the OCHA-Bucky Model, which predicted COVID-19 cases in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan, have been deployed for humanitarian use (OCHA, 2021d); others appear not to have been integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia (UNHCR, 2021). According to the project's public-facing website, the tool has not been updated since 2019. Several of the numerous proof-of-concept projects developed by the UN Global Pulse have also not been deployed into production (Global Pulse Lab, 2021). One of the most important difficulties in deploying these solutions is related to trust, both in terms of internal adoption of the tools by decision makers, as well as acceptance by the target populations. Trust in artificial intelligence systems is notoriously difficult to obtain, particularly in the work in which the United Nations engages, which is highly political and impacts very vulnerable populations. Some of the attempts at promoting transparency in AI, such as the OCHA Peer Review Framework, can be seen as a way to build trust. In fact, there have been other similar initiatives outside of the United Nations, such as Datasheets for Datasets (Gebru et al., 2018) and Model Cards for Model Reporting (Mitchell et al., 2019), as well as IBM's AI Factsheet, which provide tools for technical developers to explain their technologies, and therefore increase public trust in them. As explained by Aicardi et al. (2021), transparency is the most prevalent principle included in AI ethics. In the EU Guidelines on AI, which served to inform the 2021 regulation, transparency is listed as one of the ‘seven requirements in the realisation of a trustworthy AI.’ Rossi (2019) describes lack of trust as one of the key obstacles to the adoption of AI systems, regardless of the potential benefit. The onus has largely been on the technical developers of these tools, such as data scientists, computer scientists and engineers, to develop the credibility of their tools. While the United Nations has invested, and continues to invest, large amounts of money into research labs and private partnerships, unless it is able to build internal and external trust in them, it will also face important barriers in their implementation. A regulatory framework like the one proposed by the European Commission, however, especially with an authorisation procedure like the one described for high-risk activities, would take the pressure off technology developers in the humanitarian sector to individually justify their activities to decision-makers. Instead, agencies or research labs who wanted to develop an AI solution would work towards authorisation, likely quelling many internal doubts as to the effectiveness, safety and accuracy of their system. Given the powerful nature of AI, the risks of research and development initiatives and the threat of unregulated public–private partnerships, an internal, enforceable United Nations regulation on AI is highly recommended. An UN-wide AI regulation would not only protect the risks posed by the technologies to the mission itself of the organisation, but it would also build trust in those applications that are actually supporting its work. This is an opportunity to concretise the efforts of the organisation in AI ethics and best practices, as well as further demonstrate its leadership on an issue of global importance.

#### The creates an IIGO which solves best

Erdélyi and Goldsmith ‘18 (Olivia, faculty of Law at University of Canterbury and Judy, faculty at University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Proposal for a Global Situation, Published February 2018, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3278721.3278731)

International institutions are the prevalent vehicles of international cooperation in our interconnected world. When a critical mass of states and/or non-state actors feel that transnational cooperation is necessary to solve a problem that is impossible to tackle by isolated national measures, they establish a new IGO or NGO for that particular purpose. Based on legal and international relations definitions in circulation — see [9, 14, 18] — we define an IGO as a formal entity (1) established by an international agreement governed by international law; (2) with at least three (sometimes two) members — typically states but increasingly also IGOs; and (3) having at least one organ with a will distinct from that of its members. FIGOs’ organizational purpose is laid down in a binding international agreement such as a treaty or a formal legal act of another IGO, their membership is clearly defined in the founding legal act, and they have a permanent and significant institutionalization in place. By contrast, IIGOs operate based on an explicitly shared, but informal expectation about purpose, their membership is not always clear, as members are explicitly associated but only by non-legal mutual acknowledgment, and they do not possess any significant institutionalization. NGOs differ from IGOs in that they are not created by treaty — meaning they are governed by national rather than international law — and their membership is made up of non-state actors. Given the severity and global nature of AI’s anticipated impact on humanity, we expect it to join the long line of issue areas requiring interstate cooperation, raising the question of establishing an IGO at some point in the future. Against this background, we propose the creation of the IAIO as a new IGO, which could initially serve as a focal point of policy debates on AI-related matters and — given sufficient international support — acquire increasing role in their regulation over time. We start by determining the degree of desired institutional formalization by examining, in turn, the six above elaborated tradeoffs in relation to AI.

Binding commitment vs. flexible cooperation arrangements: As pointed out earlier, AI will fundamentally transform human society worldwide. Since this process of transformation is likely to be inescapable for any single state, states will probably wish to cooperate sincerely. Also, violations will be difficult to detect as keeping pace with technological innovation will require considerable technical expertise and capacities, presumably exceeding especially weaker countries’ capabilities and evoking severe power asymmetries. While apart from this latter circumstance, these factors speak for hard legal commitments, it must be kept in mind that AI research and AI-human interactions are relatively young phenomena and their novelty severely restricts our ability to anticipate the spectrum and extent of the impending changes, let alone the dimension of the problems they will raise. Many AI instantiations encroach on our most basic rights, pose an existential threat, or bring up profound ethical and social questions, not to mention that they will utterly and completely upset our legal system. So, we are looking at heated debates among radically diverse parties over a variety of uncertain issues, which may change in rapid and currently unimaginable ways — conditions that, based on past experience, do not exactly favor international consensus. Therefore, we need all the flexibility we can get to acquire familiarity with the issues at hand, sort out differences, and establish common ground, before we can contemplate drawing up a more binding framework for cooperation. Delegation/high sovereignty costs vs. state autonomy/low sovereignty costs: Weaponized AI technologies and certain data mining practices are clearly relevant for national security. As this is a sensitive issue area involving particularly high sovereignty costs, at least initially, states will show reluctance to give up and delegate decisionmaking authority to the IAIO. On the long run, however, powerful collective oversight and enforcement mechanisms will probably be indispensable in order to curb incentives for violations and opportunistic behavior, which should otherwise be high in light of the major shifts in international power constellations triggered by changes in countries’ competitive positions. Also, domestic AI policies will produce significant externalities, affecting other countries. Based on this analysis, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a highly institutionalized organization with binding legislative, dispute resolution, and enforcement authority would be better suited as new international AI regulator. Nevertheless, the political reality remains that until sufficient clarity is reached on the IAIO’s precise purpose, membership, the issues to regulate, and the broad directions to follow, international consensus supporting such a high degree of institutionalization is off the table. Collective control of information vs. close control of information: History shows that states are generally cautious about sharing information on fate-changing technologies, which speaks for close control of information with respect to AI. However, if and when we manage to gather consensus for hard legal commitments (e.g., treaty on certain AI applications), we will probably need to be more forthcoming with certain information to ensure compliance with those instruments. This is again a strong argument in favor of starting cooperation on AI regulation in a softer institutional framework and using soft law instruments, although a move towards harder legalization seems to be desirable over time.

#### The counterplan models existing IIGOs and centralizes global AI policy

Erdélyi and Goldsmith ‘18 (Olivia, faculty of Law at University of Canterbury and Judy, faculty at University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Proposal for a Global Situation, Published February 2018, Accessed 7/13/2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3278721.3278731)

Low long-term transaction costs vs. low initial contracting costs: International discussions on AI are just beginning and powerful states will likely have divergent preferences with respect to the regulation of this high-impact field. Compounded with the difficulties discussed in the context of previous tradeoffs, this makes the prospect of reaching a workable international consensus on the short term rather remote. Yet crucially, swift regulatory response is imperative to prevent proliferating unregulated AI applications from causing social harm and to ensure that the opportunity presented by the rise of AI is harvested to humanity’s benefit rather than detriment — an aim best facilitated by lowering initial contracting costs with soft legalization and low institutional formalization. This is not to say that the idea of setting up a more robust regulatory framework with standard operating procedures should be abandoned. On the contrary, such a step has merit but only at a later stage, in possession of sufficient expertise and political consensus to better assess the implications of various policy options and formulate informed policy recommendations. Complex centralized administration vs. minimalistic administrative functions: Similar considerations apply as far as the level of administrative sophistication of the IAIO is concerned. In the initial stage of determining the purpose of the organization, its membership, the issues that need to be regulated, and the backbone of its regulatory agenda, less is probably more. Later, with perhaps binding legal instruments governing selected aspects of AI for a wide membership, work will get more complex, requiring stronger oversight, dispute resolution, and enforcement mechanisms as well as more powerful bureaucratic functions to service them. Routine management vs. crisis/uncertainty management: In view of AI’s novelty, extreme complexity, unforeseeable evolution, and the controversies it is expected to elicit among a very heterogeneous circle of members, we are up against managing an extraordinarily uncertain issue area. Consequently, we need time and soft legalization’s flexibility to establish commonly shared ideas, interests, cooperation mechanisms, and solutions, which can then form the basis of more formalized cooperation arrangements in the future. In summary, at least initially, the IAIO should start out as an IIGO displaying a relatively low level of institutional formality and using soft law instruments, such as non-binding recommendations, guidelines, and standards, to support national policymakers in the conception and design of AI-related regulatory policies. Its interim goal should be to galvanize international cooperation in this domain as early as possible, before states develop their own, diverging policies, which may be hard to rescind without political damage. Whether the international community wishes to move towards more formalized cooperation at some point in the future, remains to be seen. Sometimes informality turns out to be the key to an organization’s success. This seems to be the case with the Bank of International Settlements especially during its initial years of operation and World War II, or the BCBS and the different GGroups at present [2]. Another common trajectory is when initially informal arrangements turn into formal frameworks of cooperation. A case in point is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) gradual transformation into the WTO [1]. Finally, there are examples for remarkably successful, sustained, complementary, and mutually beneficial cooperation between several organizations of varying institutional formality in the same issue area. This sort of relationship is characteristic for the IMF and various G-Groups in financial regulation, or the Australia Group (AG), an IIGO, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a FIGO, in the regulation of chemical and biological weapons [18]. Our excursus in the domain of international lawmaking shows that beyond the optimal level of legalization and institutional formality, the IAIO must fulfill a number of more subtle requirements to be perceived as a fair and legitimate regulator. While leaving the elaboration of details to future research, we would like to stress the importance of two points: (1) including an interdisciplinary mix of experts (with, e.g., AI, legal, political, and ethics background) in the initial deliberations related to the IAIO’s establishment, modus operandi, and regulatory agenda, and (2) conducting regular, largescale consultation processes with a diverse spectrum of interested stakeholders from public sector, industry, and academia, to ensure due consideration of all relevant perspectives

## EU CP

#### The European Union should [plan]

#### The EU has collaborated on AI initiatives before, the counterplan solves---but the EU still has a long way to go

Andrés ’22 (Moisés, Lawyer of the Council of State , Professor of Digital Law at the Carlos III University of Madrid, “Towards legal regulation of artificial intelligence”, Published 3/14/2022, Accessed 7/13/2022, http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#aff1)

The European Union has launched several initiatives aimed at developing a comprehensive AI strategy, including its regulation. The three key documents in this regard are the General Data Protection Regulation[5](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn5) (GDPR), the European Parliament’s Resolution of February 2017 on Civil Laws for Robotics[6](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn6), and the Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI produced by the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence[7](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn7) (AI HLEG), a final version of which was presented in April 2019.

Although the GDPR was not aimed specifically at AI, its provisions nevertheless appear likely to have fairly drastic effects on the industry even beyond what its drafters might have intended.[8](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn8) The GDPR extends the scope of EU data protection law to all foreign companies processing data of EU residents. The GDPR is intertwined with AI for several reasons, including that it requires a certain amount of explanation, which can be challenging with “black box” AI systems. Article 22 GDPR stipulates that: “*In particular, the controller must allow for a human intervention and the right for individuals to express their point of view, to obtain further information about the decision that has been reached on the basis of this automated processing, and the right to contest this decision.***”** The European Parliament’s Resolution of February 2017 on Civil Laws for Robotics includes thought-provoking content, but it has not yet created binding law; instead it was merely a recommendation to the Commission for future action. Specifically, it is the preparatory document for the drafting of a Directive concerning civil-law rules on robotics. The results and a summary of this consultation were made available in a later report published in October 2017. Meanwhile, the European Parliament voted on the resolution in February 2017 to regulate the development of AI and robotics throughout the European Union. The Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2018-2019 also named data protection, digital rights, and ethical standards in artificial intelligence and robotics as priorities. Taking up the European Parliament’s appeal to create binding legislation, the European Commission issued a call in March 2018 for a High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), which, according to the Commission, “*will serve as the steering group for the European AI Alliance’s work, interact with other initiatives, help stimulate a multi-stakeholder dialogue, gather participants’ views and reflect them in its analysis and reports.***”** The work of the AI HLEG includes “propos[ing] to the Commission AI ethics guidelines, covering issues such as fairness, safety, transparency, the future of work, democracy and more broadly the impact on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, including privacy and personal data protection, dignity, consumer protection and non-discrimination.”[9](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn9) An initial version of the guidelines was published on 18 December 2018 and the experts presented their final version[10](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn10) to the Commission in April 2019 after extensive consultation throughout the European AI Alliance. Based on fundamental rights and ethical principles, the document lists seven key requirements that relevant systems should meet in order to be trustworthy. Aiming to operationalise these requirements, an assessment list is presented to provide guidance on the requirements’ practical implementation. This assessment list will undergo a piloting process to which all interested stakeholders can participate. The objective is to then bring Europe’s ethical approach to the global stage. The Commission is opening up cooperation to all non-EU countries that are willing to share the same values. In April 2018, 25 EU countries signed a joint declaration of cooperation on AI, the terms of which included a commitment to “[e]xchange views on ethical and legal frameworks related to AI in order to ensure responsible AI deployment”[11](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn11). Subsequently, on 25 April 2018, the European Commission adopted a Communication on Artificial Intelligence for Europe[12](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn12) laying down the European approach to take utmost advantage of the opportunities offered by AI and address the new corresponding challenges of AI. In 2019, the Commission developed and made available the Guidance on the interpretation of the Product Liability Directive to prepare its reform in 2020. Also, on 7 December 2018, the Commission submitted a Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence[13](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn13), accompanied by the Coordinated Plan on the Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence Made in Europe - 2018 prepared by Member States (as part of the Group on digitizing European industry and Artificial Intelligence), Norway, Switzerland, and the Commission. Next, on 19 February 2020, the European Commission published a White Paper[14](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn14) aiming to foster a European ecosystem of excellence and trust in AI and a Report on the safety and liability aspects of AI.[15](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-21472021000200035#fn15) The White Paper proposes measures that will streamline research, foster collaboration between Member States and increase investment into AI development and deployment. It also proposes policy options for an imminent EU regulatory framework that would determine the types of legal requirements that would apply to relevant actors, with a particular focus on high-risk applications. Finally, on 20 October 2020, the European Parliament has approved three resolutions that analyze how the European Union understands that different matters affected by Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be regulated, while promoting innovation, ethical standards and confidence in this technology. These resolutions analyze (i) the intellectual property rights for the development of AI technologies (supporting an effective system to guarantee them and to safeguard the European patent standards); (ii) the civil liability regime in matters of AI (a regulatory framework is proposed to guarantee the strict liability of the operators of “high risk” AI systems in case of damages); and (iii) certain ethical aspects of AI, robotics and related technologies (having as a key guiding principle the human control and centrality). Despite these encouraging signs and laudable intentions, the EU’s regulatory agenda remains at a nascent stage.